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FREEDOM ON TRIAL IN THE NAME OF PEACE

I Mara Steven

"We saw all these people behind the fence, looking out, hanging onto the wire, and looking out because they were anxious to know who was coming in. But I will never forget the shocking feeling that human beings were behind this fence like animals [crying]. And we were going to also lose our freedom and walk inside of that gate and find ourselves . . . cooped up there . . . when the gates were shut, we knew that we had lost something that was very precious; that we were no longer free."¹ The words of Mary Tsukamoto echo the feelings of desperation and helplessness felt by Americans displaced to internment camps for no reason other than their ancestry during World War II. A young American citizen, Yuriko Hohri, recounts the chilling story of how the FBI ransacked her house, searching for something they never found. She and her family were loaded onto freight trains, carrying them to a camp that had no bathroom facilities. All they had with them was a washcloth and some soap. Early every night, there was a check to make sure that all the prisoners were securely in their quarters.² Hohri, Tsukamoto, and others were not granted due process of law before their imprisonment, a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. It was a time of war, and constitutional rights were suspended in the name of peace. One man, Fred Korematsu, refused to undergo this humiliation and abandon his home. In what would come to be known as a landmark case, *Korematsu v. United States* challenged the very framework of the country. Freedom was put on trial, and it lost. The judicial legitimization of the Japanese Internment set a dangerous precedent for unconstitutional removal of rights, one that would transcend time.

Tension had long existed between the Japanese and the United States prior to World War II. From immigration policies to foreign affairs, the relationship between the two nations was less than congenial. A decade prior to the turn of century, approximately 3,000 Japanese immigrants were residing in the United States. In the next ten years, this number rose exponentially to reach 27,000 immigrants. By 1908, 127,000 Japanese immigrants were permanently residing in the United States.³ This influx of immigration arose out of a basic need for work; in America, jobs were plentiful and paid well in comparison to Asian standards. This period of time saw a large increase of Chinese and Japanese immigration for this reason. These people saw America as a land of opportunity. Work that was, in the eyes of the Americans, undesirable was eagerly snapped up by Asians whose low wages would provide for a family much more easily than would the income of a comparable job in China or Japan. Consequently, aliens poured through the harbors of the West Coast, finding homes in many cities of California. This mass immigration was not, however, appreciated by the Americans already residing in these communities. The competition for work, added to the extant anti-foreign sentiment of the time, produced disgruntled Americans who would rather see their new neighbors pack up to go back home. Headlines voicing disgust soon littered newspapers. Some illustrated the fear that Asian immigrants were usurping American jobs:

The Yellow Peril – How Japanese crowd out the White Race⁴

Others reflected the racism that white men were not so ashamed to hide:

Japanese a Menace to American Women

Brown Men an Evil in the Public Schools⁵

The disapproval, resentment, and anger finally mounted to such heights that in 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated a Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan. This agreement provided that Japan would desist in issuing passports to laborers with the understanding that the United States would not enact any anti-Japanese Immigration legislation. This agreement proved effective and was followed; by 1920 the number of Japanese Immigrants living on American soil had fallen to 118,000.⁶ The anti-foreign sentiment remained, though, and the immigrants who were willing to work for lower wages were still heavily disdained.

When Japan began assaulting China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the United States rose to aid them. Soon after, the United States imposed an embargo on oil to Japan. Japan relied on eighty percent of its oil supply from the United States; the tension between the two countries needed to be resolved so that Japan could retain its power. No peaceful negotiations were reached, however, and Japan turned toward bellicose solutions.⁷ On the morning of December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor. More than 2400 Americans were killed in the fiery assault, with half as many more wounded. Now the United States no longer had any choice but to enter into the war as retaliation for this violent onslaught. But as troops began to assemble to meet the Japanese on the Pacific Ocean, conflict was brewing within the borders of the United States as well. While soldiers were gearing up for combat, FBI agents were preparing themselves for cutthroat investigations. December 8 marked not only the day of declaration of war against Japan, but also the first steps taken against people of Japanese descent within the country. On this day, the Department of Justice closed the United States land borders to all aliens and also to "all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizen or alien."⁸

This initial step, however, was nothing compared with what was about to come. Within short order, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. This order "authoriz(ed) the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas," for such people deemed a threat to national security.⁹ In the end, this affected about 120,000 Japanese-Americans across the United States. The people affected were resident aliens as well as American citizens. However, it is curious to note that the Order did not pertain exclusively to Japanese-Americans. The order called specifically to intern "any and all persons" whom General DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command and later assigned to the task of internment by Secretary Stimson, thought posed a threat to national security.¹⁰ As historian Roger Daniels noted, "the leader of the nation was, in the final analysis, responsible . . . Why? Probably for two reasons: in the first place, it was expedient; in the second place, Roosevelt himself harbored deeply felt anti-Japanese prejudices."¹¹

The entire issue began when General Dewitt became commander of the Western Defense Command. He feared an attack upon California, having heard of supposed air raids in San Francisco. As a safety precaution, he moved the Rose Bowl from Pasadena, California to North Carolina. When speaking with President Roosevelt early in 1942, he reported that Japanese Americans had taken no adverse action. However, to him this meant "a disturbing and confirming indication that such action *will* be taken."¹² Consequently, he recommended that the President issue an order calling for the removal of people in question from the western states. Since the nation itself was also pre-inclined against Japanese, the president acted in the way that he thought would be best for, and consistent with the opinion of, the citizens of the country as a whole. As historian Wendy Ng explains, ". . . as president, Roosevelt's responsibility was to bring a sense of nationhood and calm as the nation entered the international region of war, and in

dealing with the domestic crisis brought about by the distrust of people of Japanese ancestry." Because of this, "he did little as a national leader to protect the rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens and residents."¹³ Like most other Americans, Roosevelt and his advisors believed firmly that the Japanese could not be trusted and posed a significant threat to the safety of the nation due to old prejudice; for this reason, President Roosevelt signed off on the order.

. . . by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.¹⁴

Soon the walls of cities across the west coast were papered with exclusion orders. On March 21, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 3 required that "all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry" currently residing in military areas recognize a curfew from eight o'clock at night until six o'clock in the morning.¹⁵ Though this restriction was drafted to ensure that Japanese could not convene and share treasonous information, it was later deemed that this restriction was not broad enough to effectively prevent such behavior. Consequently on May 3 of the same year, General DeWitt issued Exclusion Order No. 34, ordering people of Japanese descent, citizen or not, to vacate Military Area No. 1 and report to internment stations.¹⁶ It guaranteed that no espionage or subversive action could occur unseen. Subsequent to the order, all persons of Japanese ancestry were obligated to check in to assembly centers, where they would wait until transported to permanent relocation facilities. Families reluctantly abandoned their homes, their lives, not knowing when or if they would be permitted to return. One man, Fred Korematsu, refused to evacuate his hometown, San Leandro, which was within the exclusion area. He asserted that the order was decreed at a time when a threat of rebellious action on the West Coast no longer existed. As such, the order violated the rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁷ After the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Korematsu faced the Supreme Court.

This was not the first time courts ruled on questions of judicial manifestations of anti-Asian sentiment; in fact, there are many precedents for racial exclusion supported by the courts. The Fourteenth Amendment was applied in 1886 in the case of *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*. Six years previously, the California legislature had passed Order No. 156, a statute intended to interfere with the livelihood of Chinese immigrants by stipulating strict guidelines under which a laundry facility may be operated.¹⁸ When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, they determined that such legislation was a direct infringement of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁹ Another case arose in 1898 when San Francisco native, Wong Kim Ark, applied for re-entry into the country through customs after a visit to China. Ark was denied entry under the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which barred Chinese natives from immigration into the United States. Ark challenged his case on the grounds of habeas corpus and the Fourteenth Amendment and appeared before the Supreme Court. Justice Horace Gray's majority opinion revealed that Ark, subsequent to *jus soli*, was indeed a citizen of the United States and was allowed entry into the country.²⁰ History reveals that the Supreme Courts ruled favorably and justly in both of these cases. However, they are significant in that they existed in the first place. The prejudice against Asians immigrating to the west coast was so great that it was necessary for such cases to climb

their way up through the legal system to reach the highest court in the country.

Although previous cases had been decided in favor of the wrongfully convicted, heightening tensions led to different results as time passed. As the United States entered into war against the Japanese, the country, including the courts, was geared toward condemning those of the same race as the enemy. Korematsu was not the first to violate an order stemming from Executive Order 9066. In May of 1943, Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi was targeted by the Department of Justice to provide a favorable precedent for the cases they expected to counter the Executive Order. Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted for violating the Act of March 21, 1942.²¹ Believing that the Act countered his rights as an American citizen, he appealed his conviction; after moving through appeals, the case reached the Supreme Court. The attorneys of the United States argued that the Act necessarily restricted the rights of those of Japanese ancestry due to the recent history of Pearl Harbor. Chief Justice Harlan Stone's opinion issued the decision that the act was a necessary product of wartime regulation, and was neither unconstitutional nor unduly discriminated against Hirabayashi on a racial basis.²² The case of *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* was cited to prove a non-racial basis; the opinion affirmed that "distinctions between citizens solely based because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection."²³ This decision was published on the same day as that of *Yasui v. United States*, which also upheld the legitimacy of the Act of March 21, 1942.²⁴

Soon the Exclusion Order escalated the degree of restrictions placed upon Japanese Americans. Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was arrested on May 30, 1942, for refusing to leave the exclusion area. Soon after, Ernest Besig, the director of the northern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter ACLU), approached Korematsu and proposed that he volunteer his case to test the constitutional legality of internment. It is interesting to note that the ACLU did not completely support this constitutional challenge. Many of the members were politically close to Roosevelt, and they did not want their actions to be taken as insubordination.²⁵ Nevertheless, Korematsu agreed, believing "people should have a fair trial and a chance to defend their loyalty at court in a democratic way, because in this situation, people were placed in imprisonment without any fair trial."²⁶ Korematsu was tried on June 12 and arraigned six days later. He was detained at the Presidio in San Francisco until September 8, 1942, when he was convicted for violating Public Law No. 503 in federal court.²⁷ Korematsu was then transported to the Central Utah War Relocation Center, where he lived in a horse stall in which the only amenity was a single light bulb. Korematsu thought that even "jail was better than this."²⁸ The United States Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, and Korematsu appealed again to the United States Supreme Court.

Since three months had passed since the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the issuance of Exclusion Order No. 34, Korematsu's attorneys argued that there was no longer a clear and present threat of danger by people of Japanese ancestry. The defense maintained that the exclusion was created on military recommendation and therefore reflected an actual threat of danger on the west coast. Thus the act was justified in contradicting the constitution, as it was a military necessity to ensure the safety of the rest of the nation. Taking both arguments into consideration, Chief Justice Hugo Black's majority opinion affirmed the constitutionality of the order, stating, "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt

constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this."²⁹ Furthermore, Black clarified that the court could not use the power of hindsight to declare that, since the situation had since been resolved, it was unnecessary at the time. However, it should be emphasized that the decision was not unanimous. Justice Frank Murphy later wrote that he believed the decision "fell into the ugly abyss of racism."³⁰ Another judge, Justice Robert Jackson, dissented on more legal grounds, saying that, though the military is justified in making unconstitutional decisions and orders during times of war, it is not the job of a court of law to endorse this decision.³¹ Nonetheless, the case was lost, and the removal of rights in question was sanctioned by the highest court of law in the United States. This was thus a landmark case of the time in that it authorized the imprisonment of law-abiding American citizens without due process of law and recognition of their constitutional rights.

Though common government regulation is necessarily suspended during times of war to make way for the results of hard decisions, the measures taken to ensure national security with the imprisonment of Japanese immigrants and Japanese-American citizens during World War II went too far and unnecessarily suspended basic rights. Indeed, one of Korematsu's attorneys believed that "history teaches that we tend to sacrifice civil liberties too quickly based on claims of military necessity and national security."³² The Japanese Internment has since been condemned as a dark mistake in our history. In June, 1983, a Redress Commission drafted five remedies for the past: one, a formal apology; two, pardons for all those interned previously; three, restoration of entitlements; four, funds provided for teaching what had happened to present-day generations; and five, awarding \$20,000 to those having been incarcerated.³³ But the question remains as to whether or not the United States has verily remedied this problem. Dr. Scott Michaelson argues that racial discrimination in United States legislation is the rule and unfortunately not the exception.³⁴ The same principles, he affirms, are found in the 2001 PATRIOT Act. Like the writing of the Executive Order after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President George Bush issued the PATRIOT Act after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. The PATRIOT Act created several procedures, such as "sneak and peak" warrants, that allowed the government to circumvent constitutional provisions in the name of preventing alleged terrorism. Though which race is discriminated against changes, the basic trend of discrimination has transcended time. Thus, citizens of the United States must be vigilant to learn the lessons that history has taught us and correct our society, which has been plagued with uncontested racial tensions and the unconstitutional revocation of rights in the name of peace.

NOTES

1. "Daily Life in the Internment Camps," Our Story, <http://americanhistory.si.edu/ourstory/activities/internment/more.html> (accessed March 24, 2012).
2. Studs Terkel, *The Good War* (The New Press, 1997), 33-5.
3. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 8.
4. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 10.

5. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 10.
6. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 8.
7. Historian Charles Maechling, Jr, interprets this embargo as the direct cause for United States involvement in World War II. Charles Maechling, Jr, "Pearl Harbor The First Energy War.," *History Today* 50, no. 12 (December 2000). America: History & Life, EBSCOhost.
8. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 27.
9. Roosevelt. United States. Executive Order 9066. 1942.
10. Japan was not the only country attacking the United States during this period. Germany in particular, along with Italy, also was a main aggressor during the war. There were, naturally, citizens of these nationalities living within the United States as well. And the order did affect some citizens and resident aliens from Germany and Italy who were interned during this period as well. However, the number of people of both ethnic groups combined only amounted to about 8,000 people. This sizeable difference in number proves the stark mistrust and racism against Asian Americans rather than white, or European Americans.
11. Wendy Ng, *Japanese American Internment During World War II: A History and Reference Guide* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2002), 28.
12. David Stafford, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets* (Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc. 1999), 151.
13. Wendy Ng, *Japanese American Internment During World War II: A History and Reference Guide* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2002), 29.
14. Roosevelt. United States. Executive Order 9066. 1942.
15. 320 U.S. 81; 63 S. Ct. 1375; 87 L. Ed. 1774; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1109. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/03/10.
16. 323 U.S. 214; 65 S. Ct. 193; 89 L. Ed. 194; 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1341. Date Accessed: 2012/03/9. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
17. **Section 1.** All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
18. SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful, from and after the passage of this order, for any person or persons to establish, maintain, or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city and county of San Francisco without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.
- SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, build, or maintain, or cause to be erected, built, or maintained, over or upon the roof of any building now erected or which may hereafter be erected within the limits of said city and county, any scaffolding without first obtaining the written permission of the board of supervisors, which permit shall state fully for what purpose said scaffolding is to be erected and used, and such scaffolding shall not be used for any other purpose than that designated in such permit.
- SEC. 3. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this order shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
19. 118 U.S. 356; 6 S. Ct. 1064; 30 L. Ed. 220; 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1938. Date Accessed: 2012/03/14. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
20. [Latin "right of the soil"] The rule that a child's citizenship is determined by the place of birth Bryan A. Garner, ed., *Black's Law Dictionary*, 9th ed. (St. Paul: Thomas Reuters, 2004), s.v. "jus soli"
21. * * * whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a

- misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.
- The Act of March 21, 1942
56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C.A. 97a.
22. 320 U.S. 81; 63 S. Ct. 1375; 87 L. Ed. 1774; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1109. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/03/10.
 23. 320 U.S. 81; 63 S. Ct. 1375; 87 L. Ed. 1774; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1109. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2012/03/10.
 24. 320 U.S. 115; 63 S. Ct. 1392; 87 L. Ed. 1793; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 461. Date Accessed: 2012/04/12. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
 25. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 65.
 26. Steven A. Chin, *When Justice Failed: The Fred Korematsu Story*, ed. Alex Haley (Raintree, 1992), 67-68.
 27. This law stated that any violation of any act or order stemming from Executive Order 9066 was a criminal act.
 28. Steven A. Chin, *When Justice Failed: The Fred Korematsu Story*, ed. Alex Haley (Raintree, 1992), 70.
 29. 323 U.S. 214; 65 S. Ct. 193; 89 L. Ed. 194; 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1341. Date Accessed: 2012/03/9. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
 30. 323 U.S. 214; 65 S. Ct. 193; 89 L. Ed. 194; 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1341. Date Accessed: 2012/03/9. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
 31. 323 U.S. 214; 65 S. Ct. 193; 89 L. Ed. 194; 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1341. Date Accessed: 2012/03/9. <http://www.lexisnexus.com/hottopics/inacademic>.
 32. Joan Biskupic, "Prisoners Test Legal Limits of War On Terror," *USA Today*, April 4, 2004. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-18-scotus-terror_x.htm (accessed March 6, 2012).
 33. Roger Daniels, *Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 98.
 34. Scott Michaelson, "Between Japanese American Internment and the USA PATRIOT Act: The Borderlands and the Permanent State of Racial Exception." *Aztlan* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 87-111. America: History & Life, EBSCOhost (accessed March 18, 2012).

**LIPSTICK AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT:
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN, 1979 – 2012**

| *Marlee Clayton*

Abstract

Since the 1979 Revolution, women's rights activists in Iran have adhered to the tenets and methods of either Islamic feminism or secular feminism. First the subordinate status of women in Iranian society and the practices and institutions that perpetuate this subordination will be examined. Then the beliefs of Islamic and secular feminists will be clarified as well as the groups' public action in contemporary Iran. Finally, the importance of the unification of the feminist movement for the future will be emphasized, leading to the point that the feminist movement serves as a vital part of the greater democratic movement in Iran today.

Introduction

Few feminists in Western society can claim that they have sacrificed their homes, well being, and lives for their belief in gender equality; the opposite is true of Iranian feminists today. Feminists have resisted against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which demarcates women as second-class citizens. The continuation and relative success of the feminist movement in an environment openly hostile to its existence marks Iranian activists as especially remarkable.

Iranian women's rights activists since the 1979 Revolution have split between two general tendencies: Islamic feminism or secular feminism. These tendencies can be better understood by first briefly surveying the women's movement in Iran until 1979 and how women's place in society changed after the revolution. The principles of the two feminist groups will be analyzed by mostly using the observations of scholars from both sides. Secular feminism connects more to the greater movement and beliefs of global feminism, and thus more attention will be paid to the tenets of Islamic feminism.

I contend that the two feminist camps, although possessing divergent objectives and strategies, are not irreconcilable. Their paths have different benefits and disadvantages, but the combination of their strengths and activists will ultimately improve women's rights. The suppression of women acts as part of the Islamic Republic's overall interference with political and social freedoms. The feminist movement remains vital as part of the larger democratic movement and as a means to erode patriarchy in Iran.

History of Women's Movement in Iran

Iranian women's issues have developed over many decades, influenced by revolutions and government policies. It remains important to mention these beginnings to help understand the current place of feminism in Iranian society. The women's movement in Iran began after the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, spurred by the widespread sentiments of nationalism, patriotism

and democracy.¹ After Reza Shah officially seized power in 1925, the woman question was adopted as a matter of state concern, and any subsequent reform in the favor of women was implemented top-down. The second Pahlavi monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah, ruled much like his father and even stepped beyond the bounds of autocracy and state-instituted reform. Women in his regime gained the right to vote, the right to enter into elections, greater divorce rights, and other civil rights. Women, both secular and religious, included some of the most vocal participants in the Revolution in 1979.²

It was only after Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in the Islamic Republic of Iran that women were stripped of many of the rights won in the previous decades. The new constitution and *fatwas*, or religious edicts, by the Supreme Leader and his supporters created direct and indirect obstacles to the fulfillment of civil rights.³ The Islamic government used the Iran-Iraq war, from 1980 to 1988, to justify its harsh suppression of political dissidents, including women's rights activists. Activists like Mehrangiz Kar see feminist tribulations as part of a larger battle for free speech that is the paramount challenge faced by all Iranian people.⁴

Iranian Women Today

In Iranian society today, both men and women suffer from a lack of rights and the crippling suppression of dissent. Women suffer doubly; they are subjugated for the mere fact that they are women. The nation's laws are explicit in their allowance of the abuse of women's rights. The lack of rights supposedly occurs in the name of Islam, but critics of the regime accuse the government of reinforcing and exacerbating the social code of patriarchy under the pretense of having religious sanction.⁵ In her discussion of Islamic societies, Leila Ahmed argues that women are the focal point of Islamist's political agendas. She states that widespread frustration, often concerning economic matters, contributes to the rise of Islamic groups to power. The group in power then pacifies the male population by restricting women's rights and giving the men more control over their wives and daughters, women who the man perceives as belonging to him.⁶ The Iranian experience during and after the Islamic Revolution reflects Ahmed's argument, especially in the area of family law.

Iran has witnessed both the regression and development of women's rights since 1979. The deterioration at the beginning of the Islamic Republic, and the struggles to regain equality, can be attributed to underlying assumptions that focus on the differences between men and women and the alleged inferiority of the latter. Such assumptions have limited women's role in the workplace and public sphere as well as created unequal rights in custody and divorce. Women's testimony and life are valued at only half of a man's; she must ask permission from male family members to work or travel outside of the country (with some exceptions for single female students). Iranian women must also wear a hijab in public or else risk harassment and possible arrest by the regime's moral police. The impact of reforms intended to improve the situation of women is often lessened because of pre-ratification revisions.

Women's second-class position in Iran reflects a simple sociological notion. A system like patriarchy is not perpetuated only by men. Both men and women can express their contentment with the existing social order or perhaps not feel motivated to activism. Even women in positions of power do not necessarily support women's rights. For example, in 2004 thirteen women, twelve of whom were conservative, won seats in the Seventh *Majlis*, the Iranian Parliament. These women conformed to the official state position on gender that aims to continue the

oppression and silence of women in the public sphere.⁷ This group demonstrates the 'women against women' phenomenon, in which elected or appointed women falsely represent the interests of their peers and instead act as detriments to equal rights.⁸

Even reformist women who strive to enact positive change are limited in their capabilities. Consider the thirteen female members of the Sixth *Majlis* elected in 2000. The Women's Faction, as they were known, expressly wished to ameliorate some of the regime's restrictive gender policies. Their work won women greater custody and (some) travel rights as well as the increase of the marriage age of girls from nine to thirteen. However, the latter reform passed the Guardian Council only with an amendment that specified a girl under 13 could be married if her guardian and a judge or doctor deemed her prepared for marriage. This clause essentially rendered the reform as an optional measure. Other bills that aimed to improve the legal lot of women were either amended or rejected by the Guardian Council.⁹

The Women's Faction represented less than five percent of the total seats in the *Majlis* (290 seats, 170 of which were held by reformists). In 2000, the United Nations reported that the average percentage of women in the parliaments of South Asian countries was 8.8% (compared to 13.6% of all developing countries).¹⁰ Not only are Iranian women vastly underrepresented in the government, but their sole representatives are either ineffective or work to their disadvantage. These factors have contributed to the continuation of the feminist movement as an essential source of hope for change.

Composition of Feminist Movement

A study by Charles Kurzman found that young, educated Iranian women were more likely to harbor feminist tendencies and wishes for equality than other Iranian citizens.¹¹ Aside from education, a possible reason for this trend is that younger Iranians were not participants in the 1979 revolution and were not struck by religio-revolutionary ideals. Instead, they focus more on social and economic opportunities and the greater acceptance of cultural diversity.¹² However many older Iranian feminists share this desire. Thus the ideologies discussed represent those held by educated, middle and upper class women from urban areas. Generally, members of the educated, urban classes constitute Iranian social movements while rural citizens tend to remain more isolated and are likely to deviate from intellectual movements.

Kurzman notes, as we should in this discussion of feminism, that the Iranian feminist movement is composed of women and men of all ages and different backgrounds, though the extent and content of their beliefs is not entirely uniform. Broad generalizations are not fair to any portion of a population (whether based on gender, ethnicity, class status, etc). They must be avoided in an examination of a social movement like feminism that is itself a branch of a global development. Thus we must acknowledge that not all educated and urban women are feminists.

Moghissi contends a similar point in her discussion of the "careless and totalizing" misuse of the phrase "Muslim woman."¹³ This term is often wrongly employed in discussions of religious women living in Muslim countries, especially in studies of Islamic feminism. Her distinctions prove useful in understanding the differences in religious adherence and how these differences have diversified women's beliefs in feminist ideology. Moghissi provides three groups of women who are loyal to Islamic values. Naturally their political views and feminist tendencies vary with their position, which is an important factor to consider when discussing theocratic states and their populations.

Moghissi begins with the women who hold very traditional views on gender and are considered the female, elite torchbearers of Islam.¹⁴ The female Majlis members elected in 2004 exemplify this group. Women in the second category have come into contact with public misogynist practices through their educational experiences and involvement in public life. She provides members of the Women's Faction in the Sixth Majlis as examples, citing that they are part of the established order while still providing role models for aspiring public figures.¹⁵ Moghissi's final category contains women critical of the Islamic regime's position towards women and wish to ameliorate oppression whilst remaining faithful to the regime and its core values. She links this group to Muslim feminists, who work to promote greater women's rights in line with Sharia and the Qur'an.

Islamic Feminism

The Islamic feminists of Moghissi's third classification have not always been a force of the Iranian women's movement. The establishment of a theocratic Iranian government is sometimes credited with the emergence of Islamic feminism; Ziba Mir-Hosseini goes as far as to state that indigenous Islamic feminism is a legacy of the Islamic revolution.¹⁶ Following the revolution, the fundamentalist government instated Sharia as the basis of the formal legal system, which resulted in a body of law that was out of touch with the conception of justice held by the majority of the Iranian public. As Fereshteh Ahmadi argues, Islamic clerics in power had to confront modern problems and contradictions of their own goals.¹⁷ Difficulties inevitably arise from applying Sharia law to a country that had endured nearly sixty years of modernization under the Pahlavi monarchs. These difficulties cast light on the disputability of some laws and practices supposedly based strictly on Qur'anic verses. Mir Hosseini contends that the implementation of Sharia in Iran revealed the gaps between clerical jurisprudence and the actual lives of Islamic men and women.¹⁸

Islamic feminists claim that both classical and post-classical interpretations of the Qur'an, hadith, and other religious texts have been completed by men, based on their own experiences and centered on patriarchal inquiries.¹⁹ They wish to incorporate the experiences and needs of women into new understandings. The feminist-based reinterpretations would then be used to reform laws that are detrimental to women. Islamic feminism, as it is generally understood, works within the framework of Sharia law and Islamic beliefs to reinterpret sacred texts in a more modern, and less misogynistic, manner. In their efforts, Islamic feminists often combine classic methodologies such as *ijtihad*, independent inquiry of religious material, and *tafsir*, interpretation of the Qur'an, with post-modern feminist concepts.²⁰ Fereshteh Ahmadi argues that their appreciation of the post-modern feminist emphasis on diversity and language connects them to their secular counterparts.²¹

Some Islamic feminists have adopted a historical approach to reinterpretation, as explicated by the theories of Dr. Abdul Karim Soroush.²² Dr. Soroush is cited as one of the most influential figures of Islamic feminism. He argues that certain tenants of Islam essentially compose the religion itself and these are called *zati*, or essentials. *Arazi*, or accidentals, are the product of the time and place of the Prophet Mohammed's life.²³ Thus some laws traditionally held as fundamentals of Islam are merely accidentals of history. Islamic feminists use this idea to contend that Qur'anic verses that subvert women's rights can only be appreciated within a certain historical context, specifically the period of Mohammed over thirteen centuries ago. Azam Taleqani, a

former member of the Majlis, echoes this sentiment in her argument that the original social context of Qur'anic laws must be factored into contemporary interpretations of the Qur'an.²⁴ Additionally, *ijtihad* demands the utilization of human reason with regards to Sharia, thereby allowing proper judgement of a precept's suitability for application in the modern world.²⁵

Interpretations aside, one of the most accessible and appealing aspects of Islamic feminism is that it does not force a Muslim woman to choose between her religion and her feminist values. Leila Ahmed characterized the choice as a selection between betrayal and betrayal; the woman was forced to betray either her gender awareness or her Muslim identity.²⁶ Cultural relativists contend that in non-Western countries feminism and cultural authenticity are mutually exclusive.²⁷ This trend sometimes misrepresents Western nations as paradigms of equality, when in reality misogynist culture has merely manifested itself in a different, perhaps secular, manner. In Iran, Islamic feminists have instigated a new discourse that attempts to reexamine Islam's relationship with gender by examining them within the framework of the other. They find no contradiction between their faith and their feminism. The dichotomy of these terms has been prominent in the gender politics of many Muslim countries during the last several decades.

More so than activists in other Middle Eastern countries, some Iranian Islamic feminists have acknowledged that they have some connections to Western feminism.²⁸ Instead of importing Western ideologies to replace Islamic ideals, Islamic feminists aim to use secular methodologies to strengthen their claims for equality in an environment that is purportedly hostile to their requests.²⁹ Islamic feminists follow the path of new religious thinking in that they do not spur Western ideas merely because they are Western. Additionally they do not claim that Islam provides inherent remedies for every problem of the modern world. Instead they recognize that Islamic tenets are flexible as understood by humans and can change with the passage of time.³⁰

Islamic feminism also discontinues the characterization of feminism as an uniquely Western concept. This renders the new discourse on women and their rights more acceptable in a regime built upon oppression of opposition. The Iranian government continues to expressly denounce the Western world and its goods. Some antifeminists even claim that women's struggles for autonomy in Iran merely indicate their desire for a Western consumer lifestyle. Victoria Tahmasebi-Birgani criticizes this approach and states that it is simple-minded and unproductive.³¹ Moghissi describes Islamic feminism as an "transformative ideology movement for addressing gender injustices in Muslim societies."³² Proponents of Islamic feminism assert that, in addition to breaking the boundaries of discourse in Islamic society, Islamic feminism has the potential to empower Iranian women of every class and background.³³

Islamic feminism has manifested itself in organizations such as the Women's Society of the Islamic Revolution (WSIR). The WSIR was formed soon after the revolution and aimed to cultivate a society that did not oppress women and upheld Islamic values at the same time. They advocated a truly Islamic society. Highly-educated and prominent Iranian women were members of the WSIR but the group still faced opposition from uncompromising conservatives, those who were unwilling to accept a woman's opinion because they believed she belonged in the house. Although they were vocal supporters of the revolution and its leader Ayatollah Khomeini, their meetings were attacked by mobs in the early 1980s.³⁴ Iran has also witnessed the exhibition of Islamic feminist ideals by the Women's Committees of Reformist groups, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front. Their committee was led for a time by Farideh Mashini, a vocal Islamic feminist, although the party has been banned in Iran since the 2009 election.

Islamic feminism is, of course, not without its faults, and these faults are partly why secular feminism has remained a fixture of Iranian oppositional discourse. As mentioned earlier, Hai-

deh Moghissi was critical of the negligent tendency to label all Muslim women in public spheres as Islamic feminists, given the variance of their actual beliefs. She states that the defense of Islamic feminism as the only outlet for women's rights activism in a theocratic state like Iran obscures the diversity of real women's situations.³⁵ Moghissi warns that Islamic feminists often fail to recognize the heterogeneity of Iranian women. Indeed many women wish to avoid such potentially problematic labels, although they share a belief in gender equality and justice.

Islamic feminists may take a defeatist position and neglect "the crucial distinction between Islam as a legal and political system and Islam as spiritual and moral guidance."³⁶ Deference is often given to the legalistic tenets of Islam that harm women while its equitable ethics should be considered more. Ahmed posits that the egalitarian voice of Islam most clearly attracts the lay Muslim, and this voice leads Islamic feminists to emphasize the nonsexist side of Islam.³⁷

Moghissi asks why religiously-based feminism is deemed acceptable for only Middle Eastern countries; she declares that the suggestion to deem all feminists as Christian in Western countries would be ridiculed.³⁸ I would like to note that this comparison seems inappropriate as states like Iran have an unwavering religious government whereas most Western countries are not theocratic. Mir Hosseini adds to this discussion with her assertion that gender inequality in ancient Jewish and Christian texts was circumvented by the appeal of religious-oriented Western feminists to the core principles of their higher power.³⁹ Moghissi's critique of Islamic feminism does, however, include many excellent points; one of which points out that no facet of any society is impervious to (feminist) scrutiny just because it has endured.⁴⁰ She uses the veil as an example, and this notion can be applied to many other aspects of both patriarchal and Islamic societies.

By promoting a romanticized version of Islam and no other alternatives, Islamic feminists can limit the potential of the feminist movement in Iran and lower the expectations of women's emancipation.⁴¹ The political and legal structure of the current Iranian government is not predisposed toward reform. Reinterpretations of Islamic texts must be accepted by the state that implements the laws; women's rights, and even basic human rights, that are drawn from these reinterpretations are not likely to be quickly acknowledged by a regime that relishes in the current suppression of these rights.⁴²

Secular Feminism

Despite its limitations, Islamic feminism has provided opportunities for secular feminists who have no other available discourse.⁴³ As in other countries, secular feminists believe that religion is a personal affair that does not have a proper place in the public or political sphere. They work for women's liberation in several domains: family, economic, and political.⁴⁴ As feminists in other countries, secular Iranians promote the idea of a woman's essential worth and humanity as an individual independent of her gender. Secular feminists tend to defend and demand women's rights as an extension of human rights and are not apt to embrace the cultural relativist viewpoint. They do not wish to brand Islam as the only path to changing the status of Iranian women, and instead they view feminism in Iran as part of the larger scheme of global feminism.

Just as Western feminists do not wish to shirk Western heritage and culture, secular feminists in Iran do not aim to abandon Iranian culture in favor of another, less misogynistic option.⁴⁵ Both groups work in conjunction with their heritages to explore outlets aside from religion for cultural expression and enjoyment. Secular feminists such as Noble Peace Prize winner

Shirin Ebadi maintain that religious texts employed for political purposes are easily and effectively manipulated to defend gender inequalities.⁴⁶

Secular feminists are some of the most vocal opponents to the Iranian clergy's marginalization of women in public life. For this reason, they are often the most persecuted female dissidents and have had great difficulty establishing public forums to discuss their issues. For the secular feminist, issues such as the veil and modesty are the regime's tools used to subjugate women under the guise of enforcing religious doctrine. If one considers the choice of the color of clothing as a simplistic expression of freedom, then one can see how seemingly insignificant restrictions on women's choices act within a scheme of greater government control and oppression. Religious dogma as a political weapon is pervasive in the life of any woman regardless her own religious beliefs.⁴⁷ Secular women are highly critical of the regime's use of the female body as a political battleground in its attempt to control their personal identities.⁴⁸ Many activists describe the use of lipstick as a political statement in contemporary society.

Secular feminists have adopted individualistic defiance to state mandates as a key tool against the increased enmity and pressure from the Iranian government. Even non-confrontational approaches have landed an astonishing number of Iranian women activists and lawyers in prison.⁴⁹ These occurrences are best demonstrated by the work of the One Million Signatures Campaign. The Campaign began in 2006 as an effort to garner one million signatures on a petition to pressure the Iranian government, the Majlis in particular, to reform laws that they viewed as detrimental to women. Now one of the most pivotal grassroots movements in Iran, One Million Signatures began with a handful of women discussing women's issues with their family and friends and asking them to sign the petition. Soon women and men of all generations were involved in the Campaign and began approaching strangers, albeit discretely, in public places where women were often found such as on public transportation or in shopping markets. This individual approach made the Campaign more personal and approachable, especially to those who did not previously consider women's issues as important.⁵⁰

The Campaign was also amazingly effective in training new generations of young activists by providing them firsthand experience and like-minded company. Women now have a network in which to share their stories and hear others', adding greater insight into a struggle whose existence the government refuses to acknowledge or respect. The Campaign's website, Change for Equality, raises awareness of activists taken prisoner and informs the international community of the average Iranian woman's plight.⁵¹

One Million Signatures activist Sussan Tahmasebi highlights two trends among the people asked to sign the petition. Some of those approached sign the petition immediately or agree to contribute to the campaign in another substantial way, signaling that the cultural norm of Iran has progressed much faster than the law. Conversely, others remain staunch in their disbelief in gender equality. The appeal of activists' personal stories may persuade a few to join the campaign but many others still refuse. Tahmasebi believes the continued presence of the last group attests to the value of raising awareness.⁵² The resistance from the government that the Campaign has faced since its inception serves as a testament to its potential to enact definite change in the established social order.

Unification of Feminist Movement

The Islamic and secular feminist camps have joined forces many times, addressing many of the same issues merely from different stances. These issues have ranged from a woman's right to serve as the Iranian president to the minimum age of marriage for women; the former was rejected several times by the Council of the Guardians⁵³ and the latter raised from 9 to 13 in 2002 after many years of lobbying by feminists.⁵⁴ The aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, which was allegedly fraudulent, witnessed the participation of both secular and Islamic feminist groups.⁵⁵ The two groups joined forces, along with other civil rights and political activists and several NGOs, to present their issues to the four presidential candidates. They declared they were only demanding their rights from the presidential contenders.

The first proposition asked for Iranian membership in the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which had been approved by the Majlis in 2003 but denied passage by the Guardian Council.⁵⁶ They secondly requested review and reconsideration of the Constitutional Articles 19, 20, 21, and 115. Three of the amendments concern the equal protection and treatment of all Iranian citizens, while the final stipulates that presidential candidates must originate as a religious and political statesman (*re-jaal*).⁵⁷ By asking the potential heads of government to reexamine these clauses, the coalition was proposing an end to all discriminatory laws against women. Only one of the candidates responded himself to their terms; a representative of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent and eventual victor in the contested election, merely stated that CEDAW was un-Islamic.

The campaign was considered by some a failure in the sense that neither of its issues were properly addressed by the candidates or government. However, the movement was itself monumental in that it generated awareness of women's issues and motivated a new generation of young Iranian activists to protest for their rights and their political freedoms.⁵⁸ It also highlighted the potential benefits of the cooperation of the Islamic and secular feminists.

Conclusion

With further coordination of the two groups, the fight for Iranian women's rights can continue to progress. In general, female activists have integrated resistance and negotiation into their daily lives, winning incremental gains to solidify their position as an influential force to be reckoned with. Mir Hosseini claims that secular feminism paved the wave for Islamic feminism by introducing women into the public, especially political, sphere and that now feminists must conduct their activism within a religious framework.⁵⁹ I, however, believe that the combination of the ideologies will prove invaluable to the woman's movement in Iran. The differences of their beliefs are not symbolic of a struggle between modernity and tradition. They merely both wish to gain the legal and social equality that they believe duly belongs to women and view the means to this equality as varied.

The feminist movement has served as an integral part of the greater Iranian democratic movement. Tahmasebi-Birgani holds that the women's movement continues to contribute to the desire for civil and individual rights, especially those such as freedom of speech and equality in a non-arbitrary legal system.⁶⁰ The feminist quest for basic rights mirrors the fight of every Iranian who wishes to live in a more democratic, peaceful society. One of the most important tools

that could be used to their advantage is free speech; the circulation of ideas and opinions stokes the fire of every political and reformist movement.

I have examined the subordinate status of women in Iranian society and the practices and institutions that perpetuate this subordination. After clarifying the composition and general nature of the Iranian feminist movement, I explored the beliefs of Islamic and secular feminists and briefly how these groups have been moved to public action in contemporary Iran. I emphasized the importance of the unification of the feminist movement for the future.

Their cooperation of the secularists and Islamists in opposing discriminatory policies attempts to transcend their differences, namely divergent religious identities. The success of the feminist movement as a whole in Iran depends on the continued cooperation of the two trends. The desire for freedom and equality has proven to be a very powerful instrument of unity. Moghissi aptly describes the feminist movement in Iran with a metaphor: "The Islamic government has not opened the gates to women; women have jumped over the fence."⁶¹ Even if in the future the Islamic government cedes greater human and political rights to its population, Iranian women will still face the oppression of a patriarchal society. The feminist movement thus stands as an invaluable tool for the future freedom and equality of Iranian women.

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THE REVOLUTION WILL BE TWEETED: THE INTERNET AS A VENUE FOR SHIFTING ISLAMIC DISCOURSE

| Brennan Peters

Introduction

In the spring of 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) erupted into turmoil and, in some cases, revolution. There were a number of mitigating factors behind each upheaval and demonstration; indeed, it could be argued that each brick thrown had its own unique motivation.¹ The reasons behind this sweeping movement for social change in the MENA are many, varied, and subject to debate. However, after the initial protests and subsequent restructuring, interesting trends emerged as especially critical to the successful plight for social change, one being the pivotal and unprecedented role that the Internet has played in shaping Islamic discourse and communities.

There is one question on the minds of many who have been party to or have witnessed the degree to which the people of MENA have been able to make their voices heard and accrue the critical mass necessary to affect change in recent political upheavals: Why now? One element contributing to this heightened political activity and reform is access to and use of the Internet as an organizational tool and resource for shaping culture. I will examine the implications of Internet communication on redefining and de-essentializing Islam, a powerful institution that affects the people of MENA's daily lives. Additionally, I will demonstrate how Internet connectivity allows for the shaping of a global Muslim community, encouraging more liberal, multicultural interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, I will provide examples of current shifts in cultural, economic, and political spheres that are indicative of the rapidly changing face of Islamic culture.

A Spectrum of Change

The crucial role that women played in the events of Arab Spring is one poignant example of where this shifting, globalizing Islamic environment might lead. In Syria, women such as Razan Zaitouneh, a human rights lawyer, have played a crucial role in the dissemination of news about protests against President Bashar al-Assad.² The Egyptian revolution relied heavily upon the organizational efforts of women on Twitter and other social networking sites to accomplish its goals and call together the masses.³ Even the United States government agrees that from Tunisia to Libya and across the Gulf, Arab women have been central to the process of speaking out and ending governmental oppression.⁴ Yet as the dust settles and new governments take shape, are women's rights and issues going to take a back seat as has been the case in previous revolutionary efforts?⁵ I believe important steps are taking place right now, and a gradual shift to a less patriarchal, more pluralistic model of Islamic society is inevitable, but just as every rose has its thorn, these emerging paradigm shifts are not without their detractors.

Before discussing the current shift in social roles and standards for modern MENA women, it is critical to understand the historical evolution of gender inequality throughout the region, especially as it relates to the Muslim faith. It is impossible to separate the plight of women in MENA from Islam, which, as an institution, is central to the cultural and national identities of the

region. Western perceptions of important social issues facing these women—including stoning, forced veiling, domestic violence, and other forms of gender inequality—often wrongly attribute misogyny and subjugation of women to Islamic doctrine. Even the earliest of civilizations perpetuated gender inequality in practice and doctrine.⁶ While Islam did, in some senses, exacerbate "a restrictive trend"⁷ initiated by previous conquering outside powers, it "did not bring about radical change, but a continuity and accentuation of life-styles already in place."⁸

However, the life of pre-Islamic Middle Eastern women included the practices typically associated with the most fundamentalist Islamic sects and worse. Female infanticide was commonplace (as females were not legally eligible to inherit family property).⁹ Forced incestuous marriage was also relatively common among upper classes, especially in harem culture¹⁰ as was forced veiling, particularly in Syrian and Arab cultures.¹¹ Early Islamic doctrine sought both to put an end to these practices and also to elevate the legal status of women by granting them the right to own property and operate businesses, enter contracts (independently of a husband or male kinsman), and to divorce an unfit husband.¹² In a broader sense, early Islamic ideology "stressed that women, as half of the society, should be offered all opportunities which could enable them to develop their natural abilities" and "be allowed to attain the highest ranks of progress materially, intellectually, and spiritually."¹³

It goes without saying that, as with all religious doctrine and teachings, cultural attitudes, political climates, and numerous other elements factor into Islam's interpretation and permutations; subsequently, numerous modern manifestations of Islam do run counter to what Western feminists would consider egalitarian. As the aforementioned texts and many Muslim women assert, this inequality is not attributable to Islam itself, rather to the cultural context and environmental factors that influence its implementation. One element that has recently emerged as particularly important to the radically changing role of women in Islam is global connectivity.

The Internet and Modern Islam

Modern Islamic thinkers and Islamic feminists believe that the Internet has provided Muslim women, in particular, the opportunity to both define and achieve equality for themselves. This change is happening on a number of levels, but several specific intersections of Islam and the Internet have emerged as particularly central to a shift toward an emerging more progressive, egalitarian version of Islam. As the world wide web has extended its reach to women, so, too, has the proliferation of online *fatwa* (plural *fatawa*), which is rapidly changing the modern face of Islam.¹⁴ This is particularly evident in Islamic family law, particularly issues that pertain to "norms regulating Muslim women's dress and demeanor, her rights and entitlements in family life,"¹⁵ including one that has been central to feminist criticisms from both within and outside the Islamic community: pervasive domestic abuse.

While domestic violence is not an issue unique to Islam, the Qur'anic verse 4:34 has historically been cited frequently as a justification for marital abuse:

Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat (*daraba*) them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great (above you all).¹⁶

Because of the broad reach of the Internet, and the merging of the varying backgrounds of those interpreting this verse, which has long been the subject of much discourse, has been subject to expanding and interpretation. For instance, the word *daraba* has a number of meanings—ranging from 'to beat' to 'to tap lightly' to 'to have consensual sex with.'¹⁷ However, widened interpretation of the language of Islamic teaching is not the only important shaping influence the Internet brings.

Islam is subject to the cultural context and legal norms of the culture in which it is practiced. Domestic abuse is both socially and legally unacceptable in the United States and other Western nations. As Western and MENA Muslims connect—through social networking, discussion forums, and other outlets—they engage in important, and unprecedented, ideological exchange.¹⁸ This discourse between different interpretations of Islamic texts and practice serves to gradually shift normative views and help form more trans-ethnically informed, moderate Muslim communities.¹⁹

Clearly the emergence of the world wide web as an interpretive and community building tool "breaks the monopoly of traditional Islamic scholarship and leadership."²⁰ Along these same lines, the Internet is expanding the connectedness of the Islamic community beyond not only ethnic or regional boundaries, but the representativeness of the genders in the process of interpretation of tradition and texts is changing as well. Anonymity offers women the opportunity to initiate conversations about sensitive or controversial issues—abortion, *hijab*, sex-based hierarchy²¹—topics they may not otherwise feel safe inquiring about "due to the societal environment of what may or may not be discussed in public."²² It also allows women to interact directly with men, express their opinions openly, and have their voices given equal credence in online spaces²³ while adhering to a "separate but equal doctrine of genders."²⁴ In fact, in the highly gender-segregated Islamic Republic of Iran, approximately 49% of Internet users are women,²⁵ an astonishingly equitable level of representation, resulting in what will hopefully be egalitarianism in Islamic law and tradition reflective of an authentic Iranian Islamic feminism.

The current discourse surrounding *hijab*, or appropriate covering/modesty of attire for Muslim women, is an example of how increased communication and connectivity yields permutations of feminism reflective of individual cultures. Opinions on *hijab* vary widely—between MENA and Western, and Islamic and non-Islamic, women in each camp. Some Islamic feminists insist that the Qur'an calls for only the wives of Muhammad to practice veiling.²⁶ Others assert that, as an Arab tradition predating both European colonization and the genesis of Islam, veiling is a separate aspect of MENA women's identity and should not be discounted as anti-feminist simply because it does not align with Western ideals of gender equality.²⁷

The discourse surrounding the veil is complex and, aside from the intersection of feminism and Islam, represents a multitude of issues: economic class, education level, the effects of imperialism, etc. However, what is particularly important about this debate is that it now incorporates a broader range of voices than ever before. The Internet allows Islamic women from across the globe to unite as a community and discuss their Islamic feminist identity, priorities, and future amongst themselves, on their own terms.

More Than Voices

Gender equality and Islamic practice are not mutually exclusive. However, the intersec-

tion of egalitarianism and traditional Islamic daily life has been problematic in the past. Fortunately, the Internet has offered inventive solutions to some of these past conflicts, allowing women to affect change while retaining their sense of heritage and culture and, to an extent, adhering to socially normative practices regarding the role of women in MENA society.

Consequently, the Internet is empowering oppressed women in very concrete ways. Increased connectivity allows women to generate income and stake their claim in the workforce while observing even the most stringent Islamic edicts concerning modesty of dress outside the home, limits to interaction with men outside their family, and other restrictive and inherently limiting expectations because, as a virtual meeting space, the Internet does not require women to leave the home. Subsequently, women are rapidly emerging as forces of change in economic spheres. One element contributing to the heightened presence of women in the economy and workforce is an increase in female consumers. As women generate capital, they become an increasingly important market demographic, a demographic that—due to current separation of genders, codes of conduct, and misogynistic attitudes—can ironically only be serviced by other women.

In Egypt, Yasmine El-Mehairy, CEO of SuperMama, the Middle East's first online parenting community, explains that "generational shifts that have ushered in more Arab women working and earning their own money."²⁸ Her web site, in addition to generating a tidy profit from advertising sales, empowers women through providing information, so that "the woman can finally choose what's best for her."²⁹

This is, perhaps most importantly, practically as well as ideologically, a critical aspect of the Internet as a medium for shifting Islamic discourse: The Internet allows Islamic people to affect the kind of change they want for themselves, as opposed to forcing their reliance upon nearly colonial attempts at implementing Western change based on Western ideals. However, this notion is a double-edged sword. Extremist groups, most notably Al Qaeda, use the Internet not only as a means of planning terrorist attacks,³⁰ but also for fundraising, recruiting, and as a propaganda machine to "win the hearts and minds"³¹ of those whose support they desire. In fact, the exact same online elements and resources that are so key to the liberalization and de-essentialization of Islam work also in the favor of Al Qaeda and other groups like them. However, it should be noted that as access to global perspectives of Islam increases, the appeal of factions such as Al Qaeda decrease; while, on one hand, the Internet allows members of terror organizations to remain anonymous, it allows many more Muslims to forge genuine connections with Muslims throughout the world, helping to shape a more accepting, pluralistic identity for Islam as a whole.

Conclusion

The efficacy of Internet connectivity as a tool for pursuing equality, as well as past problematic results of traditional humanitarian aid, certainly seem to indicate a much needed departure from our current models of assistance and advocacy for the oppressed. While it is, perhaps, impractical to implement global Internet connectivity—due to expense and logistical challenges—perhaps infrastructure and education, in the interest of affecting long term change and with respect for the agency of the oppressed, are just as essential as food, medical care, and other forms of assistance that we currently deem to be "essential" aid. Perhaps infrastructure is the best investment for minority groups seeking to affect change. Then again, the rapidly changing face

of the Islamic world indicates that perhaps no investment is warranted on our part at all.

In the Middle East and North Africa, the Internet is currently serving many functions—some anticipated, others rather unexpected—in allowing individuals in the region to shape their culture and seek equality as they define it. Increased connectivity allows large numbers of like-minded individuals to communicate efficiently and organize effectively. The global nature of the world wide web allows for an unprecedented reach, promoting education and broadening discourse. As such, opportunity for Islamic culture to become more pluralistic, egalitarian, and representative of its practitioners, a previously seemingly unachievable within the cultural contexts of the region, now seems a feasible—perhaps even inevitable—goal.

NOTES

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LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN MOROCCAN NATIONALISM: A MOSAIC?¹

I. B. Warren Oliver

Introduction

In 1912, the Moroccan Sultan, 'Abd al-Hafiz (1908-1912), signed a treaty with the French state. The treaty "invited" the French into the Morocco in order to help modernize the ancient kingdom and restore order under the Sultan after years of civil war and European colonial encroachment.^{2, 3} Taking this as an advantage to expand their influence, the French government set up a series of policies, especially with regard to education, which rendered the role of any Sultan of Morocco into a puppet regent for the French.⁴ Opposing these colonial policies became the battle cry for Moroccan independence. It is my contention that early Moroccan nationalism evolved by shaping the role of the French, Arabic, and Amazigh⁵ linguistic groups in forming a national history of the kingdom.

Many theories of nationalism, especially the ideas of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (2006), describe non-European nationalism as a counter-colonial force. In his account nationalism is formed from a common language, which in turn leads to a national narrative to bind each member to the nation.⁶ However, the specific example of Morocco poses a major problem to this canon of nationalism. The kingdom of Morocco has no common language or vernacular to bind the population into a monolingual entity.⁷ Instead, each sub-group in the population retains its original language from its entrance into the kingdom over the past 1,231 years. Following Anderson's theory literally, this lack of common language and national narrative would prevent these various groups from forming a Moroccan nation because they would have no sense of community. Thus, it seems that the national movement in Morocco goes beyond a common language that binds together all of these various diverse linguistic groups into a single nation with a single national story. This is the central claim of this thesis.

Yet before exploring the peculiarities of nationalism in Morocco, I will explain the concept of nationalism itself: As an idea, nationalism is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, dating from approximately the eighteenth century.⁸ Some of the predominate thinkers in this field, E.J. Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Anderson Smith, and Benedict Anderson, have agreed that language has been a key component in the creation of nationalism because of its necessity in conveying and narrating a common myth/history of a group. Thus, a nation forms itself around a self-perceived narrative of nation-hood, which chronicles the trials and successes of the group through time.

Illustrating this concept of a national narrative, Hobsbawm, in *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (1990), points out that there is a self-educating element in nationalism.⁹ Accordingly, nations rely on the standardization of language, which in turn relies on the invention of printing and mass education. So, nationalism is not solely the result of state politics or nationalistic leaders. Instead, it is a result of interaction between politics, society, and technology. While nationalism needs political leaders, Hobsbawm rightly suggests that a lone, political call for a nation does not always signal nationalism.¹⁰ Instead, nationalism exists when the popular masses take up and express nationalistic ideas. However, the population might take up these ideas unevenly as they are passed person-to-person through different parts of society.

Hobsbawm also notes the ambiguity of nationalism.¹¹ In fact, most scholars have difficulty describing the concept of nationalism as a whole. Because of this vague nature, leaders can easily manipulate the idea of nationalism in order to fit their own goals. Therefore, nations and nationalism are nearly impossible to describe by a self-determinative definition. Almost any group can manipulate history from their point of view in order to appear as a nation. Similarly, even if a nation does exist, that "true" national history is no more artificial or manufactured than a false one. What matters is that the nation believes in their conception of this auto-history.¹²

To avoid this ambiguity of the idea of nationalism many scholars first explore the definition of a nation, a group with a common culture and history, before they begin to explore the nature of nationalism. For example, Hobsbawm adopts Ernest Gellner's basic principles of nationalism: 1) nationalism is defined by the desire of a nation to match national interests and political interests of a state and 2) members of a nation have a duty to become politically involved.¹³ These points, if nothing else, establish the political nature of nationalism, which states nations believe that their main political goal is to protect the interest of their own nation.

Building off of similar points, Benedict Anderson, in *Imagined Communities*, explores the role of common language in the creation of a national history. Specifically, he notes that nationalism grew out of the scientific revolution, which diminished the importance of the major world religions as well as the importance and influence of those religions' divine languages, such as Latin in Christendom or Arabic in the Islamic *Umma*.¹⁴ Following this loss of influence, people began speaking and writing in their common vernaculars, which when combined with the spread of newspapers, as well as other forms of print media, people began to associate more with the other speakers of their languages, creating a sense of community between these people. Eventually, these communities then take their individual experiences, expressed through their written word, into a collection, creating a single history.¹⁵ In this way, a common language then creates a common history for a community, which in turn becomes the basis of a nation.

Anderson illustrates this concept of a linguistic based nationalism with many examples. However, unlike Anderson's various examples, the kingdom of Morocco does not have a single unifying language. In fact, linguistically, the entire land can be described as a collage of a plethora of tiny language groups (see Appendix I). So, following Anderson's logic, this would prevent Moroccans from viewing themselves as a unified group with a single history. Therefore, the Moroccan independence movement during the years of the European protectorates, 1912-1956, would either have to not be a truly nationalistic movement, missing the unifying nation to push people to resist European dominance, or something more than a common language bonded together the various native groups in Morocco into a Moroccan nation.

Morocco experts, John P. Halstead and Spencer D. Segalla, would reject this concept of the Moroccan independence movement as being non-national. Instead, each seems to describe the role of French colonialism, especially with their educational policies, as a catalyst for this change in Moroccan society. This concept is evident in both early works on this subject, such as John P. Halstead's *Rebirth of A Nation* (1963), as well as later ones, such as Spencer D. Segalla's *The Moroccan Soul* (2009). In this way, many Moroccans, who were subjugated to a secondary class by colonial policies, became a unified nation as a reaction to this colonial attempt at assimilating Moroccans into European society.¹⁶ Many of these movements called for the elevation of Arabic to that of the use of French in these various colonial schools.

Although Segalla points out that many of the French educational policies were implemented as a form of anti-assimilation, these policies enforced social barriers between the definition of French, Arab, and Amazigh nationalities, as well as encouraged them to develop their

own identities within Moroccan culture; many of these nationalist movements called for the end of the French-run schools bent on assimilating Moroccans into a modern European world-view. However, due to the fact that the early nationalists were urban dwellers, which were dominated by native Arab speakers with French educations, the various counter-colonial writings were done in mostly French and Arabic.

Thus, it can be concluded that French colonial policies lead to a Moroccan linguistic hierarchy, which favors French, then Arabic, and lastly Amazigh. Likewise, because language is so closely linked to a national identity, it becomes apparent that these policies played a large role in creating these national identities as well as their roles in creating the overall Moroccan identity. The creation of the Moroccan national myth would follow in these steps: First, following common nationalist theory, each language group would be linked to a certain national identity/group. Second, French colonial policy would create/heighten barriers between each of these groups, resulting in a tiered linguistic hierarchy. Last, this hierarchy would manifest itself in nationalists' choice of certain traits/ideals, such as the language of choice and views of the king, witnessed in the national story.

Research Strategy and Methods

By connecting various French colonial policies and the formation of this national myth/identity in Morocco, I analyze the combined efforts of both Francophones and Arab speakers as creators of this myth. While Segalla pointed to the combined efforts of all Moroccan linguistic groups in this nationalistic resistance to colonialism, I will compare the role of each groups identity to the formation of the national identity as well as why each group specifically had that influence at the time. To accomplish these goals, this work will draw upon various scholarly works to explore the nature of the French colonial linguistic and ethnic policies in Morocco as well as other religious and political ideas, such as Salafism and Pan-Arabism, present in the country at the time; the origins of the national movement in Morocco; and compare and contrast these ideas in the over-all nationalistic story of Morocco.

Flavoring Moroccan Nationalism: The Role of the United Makhzan and Sufi Orders

Anti-Colonial sentiments in Morocco did not originate with the nationalist movement of the Protectorate Era (1912-1956). Rather, European encroachments into North Africa lead to a counter-colonial movement by members of the *Makhzan* (nobles) and Sufi orders in the region as early as the Pre-Protectorate Era (the 18th and 19th Centuries). This movement criticized the sultan for his alliances with various European powers. During the Protectorate era, the counter-colonial movement transformed into the national movement in Morocco, and Sultan Mohammad V (r.1927-1953/1954-1961) began to side with the Moroccan nationalists over the French-run Protectorate government. In this way, the sultan became a symbol of the Moroccan nationalist movement giving the movement Islamic and royalist overtones. In this chapter I narrate the transformation of anti-colonial sentiment of the Pre-Protectorate Era to the Nationalism of the later period.

Pre-colonial Morocco was marked by a major shift, namely, an increased European interest in North Africa.¹⁷ Initially, this influence manifested itself in stronger economic connections

between Morocco and various European states because Moroccans could not compete with cheaper European goods or technologies. For this reason, many North African merchants without connections to Europe, mostly those from the Muslim class, began to resent this increased trade with Europe.

This economic advantage quickly shifted to an actual takeover with the French conquest of Ottoman North Africa.¹⁸ The conquest of Algeria (1840) and ensuing Moroccan defeat at Isly (1844) were the most significant of these European conquests because they not only legitimized the French presence in Morocco but also made the French and Alaouite dynasty aware of the comparative Moroccan weakness to the Imperial European war machine. France used this new formal control in North Africa as an excuse to control the newly conquered areas but also to demand a protected status of their citizens in Morocco. Unable to resist these edicts, the sultans during this period were hard-pressed to resist European influences.

Each time the Sultan would follow a Euro-centric policy, though, the Moroccans, especially various members of the Makhzan and the rural Sufi orders, became more distraught with the monarchy because it was openly defying its role as the protector of the *umma* against outsiders.¹⁹ By the 1880s the problem had become a major issue, and certain Sufi leaders began to seriously discuss about the replacement of Sultan Moulay Hassan (r.1874-1894) by another, better leader. These Moroccan anti-Monarchy sentiments were complimented by the arrival of Ottoman emissaries to Morocco in 1895. These emissaries carried the message of Pan-Islam, a political movement which called Islamic areas to unite against the growing non-Muslim/European influence in the region.²⁰ This support for Pan-Islam was realized in Meknes against Sultan Hafiz and resulted in fears of popular uprising and the possibility of Ottoman control of the area. The Alaouite sultans were forced to further tie themselves to European powers with the belief that Europeans would help modernize the ancient kingdom. Thus, these calls against the Alaouites in many ways laid the foundation for the Protectorate and the resulting Moroccan National movement.

These anti-European sentiments did not disappear during the Protectorate Era. In fact, many of the problems with colonization, such as the War of the Rif (1921-1925)²¹ and the attempted creation of an Amazigh *dahir*—an extra-sultan and independent leader for the Amazigh—only strengthened these anti-European beliefs in Morocco.²² This led Sultan/King Mohammed V (r. 1927-1961) to begin to side with the *Istiqlal* (Independence) party and to call for Moroccan independence from the French Empire. Eventually Mohammed V was exiled to Madagascar (1953-1954) but was re-instated as the King of Morocco by the French. It was this anti-Empire stance that made Mohammed V the charismatic symbol of the Moroccan independence movement.

With this history in mind, it becomes obvious that there were three major institutional components of the Moroccan national movement: the Sufi orders, which brought in the rural, Amazigh-controlled, areas (*bled al-siba*); the Makhzan, who brought in their followers from the cities (*bled al-makhzan*); and finally the sultan, who legitimized the entire movement by giving it a face. Thus, religious and political influences determined the nature of the national movement, which came to represent an Islamic movement to empower the Sultan. Without the two sides, it is easy to conclude that the Moroccan nationalistic movement would not have succeeded.

The Pre-Colonial Movement of Sufi Orders Against Europe

Before the Moroccan nationalist movement Sufi orders played a central role in the resistance to European imperialism in Morocco. The Sufi movement was not limited to Morocco. The Muslim resistance to European influence began in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria before passing into Morocco through other orders. Although this resistance led to popular mistrust of the Alaouite sultan at the time and to the uprising in Meknes, which caused the sultan to ask for French intervention, it simultaneously created the foundations of a national Moroccan identity through its rejection of a European influence and identity.

Sufi orders and their associated *zaouias*²³ have a long history in the Maghrib, the proper name for non-Egyptian North Africa, taking root during the Murabit dynasty (1056-1147).²⁴ Throughout its existence, North African Sufism combined with various other pre-Islamic traditions in the region to create a very distinct form of Islam.²⁵ Overall, there were three major differences from Moroccan Islam and more traditional forms of the religion: a cult of saints centered around the tombs of dead *marabouts* (living *wali*, Muslim saints) and their lineages; voluntary religious organizations, the Sufi brotherhoods, which were organized into lodges; and the Sharifian government that controlled the state.²⁶ Alongside various ritual-practices, centered on the magical powers from the religious leaders' Baraka, the orders also maintained a religious space and school, from which the name "zaouia" originates.²⁷ Also, the Baraka and authority of each zaouia leader was passed amongst family members, creating a rural elite class.

While there are examples of a few important urban zaouias, the vast majority of these schools/shrines were in rural areas.²⁸ While the Sultan, through the makhzan, controlled the cities, Sufi marabouts controlled the rural communities. Subsequently, the traditional Sharifan state required the cooperation between urban makhzan and the rural Sufis. Indeed the Sultan's political authority in Morocco is based upon his authority as a sharif.²⁹ Interestingly enough, both Geertz and Bazzaz note that the sharifa class, comprised of members of the makhzan and marabouts, are the traditional sources of resistance to the sultanate. Whenever a Moroccan challenged the legitimacy of a dynasty, traditionally the challenger was from one of these two groups.³⁰

This relation between the sultan and the sharifa class became apparent during the Pre-Colonial period because of the perceived increasing influence of European powers on the Moroccan monarchy.³¹ These critics faulted the Sultan, who was considered the grand protector of the land, for not standing up for their rights, instead favoring the policies of various European visitors to the court. However, as previously mentioned, these sentiments did not originate in Morocco. In fact, much of this resentment came from other North African territories before being passed to Morocco. The primary reason behind this mistrust lies in the economics as well as the politics behind this European move: during the second half of the 18th Century, Europeans began to trade with North Africa, bringing the region more into the world economy.³² Therefore, many North African goods, including Moroccan items, found European buyers, and conversely, more North Africans bought European goods. In many ways, this trade was not entirely negative; it brought new technologies and ideas into North Africa. However, as time progressed, North Africans began to resent this trade because artisans were unable to compete with cheaper European goods, thereby destroying the local groups' abilities to produce goods.

Before this time, the trade routes, like most of the rural areas, were dominated by the various zaouias found in the regions.^{33,34} Zaouias primarily functioned to serve as ritual places and schools for Sufi orders. However, their locations, often along trade routes, and their willingness to act as a series of safe houses to the travelers as they passed through particular areas³⁵ made

these rural schools perfect places for merchants to find out what exactly people wanted as well as the market prices of those particular goods. Thus, the zaouias indirectly affected trade by creating a social place where fellow merchants could bond with each other and settle disputes.³⁶ As such, the Sufis were highly involved in the trade across North Africa and acted as a mode of quick communication between different locations across the region, making some orders particularly wealthy. Thus, when Europeans began to challenge the economic dominance of North African traders, many Sufi orders came to resent them.

Alongside the zaouias' presence and function as connecting points between Morocco and the Middle-East, these trade routes as well as students studying and members of families relocating led to groups of Moroccans living abroad.³⁷ One of the largest Moroccan migrant areas was Egypt, which became a hot bed of anti-European fervor by the end of the 20th Century—particularly resulting in a counter-colonial national movement around 1900, catalyzed by a group of clandestine secret societies. These Egyptian national groups were originally funded by Pan-Islamic influences in the region.³⁸ The connection between individuals in Morocco and Egypt not only led to personal communications in the two regions but also to many Egyptian newspapers gaining a Moroccan readership.³⁹ As a result, while the Moroccan Sultans and many members of the makhzan had officially rejected Pan-Islam because of its Turkish roots, the concepts of Pan-Islam and Egyptian nationalism were able to slowly seep into Moroccan society through Moroccan readership of these Egyptian periodicals.

This is a perfect of example of how print-media led to the creation of an imagined community in the Muslim world. Benedict Anderson explained this dynamic in *Imagined Communities*.⁴⁰ Essentially, by reading the same stories in these newspapers, members of these communities began to adopt similar beliefs about the world around them. This particular Moroccan-Egyptian community centered on a Muslim identity and therefore cannot be considered nationalistic.⁴¹ Nonetheless, this common religious identity amongst North African Muslims created a sense of solidarity between Muslims against the non-Muslim outsiders.

With trade came a cultural exchange. This exchange, in turn, pitted various traditional Moroccan beliefs against European beliefs. This initially led to conflict between North Africans and Europeans ideologically. These tensions were only heightened by the French conquest of Algeria in 1840. This particular incident, which was hotly contested by the Ottoman-instilled powers there,⁴² sent shockwaves throughout North Africa and the rest of the Muslim world because of the anxiety caused by the belief that non-Muslim Europe was expanding into the Muslim world.⁴³ For many Muslims, this changed the image of the *Dar al-Islam* (Arabic term for the Muslim World) to an idea that Algeria was no longer Muslim, causing many to feel that the French were then taking Algeria to convert it, thereby removing it from Muslim control. While this resulted in an open and violent rejection of French rule by some Algerian tribes and Sufi orders,⁴⁴ many pious Algerian Muslims, such as many Sufi leaders, left the region to other "untainted" Muslim lands. Thus, as more and more Algerian Muslim refugees relocated into other North African areas—mostly into Tunisia—North African resentment of the French grew across the Muslim World.

This dynamic continued beyond Algeria. As the various European states conquered more territories, the Muslim anti-European sentiment grew as well. For example, the loss of the Ottoman controlled areas in the Balkans (1878), Tunisia (1881), Libya, and Egypt (1882) was seen as further encroachment into *Dar al-Islam*. In Morocco, these anti-European sentiments were felt especially after the French defeat of the Makhzan's forces (1844) and the Spanish expansion into Tetouan (1859).⁴⁵ The French victories against the Makhzan in particular led not only to the ex-

pansion of what the French determined as Algeria but also expressed the inability of the Sultan to protect his own lands from the Europeans. The Europeans then used this as an excuse to begin to trade more and more in Morocco, creating a similar situation similar to Algeria before the French colonization.

By the 1870s, the Europeans had a huge advantage trade-wise and militarily over traditional Moroccan traders and forces.⁴⁶ Because of this, Moroccan Sultan Malway Hassan/Hassan I (r.1873-1894) decided to centralize his power through a series of modernizing reforms, funded by taxes on the Makhzan.⁴⁷ These reforms were complemented with a European protégé system that gave European citizenship and educations to Moroccan citizens in exchange for helping the Europeans trade and establish diplomatic relations in Morocco. Thus, many Moroccan elites, including established 'alims at al-Qarawiyn University, began to view Morocco as quickly falling under French control, making it only a matter of time before Morocco became just another colony of France.

However, the new policies created by Sultan Hassan I quickly shifted the Moroccan resentment of European encroachment to resentment of the Sultan. This was witnessed by the Fez Tanner's Rebellion (1873) as well as the various smaller and less-significant rebellions before it.⁴⁸ The Tanner's Rebellion centered on the implementation of the *mukus*, a market tax imposed by makhzan tax collectors, which was promptly protested by the powerful tanners' guilds in the city. Essentially, these guilds blockaded streets, preventing the entrance of tax collectors, while rioters sacked and looted the homes of market officials. Eventually these anti-Colonial/anti-Sultan sentiments led to both members of the makhzan and various Sufi orders to call for the replacement of Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz with his brother, 'Abd al-Hafiz, in 1907.

While the Moroccan national movement did not exist until the 1930s, it is certainly valid to argue that counter colonial resistance pre-dated the French and Spanish Protectorates. The increasing European pressure, predominantly by France, through both increased economic influence and colonial conquest led many Moroccans to fear that Morocco would quickly become another European colony. Further, Moroccan Muslims felt that they would then be forced to convert from their religion. Therefore, it is evident that Islam became the major identity that these early counter colonialist used to resist these European influences.

The Role of the King as Protector

During the Pre-Protectorate Era, the state of Morocco was facing cultural encroachment from many fronts. The Europeans were expanding into North Africa through trade colonization, the Ottoman Sultans were expanding their influence through Pan-Islamist policies, and revivalist Sufis and members of the Makhzan were calling for the end of the sultan's reign. These issues forced the sultans of this period to balance between the various influences in order to maintain their influence over Moroccan society, which in turn led to the creation of the Protectorate. However, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and the rise of the Moroccan national movement, Sultan Mohammad V viewed the French influence in Morocco as negative to the state, leading him to side with the nationalists over the French.

As noted earlier, traditional Moroccan government operated under a sharifa system. As a whole, the power in this particular type of system of came from a group of sharifs, people descended from the Prophet Mohammad. The role of the sultan, who was elected from this group of sharifs, was the protector of the kingdom, serving as the figurehead of the entire system.⁴⁹

This can be seen through his assumed roles as both the protector of the faithful, making him the final interpreter of all Muslim beliefs, and as the official protector of Morocco from outside forces, giving him the authority to control the Moroccan military. In both of these instances, the sultan was given full authority to achieve his goals. For example, if the sultan disagreed with a religious belief of a particular group, he had the ability to disband that group. Likewise, the sultan had the ability to officially recognize individual families as sharifs as well. This has happened on many occasions in Moroccan history.⁵⁰ This absolute authority gave Pre-Protectorate and Colonial Eras gave the Sultan an additional role as the chief mediator with other powers, such as France and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, whatever was the goal of the sultan became the goal of Morocco.

The sultan's authority as a sharif, a descendent of the Prophet pitted the Moroccan sultan against another major Muslim power: the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans controlled the vast majority of the Middle East and North Africa but were Turks—not Arabs.⁵¹ Thus, the Ottomans could not trace their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammad. For this reason, the Moroccan monarchy argued that Moroccan Islam was a "purer" interpretation of Islam than Ottoman Islam and thereby tried to limit the influence of the Ottomans in Morocco. During the rise of Pan-Islamism in the Middle East, this interpretation of the Ottoman lineage led the sultan to be very reluctant to accept the spread of Pan-Islamist ideas from the east.⁵²

The rejection of Ottoman Pan-Islam did not mean that the Moroccan monarchy rejected the idea entirely. During the 1870s and in the wake of European encroachment into North Africa, Sultan Hasan I began to reach out to Muslim lands that the Moroccan Monarchy had traditionally influenced in order to safeguard the Moroccan border.⁵³ Specifically, the sultan reached out to the Central Sahara (including the Touat oasis complex), Mauritania, and the Western Sahara (including the Muslim city of Timbuctu). These Muslim regions accepted the increased Moroccan influence because they viewed Muslim Morocco as more fitting rulers than non-Muslim Europe. In this way, Pan-Islam played a huge role in Moroccan foreign policy before the Protectorate Era, even though it was not the direct Ottoman-lead version of Pan-Islam.

In contrast to their policies with the Ottoman Empire, the Pre-Protectorate sultans were much more lenient on regulating European infiltration of traditional Moroccan society because the Pre-Protectorate and Protectorate Eras were more or less helpless in the face of European encroachment.⁵⁴ The entire North African economy was being disrupted by increased European influence. Further, after the defeats at the hands of the French during the colonization of Algeria, the Moroccan sultans during the 19th Century felt that Morocco was unable to compete with Europe militarily or economically.

These sentiments were expressed in a letter written on behalf of Sultan Hasan I, by *Faqih* (scribe/scholar) 'Ali bin Mohammad as-Susi as Simlali, in 1891.⁵⁵ The letter was a response to a letter asking why the sultan refused to lead a jihad against the Europeans. Particularly, Simlali cited both the military advantage of the Europeans over the Makhzan's military as well as the perceived disunity in Moroccan society. He and many other Moroccan officials felt the Moroccans be unable to win a war against the Europeans. Further, Simlali was unsure that the Moroccan people would even support a war against Europe. Instead, he argued, many people would turn and support the invading colonizers over the sultan. Thus, while Hassan I may have disliked the European encroachment, his inability to stop it forced him to adopt a policy of appeasement towards European powers.

Each sultan approached this problem in different manner, but overall this policy of appeasement became the major policy of the Sultan towards Europeans.⁵⁶ This is witnessed through

the opening of the Moroccan economy in 1856⁵⁷ along with a law that exempted European merchants from Moroccan laws in 1863.⁵⁸ These two actions by the Moroccan monarchy allowed European merchants to have relatively free reign over the Moroccan markets and allowed European diplomats to have more and more influence on the Moroccan monarchy. As a result, by the time Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz (r.1894-1908) succeeded Hassan I to the throne, the role of the sultan was overshadowed by various advisors and European representatives.⁵⁹ Eventually, as has been previously noted, the public unrest over the relationship between the sultan and Europe would eventually explode into the Hafizian Affair and Meknes revolt (1911), leading Sultan Moulay Hafid (r.1908-1912) to invite in the French and creating the French and Spanish Protectorates in 1912.

During the early years of the Protectorate, the Resident-General, the head of the French government in Morocco, ultimately controlled Moroccan politics through the French Protectorate government.⁶⁰ This period was deeply colored by the Treaty of Fez, which limited the French to the practical business of the state. The treaty granted the French control over the Moroccan military and economy. With this control, the French focused mostly on establishing their rule in Morocco within those specific realms. They developed a complex system of advisors to various members to the Makhzan and tribal leaders, actively trying to establish their invisible government in the daily affairs of the Makhzan and to include themselves in the Amazigh affairs of the rural areas. The French limited the role of the sultan to interpreting culture and religion in Morocco, thereby effectively eliminating the monarch's role in Morocco.

The French political influence extended into all facets of Moroccan politics, including the selection of the sultan. The protectorate government would use this influence to intentionally pick weaker sultans who the French could then easily control as pawns. The lack of royal leadership would then bolster the argument that Morocco needed the French to survive.⁶¹ Further, this would allow the French to act as they pleased in Morocco, with no fear of a royal challenge to their authority.

This was the logic behind the selection of Mohammad Ibn Yusef, later to be known as Sultan/King Mohammad V, as sultan in 1927. The young sultan was considered the weakest of his brothers and thus the perfect French pawn. In reality, Mohammad V was the exact opposite of a French-chosen figurehead. Along with welcoming the Allies into Morocco during Operation Torch in World War II, he became a major supporter of the nationalist movements during the 1940s.⁶² The source of his ability to resist the policies of the French protectorate government came from the Treaty of Fez. The treaty required that the sultan sign off on all proposed French policy before it could be enacted. This allowed the sultan to protest legislation by barring it from being carried out until the French met his demands, similar to a presidential veto in the United States.

It was these types of rejections of French control that occurred throughout Mohammad V's reign during the 1940s.⁶³ Through his reign, led the sultan became more involved in the fight between the nationalists and the French loyalists. The most prominent bill Mohammad V refused to sign was the French law that made a formal disavowal of the nationalist movement; after this vote, the sultan became completely associated with the Moroccan nationalist movement. As a result, the French began to look for ways to topple Mohammad V in order to stop the nationalist movement in Morocco.

Between the 18th and mid-20th Centuries, the role of the Moroccan sultan had been shaped and re-shaped by various external and internal factors. Nonetheless, the role of the sultan as the protector of the Moroccan state remained stable throughout this time. This prompted many

of the sultans before Mohammad V to appease European powers in order to prevent Morocco from becoming just another European colony. However, with Mohammad V, the role of the sultan began to be associated with the nationalist movement through his incessant vetoes of French policies against Moroccan sovereignty.

Creating the Nationalist Symbol of the Protector King

Mohammad V's counter-colonial actions did more than simply counter anti-Moroccan/Pro-French interests in the French Protectorate of Morocco. These acts aligned the sultan with the Nationalist movement as a whole, making him a target for the French as the primary symbol of the Moroccan nationalist movement. Thus, Mohammad V united the counter colonial/nationalistic movement, giving the movement a royalist element on top of its Islamic counter colonial image.

After associating Mohammad V with the national movement in the 1940s, the French began to look for ways to depose the sultan. At the same time, actions began to escalate against the Protectorate government in the late 1940s and early 1950s.⁶⁴ The French countered these acts with arrests and exiles of various individuals. But these arrests did little to deter the nationalist efforts, and by 1952, the colonial government banned the Istiqlal Party. Then, Resident-General Guillaume (r.1951-1954) united the pro-French tribes to overthrow Mohammad V. Guillaume replaced the popular sultan with Mohammad Ben Arafa and exiled Mohammad V to Madagascar.⁶⁵ This was a measure to remove the official support for the nationalist movement. Essentially, the idea was that if the French could separate the sultan from the national movement they could then wipe out the counter-French movement all together.

The French's view of Mohammad V highlighted the sultan's role as a public spokesperson for the Moroccan nationalist movement. Unlike the various nationalists before him, Mohammad V did not have to hide from the French Protectorate Government. Instead, the Treaty of Fez gave him the right to question the French influence in Morocco. Therefore, the nationalist movement was able to mobilize behind him without fearing the repercussions of their counter-colonial actions. Instead, the sultan would become the public figure of the nationalist movement, incurring the vast majority of the French attacks towards the nationalists. While the nationalist movement was founded in these counter-colonial calls, those anti-French sentiments were tempered by a royalist nature with the reign of Mohammad V.

Conclusion

While the modern Moroccan nationalist movement is dated to the 1930s, the counter colonial nature of the movement dates back as far as the 18th Century. At many times this counter colonial movement was very much at odds with the sultan because of the sultan's policy of appeasement towards European influences. However, after the crowning of Sultan Mohammad V and his eventual siding with the nationalist movement in Morocco, the Moroccan nationalist movement quickly adopted an identity that not only advocated the end of the French Protectorate but also called for the return of power to the sultan.

Interestingly, this new nationalist alliance between the Islamic nationalist movement, led mostly by members of the Makhzan and the sultan mimicked the old sharifa system, where the

Makhzan and Sufi orders helped the sultan maintain control through an Islamic identity. Thus, Morocco, unlike many post-colonial states, was able to maintain its pre-colonial government through colonization. Nonetheless it becomes paramount for these systems to work together for this system to work properly. The nationalist movement in Morocco ran off a similar dynamic. Thus, the Moroccan nationalist movement contained both an Islamic counter-colonial identity and a royalist nature.

The Nationalist Explosion: French Colonial Education Policy and Formation of Moroccan National Identity

French education began in Morocco through missionary schools in 1862, with the opening of a Jewish school in Tetouan.⁶⁶ An Algerian chapter of the Alliance Française, a secular Paris-based French group founded in 1883, followed suit by founding a school in Tangiers in 1894. These new schools spread French culture to the Moroccan population. They also became the foundation of French influence in Morocco in the era leading up to the Treaty of Fez⁶⁷ and its establishment of the French protectorate of Morocco in 1912.

The role of these French schools rapidly expanded soon after the Treaty of Fez, when the French colonial leadership in Morocco viewed these schools as a way to enforce their influence over the Moroccans.⁶⁸ Amongst ideas, like the dependence of the Moroccan state on French aid as well as theories, like nationalism, a key French concept was ethnology, the study of the different ethnicities. This now gravely discredited pseudo-science allowed the French to split the urban, Arabic-speaking population from the rural Amazigh tribes by establishing French-conceived definitions of the various ethnic identities and emphasizing them through cultural, professional, and academic educations for each language group.⁶⁹

Many Moroccans, especially members of the Royal family and the Makhzan, the traditional Moroccan bureaucratic/noble class, initially embraced these French schools as a way to improve the quality of life in Morocco as well as insurance that the French would protect the weak old system from the threat of civil war.⁷⁰ However, by 1923, many French-educated Moroccans became critical of these educational policies because of the forced submission of Moroccans to the French, despite the promise of the Treaty of Fez to make Moroccans modern equals of the Europeans through French control of Moroccan affairs.⁷¹ By 1944, the critics of colonialism had decided that independence from the French Empire was the only solution to this problem. These critics formed the nationalistic *Istiqlal* (independence) party during the same year.

Even though the Moroccan independence movement incorporated different groups of Moroccan society, Amazigh and Arab alike, the initial Moroccan counter-colonialists were mostly French-educated Arabs from urban areas. Thus, early leaders of the independence movement spoke either French or Arabic.⁷² By contrast, the French had set up schools in Amazigh lands that focused more on assimilating the Amazigh into French society because they viewed these mountain tribes as almost European in contrast to the urbanized Arabs.⁷³ Thus, it becomes apparent that these educational policies, which focused on separating the Moroccan ethnic groups from each other, attempted to create a hierarchy of the language groups in Morocco, placing French at the top, with Amazigh immediately under it, and Arabic at the bottom. However, because the early nationalist leaders, including the sultan, held an Arab-Moroccan identity, the original colonial hierarchy, with the French at the top, followed by the Arab and Amazigh language groups respectively, was imposed by the early national movement.

French Education Policy

When the Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez in 1912, his obvious goal was self-preservation. The French government was given control over the Moroccan economy and foreign policy in exchange for protecting the current and future sultans from domestic uprisings and invasions.⁷⁴ Likewise the treaty simultaneously maintained the sultans' influence over Moroccan Islam and culture. For this reason, the French limited themselves to more covert influences over the Sultan instead of an overt military control of the state.⁷⁵ Thus, the French viewed education as the perfect way to control the Moroccan masses by reinforcing French constructed ethnic boundaries and the idea of French supremacy in the region.

The spirit behind the treaty of Fez colored all of the French approach to colonize Morocco because it left the sultan in power of certain aspects of Moroccan culture. Thus, while the French could maintain control of nearly all aspects of Moroccan life, they still had to rely on the sultan to influence any cultural and religious aspects of Moroccan society.⁷⁶ This dynamic resulted in the creation of a French shadow-bureaucracy in Morocco to advise the sultan and the Makhzan in the modernization of Morocco.⁷⁷ These French "residents" acted as liaisons to members of the Makhzan and were thereby able to influence nearly all aspects of Moroccan society through their advice to the Moroccan nobles.

At the top of the French bureaucracy in Morocco was the Resident General, who acted as the official voice of the French government to the Sultan. This position essentially set the tone of French influence in the protectorate. Thus, a key figure in the creation of these policies was the first Resident-General of Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey (1912-1925), who essentially hand-crafted most of the French policies in Morocco.⁷⁸ As a veteran of many French colonial campaigns, including being second in command under Joseph Gallieni in both the conquest in Madagascar and Indochina, Lyautey was trained to fit policy to specific situations.⁷⁹ He thus tailored French policies specifically to handle the problems presented by the sultan's heavy influence over Moroccan culture.

After the establishment of the Protectorate in 1912, Lyautey's policy called for education to be the major enforcement of French influence in the kingdom. French schools began to educate Moroccans in the "proper" social relationships, primarily the dynamic between the colonized and colonizer as well as ruler and subject. French pedagogical influence was expanded from a small minority of Moroccan schools to the vast majority of schools in Morocco.

Despite this increased influence, the French planned out many of their policies in order to protect the hegemony of the sultan's culture. However, the cultural diversity of Morocco confused the initial French educators and policy makers as to which aspects of culture were distinctly "Moroccan".⁸⁰ To solve this dilemma, colonial officials decided to rely on the idea of ethnology, the study of the physical and cultural differences between ethnicities. Interestingly enough, there was no official school of this pseudo-science at the advent of the protectorate. These various ethnic-based French policies were based off of the various accounts of French colonial officials in North Africa. These accounts divided the Moroccan population between the urban, Arab-speaking people and the rural Amazigh populations. Thus in local applications of these policies, the regions and economy were divided into the different ethnic and class groups.⁸¹

These various groups were not just culturally separated from each other. They were also physically separated.⁸² For example, the French officials created separate parts of cities called *nouvelle-ville* (French for "new city"), which were separated from the *medinas* (Arabic for "cities"). According to Lyautey, this would allow the French to influence local Moroccan economics

and culture without physically interfering with them. Thus, like in South African apartheid, different groups were separated through physical and cultural barriers of colonial policy.

Schools also divided the Moroccan population. After dividing the population amongst ethnicity, class, and gender, the French supplied schools for each ethnic group. Each school would therefore enforce the French goal for each group.⁸³ For example, a working class Arab would be placed in a technical school and trained in their local craft. Contrastingly, a member of the Makhzan would be enrolled in a more western-styled higher education. Thus, the French used this class segregation to insure that the rulers would remain in power.

Lyautey believed this chance of a proper education for the Makhzan would make them feel indebted to the French and would consequently convert them to the French mind-set.⁸⁴ Initially, the French attempted to reform the traditional Moroccan mosque-universities, such as the *Qarawiyyin*⁸⁵ in Fez. The French attempted to take over the professor selection in the *Qarawiyyin* in 1914 by collaborating with Mohammad al-Hajoui, the sultan's delegate for education, and creating a *majlis ulema* (administrative council of teachers). The primary goal of this council was to standardize professor salary and appointment to the university. However, when the colonial government moved to change the pedagogy of the *Qarawiyyin*, the professors, especially those holding salafist and/or sufist beliefs, resisted the changes. Unwilling to violate the Treaty of Fez, the French abandoned further attempts to reform the traditional school system until the 1930s.

Instead, the French focused on creating new schools for the Makhzan.⁸⁶ These new schools, called *collèges arabes* (Arab schools) and later *collèges musulmans* (Muslim schools), were designed to give the children of the nobility a modern education in order to craft them into the future leaders of the Moroccan Protectorate. The first of these schools, *collège Moulay Idriss*, was founded in Fez in 1914. A similar but smaller school, *collège Moulay Youssef* in Rabat, soon followed the school in Fez in 1916, and multiple others as the years of the Protectorate continued. Overall, these schools effected a small portion of the Moroccan elite.⁸⁷ Part of this limited size was intentional. As a part of the class segregation, the French made tuition only affordable by the elite members of the Makhzan. However, many of the initial Protectorate nobles refused to send their children to these schools for fear of French influence, which aided in this limited size as well.

With these new schools for the Makhzan, the French also opened the Military college of Meknes in 1919.⁸⁸ The graduates of this academy would become French military officers, who would serve as Auxiliary Troops of the Levant. Further any graduate of this school was forced to become a French citizen, which normally entailed renouncing their religion. Yet after serving 10-15 years as an officer, Lyautey planned for these officers to return to Morocco and become functioning members of Moroccan society, mostly as qa'ids (tribal leaders). Thus, they would become indebted to the Protectorate system and maintain it.

Thus, the French used education in order to influence the Moroccan elite during the era of the Protectorate, witnessed by both the associational-styled Makhzan schools and the assimilation-styled military college in Meknes. Although this style of cultural manipulation was nothing new for the French Empire, the protection of "Moroccan culture" by the Treaty of Fez made the implementation of these cultural policies quite difficult.

Understanding the "Good Berber/Bad Arab" Policy:

While education was important in the French dominance of Morocco, these educational policies varied by location because the French policies revolved around dividing the extremely diverse Moroccan population into Arab, Amazigh, and French language groups. The colonial planners, mostly under the guidance of Georges Hardy, created these divisions through ethnological studies from other African colonies of France, predominantly Senegal and Algeria.⁸⁹ Together, these studies led to French policies that not only divided Arabs and Amazigh along lines of urbanization but also viewed the Amazigh populations as a more European group than the Arabs and less loyal to the sultan. Therefore, the French applied more policies to assimilate Amazighs into French culture.

Georges Hardy, director of public education in French Morocco (1920-1926), is the key figure in the adaption of French ethnography in Morocco.⁹⁰ Before Hardy headed the educational system in colonial Morocco, he served as the educational director of the *l'Afrique occidentale française* (AOF) in Senegal. There he worked under William Ponty, a French republican with a background very similar to Lyautey and a disdain for native officials, who developed the *ap-privoisement* (domestication) style of educating native populations in the colonies. This policy was built off the idea of assimilating entire populations instead of individuals, which prevented the creation of an official class of *évoulés* ("evolved individuals"/completely assimilated native) from single assimilated individuals.⁹¹ Ponty's goal was to bring African culture into a French mindset. Thus, the French attempted to respect the native culture, established by French ethnographic definitions of important cultural traits, as much as possible.

In Morocco, Hardy carried out Ponty's policies of *ap-privoisement* mostly through his focus on expanding the role of ethnology in French colonial policy.⁹² He created an ethnographic academy, *l'Institut des hautes études marocaines*, in 1920. Further, until Hardy's departure from Morocco in 1926, he and his future successor, Louis Brunot, acted as the leading French specialists on Moroccan culture. There was a group of ethnographers in Morocco before Hardy. This early effort to ethnologically study rural Moroccans was a part of a committee on Amazigh studies (ESLADB) due to resistance in the Rif Mountains in 1913, whose primary job was to gain an understanding of the Amazigh populations linguistically as well as culturally. Hardy then formally institutionalized ethnology in Morocco through his school as an expansion of French interest in building local government in response to the need of increased French troops in France because of World War I. However, because the subject was so new to ethnographers in Morocco, most studies, before and after Hardy, came from previous studies in other French colonies, particularly Algeria.

The most influential of these extra-Morocco ethnographical studies was the French study of the Kabyle Berbers in Algeria.⁹³ This particular Amazigh tribe, along with the Shawi of Central Tunis, is characterized by blond hair and blue eyes, which thoroughly confused European visitors to the region.⁹⁴ These scholars also noted that the Amazigh language, which could be traced more closely related to European languages than Arabic or African tongues. Similarly, these ethnographers labeled the Amazigh Islam, which is not entirely like Arab Islam and contains some elements of pre-Islamic/Arab influences, as a "weaker" interpretation of Islam. Together, these ideas led various ethnographers to describe Amazigh as not only different from Arabs but closely related to Europeans, thus more susceptible to European influence.

Interestingly, Hardy, while holding to the findings of the Kabyle studies, declared that all Moroccan culture was Berber.⁹⁵ He based his claim on the dialectic difference between Darija,

Moroccan Arabic, and traditional Arabic from outside North Africa. Hardy argued that Amazigh were a resilient and resistant race, who had resisted a series of invaders, the last being Arabs, and had had never truly submitted to these colonizing cultures. The *makhzan* was then to be viewed as semi-Amazigh institution that held onto the sultan as a keystone in power over the Moroccan because of his role in Islam.

However, most French ethnographers in Morocco did not support Hardy in this idea. The most notable of these rejections was "*l'École française et la question berbère*" by Laglay, which claimed that while all Moroccans may be Amazigh, there is a difference between the adoption of Arab culture in urbanized Moroccan areas and the absence of that influence in the rural areas.⁹⁶ The urbanized areas, controlled by the *makhzan*, were also characterized by their loyalty to the sultan, making these purer Amazigh areas completely separate from the Arabized parts of the kingdom. This idea was supported by studies of Moroccan products, which claimed the Amazigh crafts, such as jewelry and blankets, made in the isolated mountain communities as traditionally Moroccan, while the urban crafts, such as carpets and pottery, was described as being based in the Syrian and/or Persian in origin.⁹⁷ These foreign styles were considered commercial in nature and their supply was maintained by constant contact, either by trade or intermarriage, with the Middle East.

This ethnic distinction manifested itself in colonial policies predominantly through education. Laglay argued that unless the French acted, the Arabs would completely assimilate the Moroccan Amazighs, as was witnessed by Algerian colonial policies in the Kabyle region.⁹⁸ For this reason, he advocated the creation of separate Amazigh schools, focusing on French language and assimilation, for the rural regions. This fit perfectly into Hardy's school plan, which called for limited Arabic education.⁹⁹ Arabic and Islamic education was banned from the Moroccan education system except where they already existed. For example, there was no standard Arabic education in the rural areas. Even in urban areas, these classes were limited, and even when standard Arabic was taught, it was always taught by colonially appointed teachers, generally from Tunisia or Algeria.¹⁰⁰ Again, the argument was that Moroccans, who spoke a remote dialect of Arabic, did not need to know more traditional Arabic as much as they needed French, which would tie them to their colonizers.

Origins of the Moroccan National Movement

Moroccan nationalism arose in this divisive atmosphere of French Colonial policy in North Africa.¹⁰¹ In many ways, it was a reaction to the French attempts to separate and subvert the native Amazigh and Arab populations to the French colonial effort. This led the children of the *makhzan* educated in French schools, who were often stigmatized by their Arab origins, to feel ostracized in the colonial Moroccan society, which in turn led them to call for the end of colonial rule in Morocco and the creation of a free Islamic state under the sultan. These national aspirations were cemented by the French attempts to separate the Arab and Amazigh language groups as well as the French aid of the Spanish in the Rif War (1921-1925).

French policy went beyond the mere separation of the various ethnic groups in Moroccan schools. They also divided the interpretation of certain laws for each ethnic group.¹⁰² These differences were felt at all levels of the French colonial legal system. On a political level, the native Moroccans, both Amazigh and Arab, had no representation until 1947.¹⁰³ This was because they were not allowed to vote. By contrast, the French colonials in Morocco, who were allowed to

vote, were quite politically active. This made many complaints of the native Moroccans fall upon deaf ears of the Residency. Also, with the close connection between the makhzan and the French colonial government, these influences were often heeded on both the colonial and traditional levels of government. Beyond voting, native Moroccans were not given any political rights whatsoever by the French colonial system. Partially, the French scholars noted that there was no pre-existing tradition of civil rights and liberties. Therefore, Lyautey was able to superficially argue that there was no real need to impose a foreign conception of protecting individual rights in Moroccan society.

Without these protections, the French colonial government was able to prosecute Moroccan dissidents without trials.¹⁰⁴ Many Moroccans were arrested and detained without any explanation by either the makhzan or the colonial government. The sentences ranged from a few months in prison for minor offenses to exile in either another part of Morocco or even another French colony.¹⁰⁵ These detentions and exiles were not used only on individuals who had broke laws; instead, the French also threatened the families of individuals that acted against the desires of the French colonial government. This was a popular method to control people in French schools. For example, when Messaoud Chiguer's father, a member of the makhzan, refused to send Chiguer to the muslim school in Rabat, the colonial government had the father arrested and sent to prison. However, the French would also withhold degrees from students enrolled in Moroccan schools until the individuals submitted to French rule. Allal al-Fassi, one of Morocco's prominent early nationalists, was subject to this style of oppression when the French suspended giving him his certificate to become an ulama, an Islamic instructor, despite his completion of final examinations, as well as exiling him to Casablanca because of his role in the 1930 reformist riots in Fez.¹⁰⁶ Despite the equality between the Moroccans and the French promised by the Treaty of Fez, the colonial policies subverted the native Moroccans into second tiered citizens of their own country.

This subversion even held for Moroccans who had completed the elite French schooling. Constantly, the French often patronized these individuals if they were not snobbishly writing them off as inferior beings.¹⁰⁷ Often, Moroccans were simply and pejoratively referred to as the indigenous people. Also, these educated individuals, generally the children of the makhzan, were only given two options at the completion of school: become a prominent member of the makhzan or become a low-level member of the colonial government. Either choice gave little room for individual advancement. Thus, the newly graduated French educated Moroccan noble was trapped by birth in the colony of Morocco. Partially this was a result of the segregationist French policies, which banned Moroccans from serving the French government, as well as the absence of jobs all across France caused by the Great Depression.

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson argues that this style of elite colonial isolation, which he refers to as the pilgrimage of the elite, results in a native elite in a colony (53-59). These local elites, who begin to identify more with the colony than the Empire, then start to view the colony as its own entity, helping contribute to the colonial sense of an imagined community. They then become the leaders of any resulting national movement. It is in this manner that the French educated children of the makhzan became the most likely early leaders of Moroccan nationalism.

Beyond theory, the French educated children of the makhzan became the early nationalists (1921-1930) because of their education.¹⁰⁸ Almost all of them studied at the collèges musulmans.¹⁰⁹ This exposed many of them to western ideas. Likewise, with similar backgrounds, they were able to share their problems with one another, creating a common identity through their

struggles against the colonial system. This led many of them to adopt many Salafist ideas circulating around Morocco in the early 20th Century.¹¹⁰ A major Salafist idea was the rejuvenation of traditional Moroccan influence, i.e. the sultan and makhzan, in Morocco.¹¹¹ Thus, many of these early nationalists were more interested in holding the French to the Treaty of Fez rather than completely reject the French system under the colonial thesis of the backwardness of the traditional Moroccan system based on the Islamic structure under the sultan.

However, these calls for reform became calls for an independent Morocco after the French created the separate Amazigh schools in 1923.¹¹² These Muslim-minded thinkers viewed such reforms as attempts to undermine the role of the sultan by indoctrinating the Muslim Amazigh population to a more European mindset. Likewise, when the French elected to help the Spanish in the Rif War in 1925, the early nationalists saw a colonial government forcibly imposing their government and culture on a native Moroccan population despite the promise to let Moroccans to maintain their native culture in accordance to the Treaty of Fez. Thus, the French policies towards the Amazigh cemented the counter-colonial aspirations of early Moroccan nationalists.

The official ban on Moroccan freedom to associate and assemble colored the nature of early Moroccan nationalism.¹¹³ Thus, to pass their ideas, the early nationalists formed into various secret societies.¹¹⁴ The earliest of these societies, which included Mohammed Gharzi and Allal al-Fassi, was founded in November of 1925 in Fez. This unnamed group was marked by its extremely clandestine nature. Other groups in Tetouan and Rabat quickly followed, both being founded in 1926. These groups focused on creating a current of reformist thought by propagating modern Islamic ideas circulating in the Middle East amongst intellectuals in Morocco. They accomplished this goal by having private meetings in members' homes to discuss these issues. The Fez group also made a concerted effort to spread these ideas to the countryside after each of the leaders were arrested and exiled for the group's role in the 1930 Fez Riots against the French Amazigh separation policy. It is at this point that the Moroccan nationalistic movement moves beyond the cities in the French Zone.

Each of these secret societies also had a press element to them as well.¹¹⁵ Like the right to assemble, freedom of the press was a complicated issue in colonial Morocco. Officially, Moroccans were free to print whatever they wanted, the colonial government made many laws in order to control what was and was not printed in Moroccan periodicals. A major law that supports this law was that the Resident General was allowed to ban any paper or journal not written in French. Originally, this was used as a way to prevent German and Arab propaganda from entering into Morocco but this was later used against the nationalist presses. By contrast, any periodicals written in French were only required to file a declaration of intent with the local prosecutor. This made French a much more popular choice for early nationalist papers.¹¹⁶ The first of these French papers, the Paris-based *Maghreb*, was first published in 1934 and was quickly followed by Fez's *L'action du Peuple* by August of that year. Various Arab-printed papers passed in and out of existence but never took root as well as the French printed papers.

These papers allowed the nationalists to communicate with one another and with people outside of Morocco, mostly in attempts to garner support in France. Thus, while the subject matter was quite subversive and provocative, the tone of these papers were quite calm and respectful in comparison to other Middle Eastern nationalist periodicals.¹¹⁷ This is a textbook example of Anderson's role of the press in the creation of an imagined community.¹¹⁸ These papers, which were circulated around Morocco and France, were intended to spread the beliefs of the early Mo-

roccan nationalists by creating a similar view of the French colonial influence in the Moroccan Protectorate.

The French had divided Morocco amongst the various linguistic groups in the hopes of taking away the collective power of the natives as a whole. They accomplished this through various educational and social policies. However because the Treaty of Fez required the colonial government to protect and respect the elevated role of the makhzan, the higher education was reserved for the children of urbanized Arab nobles. However, within the initial generation, the first generation noted the hypocritical nature of the French policies. This dual nature led these students to form early nationalist movement, centered on passing their message through secret meetings and nationalistic periodicals.

A New Moroccan Ethnic Hierarchy

The good Amazigh/bad Arab policy reflects the French view that the Amazigh people were superior to the Arabs in Morocco. For this reason, certain French strategists, like Marty, attempted to assimilate the rural Amazighs through the use of schools exclusively taught in French. In theory, this would have led to a social hierarchy with the French at the top, followed by the Amazigh and the Arabs respectively.¹¹⁹ In response, early Moroccan nationalists, who were from the urban Arab population and were educated in the French makhzan training schools, focused on promoting a cohesive Arab identity for their new Morocco. This led them to reinforce the original hierarchy with the French language group over the Arab language speakers, and the Amazigh at the bottom. Further this hierarchy was enforced by various nationalist policies to Arab-ize the Amazigh who interacted with the early nationalists.

This proposed colonial social hierarchy, which elevated a group disloyal to the sultan, blatantly disregarded the originally the Treaty of Fez, where the French promised to protect the hegemony of the Moroccan sultan and the makhzan. This led many early Moroccan nationalists to call for the French to uphold the agreements reached in 1912, as opposed to a complete overthrow of French influence.¹²⁰ Looking at this side of the issue, it becomes obvious that the Moroccan Arabs, who were partially identified by their loyalty to the sultan, would become the early nationalists in Morocco. By contrast, the Amazigh had no counter-colonial organization after the Franco-Spanish victory in the Rif War nor did they have a set of teachers/educational media to promote their own nationality.¹²¹ Thus, while the nationalist movement represented both groups, the Arabs' numbers gave their opinions more sway in the decision-making process.

The influence of the Arabs was then huge in the creation of a nationalist agenda. Essentially, they were the ones that pushed for the promulgation of a Muslim identity, under the sultan, over the use of a single ethnicity or national identity in forming the definition of "Moroccan".¹²² The idea of separate Amazigh and Arab identities was viewed as a French political ploy to split Moroccans. Thus, to mention the differences between different groups in Morocco was frowned upon by the movement. Instead, they promoted the idea of a homogeneous Moroccan population with an Arab-Muslim identity under the sultan.¹²³ In this manner, the nationalists placed the Amazigh identity beneath the Arab identity through the loyalty to the sultan.

Another reason for this Amazigh subversion was because of the pre-colonial relationship between the Arabs and Amazigh. Like many other societies, Moroccan society was divided along the lines of rural and urban. The Arabs, who were for the most part better connected to the sultan, lived predominantly in the cities, while the Amazigh inhabited the countryside. This ur-

ban lifestyle and better political connection gave the Arabs a feeling of superiority to the Amazigh groups.¹²⁴ During the nationalist movement, this was no different. In fact, the emphasis on the potential political influence of the makhzan only intensified this notion of Arab superiority. Nonetheless, the Arabs tended to look down upon the Amazigh in general for this reason, which in turn led the early nationalists to promulgate this policy of promoting Arab dominance in the region.

Interestingly, French was not viewed in the same manner as Amazigh. Instead of being pushed from influence, French became the dominant language of the nationalist movement.¹²⁵ This was because this was the language chosen to communicate between the various Moroccan nationalists in both Morocco and France because of the French-imposed barriers to Arabic media. The French language media, and thus the French language group, maintained its dominance over Moroccan culture during the nationalist period. In this way, the nationalist movement maintained the original colonial hierarchy (French, then Arab, and finally Amazigh) through their use of the French language and their suppression of Amazigh influence on the nationalist movement.

Conclusion

It is interesting to note how the nature of a certain set of policies can completely shape the entire nature of a society. For example, although French education was nothing new to Morocco by the time of the Protectorate, the particular policies presented during this time, especially those which ethnically divided Moroccans, led to a nationalist backlash against the French Residency government by the early 1920s. In hopes of creating a homogenous Moroccan national identity, the early nationalists completely denied any ethnic differences between the urban Arabs and the rural Amazigh, which in turn led to the subversion of the Amazigh to the Arab identity. By contrast, because all the Arab nationalists were educated in French, the colonial language gave the early nationalists an easier way to communicate with one another; and it logically became the dominant language in the nationalist movement. Thus, these reactions to the French colonial policies created a linguistic hierarchy in Morocco during this time, which placed French at the top to be followed by Arabic, and finally Amazigh.

CONCLUSION

In Morocco, the colonial language, French, was taken up by the nationalist movement as a mode of preserving the pre-existing and ideologically Muslim resistance to European encroachment into Morocco before the Protectorate Era. Likewise, the colonial attempts to split Moroccan society into French, Arab, and Amazigh groups as well as the special and protected status given to the Arab Makhzan led Arabs to become the original leaders of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement. These Arab-Moroccan nationalist leaders created a strong push for an Arab identity over French or Amazigh identities as a Moroccan identity.

Looking at the history of Moroccan Nationalism, Morocco serves as an interesting example of Benedict Anderson's dynamic of language as creating a national identity. A united language created a national identity through the creation of an imagined community. However, unlike many nationalist movements, which followed the alienation of creoles by a colonial

metropole, a subjugated former-elite class, who had already adopted a counter-colonial movement, which pre-dated the Protectorate, brought about Moroccan nationalism.

Anderson attributes counter-colonial nationalism to two major social groups. One, alienated creoles, individuals born in a metropole but living in a colony,¹²⁶ founded early nationalistic movements, such as those in the United States and Latin America.¹²⁷ These Creole nationalists directly descended from families from the metropole, but became tied to the colony because their jobs in their roles in the Empire never went beyond their birthplace. Other movements, witnessed in nationalistic movements after the Second World War, were made up of an educated indigenous elite.¹²⁸ Like the Creoles, these native elites became similarly tied to the colony through the group's personal history to the colony and isolation from the metropole. In both cases, these educated individuals also became very nationalistic through their contact with local, printed media. Therefore, nationalism in these former colonies was a product of an ideological separation of these colonial educated classes from the capital of the Empires.

Since, a Creole class did not have such a role in the formation of Moroccan nationalism, it is easy to conclude that Morocco would belong to Anderson's second category of counter-colonial nationalism. Arab members of the Makhzan expressed nationalistic sentiments only after they felt that the French Residency Government was not upholding their promises in the Treaty of Fez, to help modernize the kingdom, and instead that the French were using educational policies to ethnically divide Morocco. In traditional Moroccan society, the Makhzan aided the rule of the sultan, but after the creation of the French Protectorate in Morocco, Arab members of the Makhzan became second-class citizens. Therefore, a subjugated former-ruling class took the role of Creoles in the formation of a national movement in Morocco.

The foundations of Moroccan nationalism lie in a pre-existing movement: 18th and 19th Century, North African, Muslim resistance to European encroachment by Sufi orders and members of the Makhzan. The nationalist rhetoric carries these ideas in to a particular context of Morocco. However, French became the dominant language of the nationalist movement because many members of the Moroccan elite were educated in French schools and colonial policies to inhibit Arab print-media in Morocco. Therefore, although the Makhzan were not a Creole group, their use of French to create Moroccan nationalism mimics the formation of such movements in Creole cultures.

Nonetheless, the role of French colonial educational policies in Morocco comes in their failure to properly subjugate the Arabs and Amazigh under a single French colonial identity. Instead, it gave a mechanism for the 19th Century counter-colonial movement to continue into the Protectorate-Era. Thus, although Moroccan nationalism had a multi-ethnic and linguistic origins, the colonial language became the process of spreading these many ideas to the movement as a whole, despite originally being used by the French Empire in an attempt to subjugate the Moroccans. This particular case then highlights that nationalism is a unique synthesis of a common language with a particular set of ideals.

NOTES

1. Note from the Editor: In order to view the appendixes for this thesis, please refer to the online version at <http://chn.loyno.edu/history/student-historical-journal>.

2. John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1967, 11-25.
3. This thesis focuses predominantly on the French influence because, as Moshe Gershovich points out in *French Military Rule In Morocco* (2000), the French were the European government that directly dealt with Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz over the European entrance to Morocco and the formation the French Protectorate (40-58). By contrast, the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco was a result of a treaty between Spain and France—not Spain and Morocco.
4. Gershovich, *French Military Rule In Morocco*, 55-58.
5. I will use the preferred term "Amazigh" as opposed to the pejorative French term, "Berber", implying the group's role as an outside barbarian culture (Rachik, "Chapitre 1: Construction de l'identité amazighe," 9).
6. Pp. 37-46.
7. The official language in Morocco is Arabic, but with a quick look at figures A and B (Appendix I), it becomes evident that there are multiple native languages in Morocco.
8. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3-4.
9. Pp. 10
10. Pp. 10-11.
11. Pp. 4-6.
12. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 13.
13. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 9.
14. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 9-36.
15. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 37-46.
16. Spencer D. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 203-235.
17. David P.V. Gutelius, "The Path is Easy and the Benefits Large: The Nasiryya, Social Networks, and Economic Change in Morocco: 1640-1830," *The Journal of African History Vol. 43 No. 1* (2002), 40-41.
18. Susan G. Miller and Amal Rassam "The View From the Court: Moroccan Reactions to European Penetration during the Late 19th Century," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 16, No. 1* (1983), 28-30
19. Miller and Rassam, "The View From the Court: Moroccan Reactions to European Penetration during the Late 19th Century," 28.
20. Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138-141.
21. This war was an Amazigh rebellion under the leadership of Abd el-Krim in the Rif Mountains, a part of the Spanish Zone, against the Spanish and, through the Treaty of Fez, the sultan. Their goal was to make the Rif Mountains into an independent state. After the Spanish and Amazigh forces reached a stalemate in 1924, the French entered into the war to stop the spread of Amazigh national aspirations from entering into the French Zone. Eventually, the French defeated the Amazighs by July of 1925 (Gershovich 122-133).
22. William E. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 98-102.
23. This term, which is also spelled as *zawiya* or called a *тариقا* in Libya, refers to one of the many Sufi shrine-schools built around Muslim shrines across North Africa as well as the orders themselves (Cordell 21).
24. A.M. Mohamed Mackeen, "The Early History of Sufism in the Maghrib Prior to al-Shahili (d. 656/1258)," *Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. 91, No. 3* (July-September, 1971), 401.
25. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 49.
26. Sharifs are those that claim that they are direct descents from the Prophet Mohammad. Sharifian state is a form of a rule that Sharif as a class elect the sultan as a leader.
27. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 60.
28. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 49.
29. Sahar Bazzaz, *Forgotten Saints: History, Power, and the Politics in the Making of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 11.
30. In *Islam Observed* (1968), Clifford Geertz describes this situation the Maraboutic Crisis, which coincided with the rise of the Alaouite dynasty, where various marabouts were more in control in some areas than the sultan through the story of a Sufi leader, Sidi Lahsen Lyusi (8-9).


31. Miller and Rassam, "The View From the Court," 27.
32. Gutelius, "The Path is Easy and the Benefits Large," 40.
33. Dennis D. Cordell, "Eastern Libya, Wadai, and the Sanusiya: A Tariqa and a Trade Route." *The Journal of African History Vol. 18 No. 1* (1977), 22.
34. Cordell's article, "Eastern Libya and the Sanusiya", only describes a specific order functioning on a trade route between Sudan and Libya. However, he does note that other Sufi orders did function like this. Further this idea is bolstered by the fact that this particular order was founded by one of the many influential students of North African Sufi Master Ibn Idris (d. 1837), all of which found various orders across the Muslim world (Vikør 156).
35. Zaouias gave refuge to traders and pilgrims going on the hajj, the required Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, as they passed through regions of North Africa and the Middle East.
36. Cordell, "Eastern Libya and the Sanusiya," 30.
37. Edmund Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration: 1900-1912." *The Journal of African History Vol. 13 No. 1* (1972), 101-104
38. Pan-Islam originated in the late 19th Century Ottoman Empire, under Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), and argued that all Islamic lands should come together into a single political body (Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 9-13).
39. Readership of these Egyptians were especially in large cities like Fez and Marrakesh.
40. Pp. 37-46.
41. Ultimately, Anderson rules out religious identities, such as Muslim membership in the *umma*, as being nationalistic because they are built off of a common religion—not a communal sense of history tied to a particular area (12-19). However, he does note that a sacred written language connected religious communities and thereby resemble nations. For Islamic communities, this language was Arabic.
42. Although the French had originally felt that they would be able to easily take Algeria, but by 1847, France dedicated 100,000 troops to "pacify" this newly conquered region (Clancy-Smith, "Saints, Mahdis, and Arms," 71).
43. Julia Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protests, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1994. 125-127.
44. Initially, many tribes and Sufi orders resisted the French Colonial Forces, but after the defeat Bu Ziyān's Rebellion (1849), the French effectively stopped violent resistance by Algerian tribes (Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, 92-124).
45. Bazzaz, *Forgotten Saints*, 28-29.
46. Bazzaz, *Forgotten Saints*, 30.
47. These reforms created a Moroccan version of the infamous Turkish Tanzimat reforms, which attempted to modernize the army and centralize the state, but on a smaller scale (Bazzaz 30).
48. Bazzaz, *Forgotten Saints*, 30-31.
49. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 45.
50. Geertz chronicled the story of Sidi Lyusi, a 17th century marabout, who sought out the Alaouite sultan, Moulay Ismail, over his sharifa heritage (*Islam Observed*, 33-34).
51. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islamism*, 138-139.
52. Jacob M. Landau's *The Politics of Pan-Islamism* (1990) glosses over this Moroccan rejection of Ottoman influence in his section on the emissaries sent to pass the teachings of Pan-Islam to other Muslim leaders in 1880 (66). In particular, these emissaries were to use the idea of Pan-Islam to foster an anti-European alliance.
53. Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration," 101.
54. Miller and Rassam, "The View from the Court," 26-27.
55. The letter is in the appendix of "The View from the Court" by Susan G. Miller and Amal Rassam in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* (1983). It was translated by the authors and excludes verses of poetry and religious implications (37-38). See figure C in the appendix for this letter.
56. This European influence was quickly becoming solely a French influence because of an agreement between the French and Italians (December 1900) and the Entente Cordiale (April 1904) between England and France (Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 33-34). Each of these agreements granted France a monopoly on influencing Morocco.
57. Originally this agreement was an economic pact of friendship between Morocco and England but was later amended to include other European states.
58. Miller, "A View from the Court," 27.
59. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 33.
60. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 99. Refer to the other section of this thesis, "The Nationalist Explosion", for the particular details on how Resident-General Lyautey, the Resident-General during this period, interpreted France's role in the Protectorate.
61. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 99.
62. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 99-101.
63. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 101.
64. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 101.
65. Interestingly, Mohammad Ben Arafa was so unpopular that the counter Protectorate actions began to mount, leading the French to bring back Mohammad V the next year. Two years later, Morocco would be an independent state (Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent*, 101-102).
66. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, a Paris-based group of Jewish French-men, founded this initial French school in Tetouan. Later, Christian schools, from France, Spain, Great Britain, and the US, opened in order to convert the Moroccan Muslims. However, these schools mostly catered to Europeans living in Morocco (Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 3-4).
67. This is the official name of the 1912 treaty between the French and the Sultan, which founded the Protectorate of Morocco by giving the French military and economic control of the country in exchange for there protection of the sultan's reign and influence over traditional culture (American Journal of Law 1912).
68. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 8.
69. Hamid Irbough, *Art in the Service of Colonialism: French Art Education in Morocco, 1912-1956* (New York: St. Martin Press, 2005), 1.
70. Irbough, *Art in the Service of Colonialism*, 100-106.
71. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 203-210.
72. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 54-58.
73. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 140.
74. Treaty of Fez, III (There is no official citation style for treaties. So, I will cite the treaty of Fez, see figure D in the appendix, by stating its name then the article number in Roman numerals.)
75. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 8.
76. Treaty of Fez, I.
77. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 6.
78. Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco*, 63.
79. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 11-12.
80. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 16-18.
81. Irbough, *Art in the Service of Colonialism*, 28.
82. Irbough, *Art in the Service of Colonialism*, 28-33.
83. Irbough, *Art in the Service of Colonialism*, 47.
84. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 37-41.
85. This university is considered to be one of the oldest, degree-granting school in the world, founded in 859, and was the flagship of traditional Moroccan education.
86. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 38-41.
87. The Fez school only serviced 150 students (elementary and secondary school levels) and the 96 students by the school in Rabat (Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 38-41).
88. The Meknes school with the Syrian academy (1920) accounted for the first French military academies in the entire French colonies. However, these Moroccan soldiers were never regarded as true members of the French Military. Thus the Meknes school only supported this colonial segregation of Moroccans from the French (Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco*, 193-196).
89. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 61-63.
90. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 61-63.
91. Despite the goal of assimilation being natives who had completely adopted French culture, the French colonial officials resented the growth of the Senegalese évolué class, which used the momentary weakness in French influence on West Africa to take some governmental control. This resentment is typified by the story of the first Senegalese member of the French National Assembly, Blaise Diagne (Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 87).
92. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 87-117.
93. This particular instance requires the use of the word "Berber" because it is the term used in this famous study,

94. George Babington Michell, "The Berbers," *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (1903), pp. 161-194.
95. Segalla notes that this belief was probably more of an effort to prevent Pan-Arab/Islamist beliefs growing in Morocco at the time (*The Moroccan Soul*, 135-140).
96. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 139-140.
97. Irbouh, *Art in the Service of Colonialism*, 30.
98. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 140.
99. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 105-107.
100. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 108.
101. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 161.
102. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 46-52.
103. Interestingly enough, there was no real legal grounding in the allowance of Moroccan political parties. Thus it was viewed as more of an indulgence allowed by the colonial government than political right (Halstead 52).
104. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 52-54.
105. The most famous example of this was the exile of the King Mohammad V (1927-1953 and 1955-1961) was exiled to Madagascar in 1953 for officially supporting the Moroccan national movement.
106. Eventually al-Fassi was given the certificate upon his return to Fez in 1932.
107. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 59-61.
108. Halstead claims early Moroccan Nationalism as between 1921-1930. This would mean that these early nationalist would have to be a part of the first generation of the French-educated Moroccans, also supporting this claim (*Rebirth of a Nation*, 161).
109. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 217.
110. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 161-164.
111. A major belief in Salafism is that the various Middle Eastern powers were once great, and with a bit of adaptation to the modern methods, it would be possible to create a modern Islamic Empire free from colonial influence.
112. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 140.
113. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 52.
114. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 167-169.
115. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 54-57.
116. This was only in the French Zone. The first two nationalistic papers, *Es-Salam* and *el-Hayet*, were Arab written papers first published in 1933 the Spanish Zone. They were banned from the French Zone by May of 1934.
117. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 57.
118. *Imagined Communities*, 37-46.
119. Following the process of assimilation, the Amazigh would then disappear, as they became more and more French. This would result in French (formally the Amazigh) controlling the Arabs there as an end result of these colonial policies.
120. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 211.
121. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 231.
122. Rachik, "Construction de l'identité amazighe," 20.
123. After independence (1956), the Istiqlal Party (the nationalist party) pushed for a purification of Moroccan Arabic, substituting foreign words for their Arab equivalent. This became most popular with the eradication of particularly Amazigh words (Rachick, "Construction de l'identité amazighe," 20).
124. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul*, 232.
125. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation*, 57.
126. Alternatively, Anderson explains that creoles can be descended from families from the meroptole. The key concept to grasp is that these people have little to know familial relation to the indigenous people of the colony.
127. Anderson, *Imagines Communities*, 47-65.
128. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 113-140.

SOCIAL ISSUES, THE MCGOVERN-FRASER COMMISSION, AND GRADUAL REALIGNMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE AND RISE IN STRONG PARTISANSHIP, 1952-2008

Keaton Postler

The graph¹ below tracks the strength of partisanship in the electorate from 1952-2008.



Looking at the numbers, it seems logical to divide this graph into three periods: (1) 1952-1964, (2) 1966-1978, and (3) 1980-2008. From 1952-1964, strong partisanship remained more or less steady at 35-38% of those polled. In 1966, however, the percentage of those polled who identified as strong partisans dropped ten percentage points from 38% to 28%, the single biggest change on the graph in any two-year period and more than twice as large as the next biggest one (a 4% change in both 1970-1972 and 1980-1982). Beginning with this shift in 1966 and lasting until 1978, strong partisanship seemed to be on the decline in American politics, reaching a low in 1978 of only 23%. But in 1980, something seems to have changed as strong partisanship slowly but surely resurfaced in the electorate. Although the percentage of those polled from 1980-2008 who identified as strong partisans did not reach the 1952-1964 level, the graph indicates that things may be trending that way.

In this paper, I will focus on the cause of the decline in strong partisanship in 1966 before discussing what led to the rise from 1980 onward. What I would like to measure is what had a greater impact on this decline and rise: the changes to party nomination by the McGovern-Fraser Commission (MF-Commission) or the emergence of new social issues? By examining the effects of both the MF-Commission and emerging social issues on strong partisanship from 1952-2008, one discovers that although both played a significant part in the decline of strong partisanship, social issues appear to have played a bigger part. And when strong partisanship increased beginning in 1980, social issues alone seem to have been the cause. But before discussing how this happened, I want to take note of a few important points concerning the graph above as well as the MF-Commission.

First, the graph provides no way to determine whether the strength of partisanship for any given year is indicative of a surge/decline in one of the two major parties, the Democrats or the Republicans, or both. Consequently, factors that affected strong partisanship in both parties from 1952-2008 are as important, perhaps even more so, than ones that affected only one of the parties. (Thankfully, both parties are so dependent on one another that changes to one almost always affect the other.) Second, despite the drop-off of ten percentage points in strong partisanship from 1964-1966, this drastic change should perhaps be treated as an anomaly. The years 1964-1966 excluded, the change in strong partisanship every two years fell between only one to four percentage points, with some years (such as 1952-1956) showing no change at all. The difference, moreover, between the highest (38%) and lowest point (23%) of strong partisanship is only fifteen percentage points, and it took over a decade (1964-1978) for strong partisanship to decline this much. The conclusion we can draw from all of this, and a conclusion that I will explore further in this paper, is that the gradual changes in strong partisanship from 1952-2008 are reflective of the gradual realignment of the two major parties and their electoral bases in this period. Finally, although social issues are perennial, the changes to the party nomination system by the MF-Commission were not implemented until the 1972 presidential election. Consequently, it will be difficult to analyze the years up until 1972 through the lens of the MF-Commission and its impact on strong partisanship. The majority of my aim will be directed toward the years 1966-1978, which began with a decline in strong partisanship yet ended in it rising.

Still, the years 1952-1964 should be mentioned inasmuch as they were ones of great success for the Democrats. Despite the fact that they only won half of the presidential elections in this twelve-year period (1960, 1964), Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom they lost to in 1952 and 1956, was basically a moderate Republican who more or less accepted the expanded-government, New Deal policies that the country inherited from Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). Eisenhower's nomination, in other words, testifies to the fact that the Republicans in this period were generally seeking more moderate candidates who could win over some of the Democrats' large voter base. Additionally, the Democrats controlled both the Senate and the House of Representatives from 1954-1964. Because the Democrats were the more successful party in these years, it should not surprise one that Democrat and presidential incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson beat Republican candidate Barry Goldwater with 61% of the popular vote and 486 electoral votes in the 1964 election, one of the largest presidential victories in history. It seems logical to assume that the height of strong partisanship (38%) recorded in the graph above for this year was partly a result of the country's overwhelming support for the Democrats and their policies. This support had been growing for over three decades since FDR and the Democrats launched their liberal, pro-government policies in the 1930s, an approach to running the country that, at least by 1964, seems to have appealed to a large portion of the U.S. electorate given the fact that the party's margin of victory in the presidential election was so large and that the Democrats had been so successful in elections since FDR.²

After 1964, however, things took a drastic and unexpected turn for the Democrats, and they came primarily in the form of social issues. The drop-off of ten percentage points in strong partisanship from 1964-1966 is probably a reflection of this turn. For instance, although the party's liberal policies were designed to expand the role of government and to appeal to marginalized groups in society, increasing violence and rioting that focused on social issues of racial tension and often involved marginalized groups like non-whites were being reported in several cities. Incidents like these undermined the Democrats' claims that their programs were helping out minorities by removing economic and social inhibitors. Additionally, the U.S. involvement in the

Vietnam War increased after 1964, and the war became increasingly unpopular among the American people from the mid-1960s onward. Admittedly, the Vietnam War was an international issue more than a social one, yet it still hinged on social issues, such as the fear of containing communism as well as the domestic protests against the war that were organized by many of the same people who were also fighting for civil rights at this time.³

Speaking of this, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with its liberal social legislation, received its greatest opposition in the South. When the Civil Rights Act came to a vote, less than 10% of Democrats in the southern region supported the bill. In terms of a gradual realignment from 1952-2008 that I mentioned above, this vote is evidence of the fact that many Southern congressmen were moving away from supporting the Democratic Party, which the South had almost unanimously voted for since the Civil War, and instead aligning their votes with their social viewpoints, which were increasingly conservative. This vote, in turn, is also a reflection of the decline in strong partisanship after 1964, as many Southern congressmen and voters in this region must have been feeling estranged from the majority of the Democratic Party and its liberal social agenda.⁴

In short, then, one social issue after another came to the fore from the mid-1960s onward, and the Democrats, as the party in power, took the hit for it, losing dozens of seats in both the House and the Senate in the 1966 midterm elections.⁵ The party took even bigger hits at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. With its protests and violence over social issues, such as which delegations sent by some of the Southern states would be seated—the all-white ones or the racially-mixed ones—as well as the frustration over the selection of Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey “by the smoke-filled-room machinations of the Democratic Party bosses” (Brewer and Stonecash 103) over Eugene McCarthy, the entire convention was a complete disaster for the Democratic Party, especially because all of these issues were exposed on national television for viewers to see.⁶ Consequently, it helped Richard Nixon and the Republicans win the 1968 presidential election.⁷

It seems logical to conjecture that the convention and the social issues surrounding it contributed to the gradual decline in strong partisanship from 1966-1978. A lot of existing Democrats did not support the party during this period due to frustration and/or estrangement; thus, they no longer identified as strong Democrats. For instance, five Southern states that had historically voted Democratic since the Civil War instead gave their electoral votes to George Wallace, who was running as an independent.⁸ Moreover, those voters who defected to voting for the Republican Party because they were frustrated with the Democrats in this time period may not have necessarily felt a strong identification with the Republican Party, either. For as Hunter S. Thompson makes clear in his book covering the campaign, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72*, very few Americans actually *liked* Nixon, who won presidential election in 1968 and re-election in 1972; rather, they tended to vote for him because he steered a more or less moderate ship that was supposed to keep things from spiraling too far off course.

Putting social issues aside for the moment, how did the McGovern-Fraser Commission (MF-Commission) play an important part in the more or less downward trend in strong partisanship from 1966-1978? The MF-Commission⁹, which first took effect in the 1972 presidential election, changed the way that parties nominate their presidential candidates by requiring that those selected to attend the national convention, the delegates, would be decided by either a primary or a caucus, depending on which system the state chose. In other words, delegates would no longer be selected behind closed doors (a process that, as I mentioned above, had helped Hubert Humphrey win the Democratic nomination in 1968). In order to win delegates, candidates

now had to appeal directly to the electorate instead of the party organization or the party in government. The MF-Commission, at least for the Democrats, also created proportional representation in delegate selection based on the results of the primary/caucus. This in turn led to a multiplicity of candidates running to win the party's presidential nomination because under a proportional representation system even winning a small percentage of delegates from a high number of states would give a candidate enough delegates to be competitive at the national convention.¹⁰

One can speculate on how the MF-Commission affected the strength of partisanship in this period. It is possible that the new multiplicity of candidates, which brought with it a multiplicity of policy positions that may have been at odds with one another, diminished strong partisanship by fracturing the party's old supporter base into different factions. This is at least the way that Thompson portrays the 1972 election in *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72*. In the 1972 Democratic presidential primaries, for instance, George McGovern and George Wallace took several policy positions that were more or less at odds with one another even though they were both running to be the presidential nominee for the Democratic Party. When Wallace exited the primary race due to a failed assassination attempt that left him paralyzed and McGovern won the nomination, many Wallace supporters, as one can gauge from the difference between the 1968 and 1972 electoral vote distribution, seem to have given their support not to the Democrat McGovern, but instead to the Republican Nixon (Thompson). Looking at the distribution of electoral votes in 1968, for example, Wallace, who ran as an independent, won five Southern states, as mentioned above; in the 1972 election, however, with Wallace out of the race, these states gave their support to Nixon, not McGovern.¹¹

One would assume that the decline of strong partisanship from 1966-1978 was in some way related to the fact that all of the Southern states, who had almost unanimously supported the Democratic Party since the Civil War, gave their support to the Republicans in 1972. But in what way is it related? Was the MF-Commission the more important factor or were social issues? Admittedly, Wallace's strength in the South in the 1968 presidential election running as an independent testifies to the fact that, during 1966-1978, a significant portion of voters were less interested in supporting a certain party than they were in supporting a certain candidate who represented certain positions. Thus, the MF-Commission, which created a greater number of candidates, must have been important in diminishing partisan strength and surely contributed to the decline that lasted until 1978. Yet it is precisely because Wallace's *positions on issues*, especially social ones, made him more appealing to Southern voters that one must ultimately conclude that social issues made a bigger impact on the decline of strong partisanship from 1966-1978. Wallace, with his segregationist, somewhat racist views, was popular in a region that was also overly segregationist and racist in comparison to the rest of the country.¹² When Wallace left the primaries, however, the voters in these states were too put off by McGovern's liberal policy positions, especially social ones, and as a result they were unwilling to support the Democratic Party in the presidential election despite the fact that the South traditionally had done so.

Turning to 1980, the rise in strong partisanship at this time reflects new social issues and how they were being politicized by the parties, especially the Republicans. Looking at the graph again, it is difficult not to draw a link between the swing upward and Ronald Reagan, the Republican who won the presidential election in 1980 and overhauled the party's voter base partly through his tough conservative stance on social issues. 1978, according to the graph, which was two years before Reagan's victory in the presidential election, represents the single lowest point in strong partisanship (23%). In 1980, however, with Reagan's victory came a 3% rise in strong partisanship, and two years later, during the 1982 midterm elections, there was a 4% rise. Alt-

hough strong partisanship dropped a total of 2% in 1984 and 1986, it surged up 3% in 1988, all in all contributing to an upward trend in strong partisanship among voters that continued after Reagan left office. In other words, Reagan put a system of strong partisanship back in place in the American electorate, and he did this with his tough conservative approach to new social issues.

Remember that a handful of new social issues, such as questions over homosexuality, abortion, and prayer in public school, were emerging onto the national level in the years before Reagan's election. Jimmy Carter, who was the Democratic incumbent president from 1976-1980, took a liberal stance on these issues and further convinced conservatives like Reagan that they needed to push the country in a different social direction. Once he was elected, Reagan succeeded in fusing the existing Republican message of limited government involvement in businesses and the economy with the growing conservative social movement, which was increasingly identifying with the Republican Party since the end of World War II and which wanted the government to be more active in the social sphere. Appealing to the country's conservative social vote, Reagan supported a constitutional amendment to ban abortion, wanted to return prayer to public schools, and opposed the Equal Rights Amendment establishing equality for women.¹³

By supporting more government involvement in the social sphere and less government involvement in businesses and the economy, Reagan—and this point cannot be stressed enough—was able to build a *new electoral base* for the Republican Party that got him handily elected to the White House for two consecutive terms. It seems reasonable, then, to draw a connection between Reagan's tough stance on new social issues in the electorate and the rise in strong partisanship from 23% to 31% by 1988, his final year in office. By clarifying where the Republicans stood on many social issues, Reagan opened up a niche in the Republican Party's electoral base for the conservatives of the South who had become increasingly estranged from the Democrats. In turn, many of these conservative voters must have come to find themselves to be identifying more strongly with the Republican Party, which contributed to the rise in strong partisanship from the 1980s onward. Since Reagan, in fact, the South has become a region that historically votes Republican, a major reversal of how the region had voted from the end of the Civil War through 1964.¹⁴

Unfortunately, there is not enough space in a paper of this length to explore the full implications of social issues on the rise of strong partisanship following Reagan. We can, however, examine a single case closely, one involving Newt Gingrich. A Republican politician, Gingrich, like Reagan, has always taken a tough conservative stance on social issues as well as economic ones. In 1994, Gingrich helped in leading the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives by making social issues a bigger force in American politics. For instance, in the 1994 Republican "Contract with America" that Gingrich pioneered, there were, in addition to economic reform, proposals for stronger anticrime legislation and a reduction of teen pregnancy and illegitimate births in order to scale down welfare.¹⁵ The important point to draw from all of this is that Reagan's tough conservative stance on social issues at the national level gave the existing conservatives in the Republican Party—like Gingrich—the authorization to pursue their conservative social agenda that they had been preaching more and more since World War II.

Not surprisingly, the term "conservative" has become more or less synonymous with the Republicans today. On the other hand, the Democrats are now seen as the liberal antithesis of the Republicans, not only because the media presents them this way (in addition to presenting the Republicans as the conservative party), but also because they tend to present themselves this way (much like the Republicans present themselves as the conservative party). Thus, the net result

has been a liberal-conservative polarization in American politics that Republican President George W. Bush only helped to exacerbate from 2000-2008, especially with his approach to the War on Terror in the Middle East.¹⁶ Perhaps it is this polarization that distinguishes strong partisanship post-1980 from strong partisanship pre-1964.

Returning to the original question, then—what had a greater impact on the decline and rise of strong partisanship from 1952-2008, the MF-Commission or the emergence of new social issues—the latter seems to provide the bulk of the explanation. Thus, social issues, it seems, can cause a decline or a rise in strong partisanship depending on how a party approaches them. In fact, based on the graph above, I would like to suggest a theory: that perhaps strong partisanship decreases whenever a gradual realignment is occurring within the voter bases of the parties, as was happening from the end of World War II through Reagan (and especially in the years 1966-1978). Perhaps this decline in strong partisanship results in a period of gradual realignment because many voters who have traditionally supported a certain party find themselves identifying to some degree with the other party; consequently, those voters are not exactly certain which party they identify with, and as a result they are less likely to consider themselves strong supporters of *either* party. This would certainly make sense. Political parties are a fluid collection of represented interests that are in the business of winning over as many new voters as possible without estranging too much of their existing base in order to create a majority in the electorate. When gradual realignments occur, however, parties do tend to push out a significant portion of their existing base depending on the decisions and positions that they choose to take.

NOTES

1. "Strength of Partisanship, 1952-2008," The ANES (American National Election Studies) Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, August 20, 2010, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g2a_3_4.htm (accessed December 1, 2011).
2. Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, *Dynamics of American Political Parties* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2009), 93-9. (Whenever there is only a single note for a paragraph and it occurs at the end, the author has intended for the citation information to apply to the entire paragraph.)
3. Hunter S. Thompson, *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2006); Brewer and Stonecash, 99-101.
4. Brewer and Stonecash, 100-1.
5. Brewer and Stonecash, 100.
6. Brewer and Stonecash, 103.
7. Brewer and Stonecash, 102-3.
8. "1972," 270 to Win, 270towin.com (accessed December 1, 2011).
9. The MF-Commission was a creation of the Democratic National Committee, which means that its reforms applied only to the Democrats. The Republican National Committee, however, adopted changes to the party nomination system similar to the MF-Commission around the same time. The major difference between the two parties' new nominating systems is that the Democrats tended to use a system of proportional representation in regards to delegate distribution (which I explain more of later in this paragraph) whereas the Republicans tended to use a "winner-take-all" method. For the purposes of this paper, I talk about the MF-Commission in a general sense as something that affected both parties instead of just the Democrats (despite the fact that, technically speaking, the latter is true).
10. "Class Notes," H295: American Political Parties, Dr. Sean Cain, Loyola University New Orleans, 7. Nov. 2011.
11. "1968" and "1972," 270 to Win, 270towin.com (accessed December 1, 2011).
12. Brewer and Stonecash, 113-5.
13. Brewer and Stonecash, 123-30.

14. "1992," "1996," "2000," "2004," and "2008," 270 to Win, 270towin.com (accessed December 1, 2011).

15. Brewer and Stonecash, 131-6.

16. Brewer and Stonecash, 166-183.

**MOVING WEST:
THE MISCOMMUNICATION OF FAITH, POLITICAL PUSH, AND ECONOMIC HOPE**

| *Allegra Tartaglia*

“All the pulses of the world, / Falling in they beat for us, with the / Western movement beat, / Holding single or together, steady moving to the front, all for us, / Pioneers! O Pioneers!”¹ To this beat Walt Whitman’s poem drives the inhabitants of America, who had colonized the Northeastern states, to move together as one in the westward expansion. The assumption for travelers to move as one body west of the Mississippi River, in the territories that extended from North Carolina to California including Mexico, was proven to be false; America was too big for settlers to travel as one. Today, thanks to technology and transportation, people have the opportunity to know and discover their surroundings. American people, who wanted to migrate westward, did not have iPhones to instantly look up what land had the best real estate. Moving west meant entering an undiscovered world. Westward bound Americans were off to seek a place that was not yet touched by white human hands. Americans were not settlers, they were expeditioners. The miscommunication of faith, political push, and economic hope drove American frontiersmen to move west, but also, led to a misconception about the hardship of separation of families, journey on the trails and life on the plains.

Colonial Americans had emigrated from Europe to the New World to seek free land for new economic, political, and religious opportunities. European immigrants were led by Christian ideologies, which encouraged occupying and taking the world and its material things to then “consecrate them to [the] service of God.”² Any land that was not occupied was “recognized [by] members of the Christendom”³ to be free. Between 1620 and 1660 English Providentialists believed strongly that the world was God’s “manifestation” and its history “destiny.”⁴ They were strong believers of Christ, and lived their lives according to Christian teachings. From the Bible, “the redemptive role of God’s chosen people in the Promised Land” encouraged colonial settlers to claim that their “providential destiny [was] revealed.”⁵ Calvinistic Adams ideology proposed “puritan allegories and metaphors,” and gave “American sense of independence and liberty.”⁶ A migration was then led to move west of the Mississippi River. They took their strong European religious beliefs and laid a foundation that scholars now refer to as, manifest destiny. Colonial settlers, after years of struggle to create a society in the North East territory, were not intimidated to migrate westward.

Curiosity and especially a sense of nationalism were the other two prominent factors of Manifest Destiny. America was a “nation of human progress,” and it was constructed under the divine principles of God.⁷ O’ Sullivan was the first writer to print the “underlying principles”⁸ of Manifest Destiny in the *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*. O’Sullivan described America as being the “great nation of futurity,” since it was based on the “conscious law of the soul.”⁹ “The expansive future” of America, according to O’Sullivan, was the cause of the construction of its arena and history.¹⁰ “Its magnificent domain of space and time,” was believed by O’Sullivan to have created a nation that would “manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles.”¹¹ Economic prosperity was what drove the movement to acquire areas that could be coupled with the already “rapid industrialization [of the] already settled parts.”¹² It was the prolonged depression of 1837 that influenced unemployed laborers and farmers to travel west.¹³ Farmers heard that “harvests [were] like an army with banners, waving their golden plumes

above the houses."¹⁴ Early farmers were continuously bombarded by the American Press to go and move west. Americans had also heard that there was a large amount of silver and gold out west. Ambition rose in the hearts of Americans to migrate in search of these riches.¹⁵ Many believed finding these raw materials would make them millionaires.

Horace Greeley, being the founder of the 1860 *New York Tribune*, was one of the "most influential and popular people in America."¹⁶ "Go West, young man!"¹⁷ was Greeley's cry advocating the western migration. Being a strong supporter of the Whigs, Greeley renamed his paper the *Jeffersonian*, which was a tribute to Jefferson "who had worked for the expansion of the West, for the advancement of the common man, for the limitation of landlordism and slavery, for the extension of education, and for the preservation of American simplicities amid growth and change."¹⁸ Greeley promoted going west because he was a strong supporter of the Oregon territory, because "to include such distant territory in the United States would be expensive and would weaken the democracy."¹⁹ Americans who did not want to be associated with slavery were brainwashed by Greeley's cry, to free the nation from the dominance of the Democratic Party. Greeley believed that Americans were lacking of national unity and had no concept of the meaning of the nation, because according to Greeley, "Americans were still struggling to recapture that sense of antebellum unity."²⁰ Greeley enlightened frontiersmen: "Your true home is in the West! Seek it, and rear your children there to larger opportunities than await them on the rugged hillsides or in the crowded streets of the East!"²¹ Americans did not know that participating in the westward expansion was going to create many problems.

Being that "the frontier . . . line [was] the most rapid and effective [symbol of] Americanization,"²² families stripped themselves from their daily lives and set forth on their westward journeys. Derivatives of the Conestoga wagon took months to build for the long and exciting journey west.²³ A farm wagon that had a ten foot wide and two foot high flat bed was used for the construction of the wagon.²⁴ To cover the wagon families used "a double thickness of canvas."²⁵ "Tongues, spokes, axles, and wheels"²⁶ were stored under the wagon beds in case of breakage. Western frontiersmen were really astute in thinking how to make multiple use of the wagon. Families would use "the sides of their wagons so they could be lifted off the wheelbase and floated across the rivers."²⁷ Twenty-five hundred pounds was the limit of travel: "200 pounds of flour, 150 pounds of bacon, 10 pounds of coffee, 20 pounds of sugar, and 10 pounds of salt . . . chipped beef, rice, tea, dried beans, dried fruit, saleratus, vinegar, pickles, mustard and tallow . . . kettle, fry pan, coffee pot, tin plates, cups, knives, and forks."²⁸ Six hundred and seventy five dollars were spent on provisions for clothes, powder and shots²⁹ that had to last them about six months of travel.³⁰ But this did not stop families from leaving everything behind.

Letter writing on women's part was how families kept in contact. Letters became a way to record news of everyday life. For some women such as Abigail Malick "the letter [held] the family together, part of them in Oregon Territory, part of them back in 'the State'."³¹ Letters would take months to arrive or never arrive at all. Margaret Lowhter writes, "your note of the 16th informing me of father's death came Sunday morning, that of the 15th telling me of your arrival in J--- was received yesterday (Monday) morning."³² Conversation revolved around deaths, sicknesses and weather conditions. Nellie Carpenter on Wednesday May 14, 1879 writes, "today finds us trying to enjoy life in spite of a cold disagreeable rain."³³ Ada Colvin on Sunday June 1, 1879 says "it is dreadful cold so the men have overcoats on."³⁴ Carpenter describes her sickness, saying, "I have been most sick with a bad cold; have been a bed most all day so have not seen much of the country."³⁵ Separation from their loved ones grew harder when they found out about deaths in the family. "Each new grief made [the] hope of reunion more tenuous"³⁶ for Abigail

Malick, a pioneer who left Illinois with her family to settle in Oregon. Western families did not only have to mourn their separation with their loved ones but also had to be willing to intake all of the troubles of migrating west.

Jumping-off places were small towns along the Missouri River where families would prepare themselves for the voyage by gathering supplies and preparing their wagons.³⁷ At these starting points immigrants going west found it more reassuring to travel with other families so they "held a meeting to establish a set of traveling rules, and to elect a council of nine men to mediate any disputes that might erupt."³⁸ Trains of pioneer families, all seeking free land and economic opportunities, incorporated themselves with the western landscape. Wagons pulled by oxen did not travel in a single file line "to avoid the choking dust thrown up by the hooves and wheels" of the wagon in front.³⁹ Frontiersmen did not want to venture out on their own since there were still no trading posts or forts along the path.⁴⁰ A third of families, however; did continue to travel alone, since they could no longer take the poorly planned organization of the group.⁴¹ Families were slowed down by the "frequent spring rains that created much mud."⁴² Turbid river water was called "moving sand . . . [since it was] too dirty to bathe in, and too thick to drink."⁴³ The streams were crossed in the evening so that caravans would not get stuck in the slippery banks in case of rain.⁴⁴ Fear of encountering Native Americans would torment the frontiersmen. Mary Medley Ackley wrote about her 1852 journey: "when we set foot on the right bank of the Missouri River we were outside the pale of civil law. We were in Indian country, where no organized civil government existed."⁴⁵ "The majority of emigrants . . . saw very few Indians along the route," in fact, the very few encounters with Indians were when pioneers had to trade off "sugar, coffee, or whiskey in exchange for free passage through Indian territory."⁴⁶ The journey still had rules to follow and men and women both had distinct tasks they had to fulfill.

Women's work entailed taking over what their husbands were no longer capable doing. Women had to steer the ox, mend clothes, cook, wash, and take care of the children. Helen M. Carpenter says:

In respect to women's work, the days are all very much the same--- except when we stop . . . then there is washing to be done and light bread to make and all kinds of odd jobs. Some women have very little help about the camp, being obliged to get the wood and water . . . make camp fires, unpack at night and pack up in the morning--- and if they are Missourians they have the milking to do if they are fortunate enough to have cows.⁴⁷

Men fixed the wagons and built rafts or bridges so that the wagons could ride over water banks. Men had to also go in search of food and watch for wolves and Indians at night so that they could protect their stock. They were the ones "who determined the route, direction and speed of travel."⁴⁸ Families were eager to arrive at their destinations so that they could end this relentless journey. The Plains were not what frontiersmen expected. Catherine Haun writes in 1849:

The alkali dust of this territory was suffocating, irritating our throats and clouds of it often blinded us. The mirages tantalized us; the water was unfit to drink or to use in any way; animals often perished or were so overcome by heat and exhaustion that they had to be abandoned, or in case of human hunger, the poor jaded creatures were killed and eaten.⁴⁹

Bad weather conditions and unfertile soil made it hard to live on the plains. The plains were treeless unforested land with insufficient rain fall.⁵⁰ Houses were built out of mud or "of sunburnt bricks."⁵¹ Farmers cultivated the land producing corn and wheat, but slowly the soil became no longer fertile. Trees failed to grow on the grasslands because of soil conditions, poor drainage,

and aeration.⁵² Anna Hansberry writes on October 13, 1903; "where we live there is no running stream some years it rains very little a man who rented this place before we came here planted a crop it never rained."⁵³ Pioneers decided to leave this desert like land that was "uninhabitable with the methods, implements and instruments"⁵⁴ they were using in the eastern territories. Early farmers wanted to move more west. Oregon had become the new target of the west.

Leaving their homes for the second time was not what western settlers were looking forward to doing. They had gone through many troubles to arrive in a land that gave them no economic opportunity and isolated them from society. Early farmers had been brained washed by the previous travelers and political advocates of the western territory who wanted to make the nation knowledgeable of America's vast land. Pioneers were led by a false account. The idea of being able to gain income and fulfill Gods wish of manifest destiny was not the reality families faced out west. America was a land of opportunity, but opportunity in the west did not come until the construction of railroads. When railroads were built, western towns began to rise because of the increase in outside communication. Frontiersmen were not informed that the only means of survival meant sustaining contact with civilization. Early farmers did not have any grasp on the vastness of the country and the complications it brought. Farmers did not know that they were going to be stranded from society.

Miscommunication was the problem with the western movement. Previous traveler's accounts had only described the western scenery. Moving out west was not what early farmers believed it to be. Thinking that there was enough land to feed the world was an illusion pioneers entrenched in their minds; "All the past we leave behind, / We debouch upon a newer, mightier world, varied world, / Fresh and strong the world we seize, world of labor and the march, / Pioneers! O Pioneers!"⁵⁵

NOTES

1. Walt Whitman, *Leave of Grass, 8th Ed.* (Boston: James R. Osgood 1902), 194, cited in Gary Noy, *Distant Horizon: Documents from the Nineteenth-Century American West* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press 1999), 13.
2. Stephanson Anders, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang 1995), 95.
3. Anders, *Manifest Destiny*, 6.
4. Anders, *Manifest Destiny*, 5.
5. Anders, *Manifest Destiny*, 5.
6. Anders, *Manifest Destiny*, 4-5.
7. John O'Sullivan, *The Great Nation of Futurity* (United States Magazine and Democratic Review 6: November 1839), 2-3, 6, cited in Gary Noy, *Distant Horizon: Documents from the Nineteenth-Century American West* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press 1999), 7.
8. O'Sullivan, *The Great Nation of Futurity*, cited in Gary Noy, *Distant Horizon* 6.
9. O'Sullivan, *The Great Nation of Futurity*, cited in Gary Noy, *Distant Horizon* 6.
10. O'Sullivan, *The Great Nation of Futurity*, cited in Gary Noy, *Distant Horizon* 7.
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THE CULTURE OF ISLAM

| Kathleen Murphy

Although Islam is considered a religion, it creates, and is a culture. It creates unity, a way of life, and a community through which people live and perceive the world. An examination of contrasting Chinese and Spanish Islamic rebellions in the nineteenth and sixteenth centuries suggests that Islam is not a religious factor that motivates dissidence. Rather, Islam serves as the vehicle through which culture is maintained, even if it misses tenets of central Islamic teachings and traditions. Spanish and Chinese Islam, as seen in these rebellions, point to a Muslim identity that provides structure for a group of people to live in society, especially as they endure oppression and a changing political and demographic atmosphere. Because of Islam, both the Yunnan Hui and Moriscos of Al-Andalus were able to unite under a cause to fight for and maintain their identity within their respective regions.

In the southeastern province of Yunnan in China from 1856 – 1873, the Panthay¹ Rebellion began as a Hui resistance to the dominant Han Chinese. Atwill writes that a false assumption about the uprising is that it was “primarily Islamic in orientation, a premise which dismisses the significance of the contributions to the rebellion’s success of Yunnan’s myriad indigenous groups and allied Han Chinese.”² Although Atwill argues that Islam was not central to the rebellion by demonstrating other involvement, he fails to recognize the unifying factor among these groups. These people fought the Han Chinese to preserve their Islamic culture, not the religious tenets of Islam within the Yunnan province. For example, when Du Wenxiu leads the new Pingnan state in Yunnan, he decrees that his subjects use Arabic and honor Muslim eating customs.³ Wenxiu’s decree demonstrates that Muslim customs – not beliefs – should carry into the formation of Pingnan. Even Wenxiu’s main hall walls were inlaid with marble with quotations from the Quran in gold,⁴ further showing that cultural practices such as language were necessary to preserve. The Arabic language and eating habits are cultural tenets of Islam, not religious beliefs of Islam. While it appears that Islam was central to the rebellion, it must be clear that Islamic culture, not Islamic religion motivated the Hui rebels to defend their way of life. Therefore, the Hui (who formed the largest part of this resistance) used Islam as a vehicle to preserve their way of life under a Han dominated society. Throughout Atwill’s article and numerous accounts of the rebellion by Jianping Wang,⁵ there is no mention of specific Islamic practices that need to be saved or preserved. Rather, the Hui defended their lifestyle.

To understand this Hui rebellion in Yunnan, one must look at the development of Hui ethnicity and its significance in this particular uprising. The Yunnan Hui in the nineteenth century is a self-conceived, ethno-religious identity that claims origins from “The Islamic world” (Central Asia, Persia, and Arabia).⁶ Hui, then, are not solely Muslim people that live in China. They are an ethnic group with Islamic roots. It is also important to note that the nineteenth-century Yunnan government considered Hui an ethnic group and commonly referred to them as different from the Han during conflicts.⁷ Furthermore, the Han fought against Hui (Islamic) culture. The Han were not seeking to destroy particular Islamic beliefs that existed in Yunnan, but rather the place in society that they assumed under the Hui people.⁸ Islam as a religion did not motivate the Han massacre of Hui people that began on May 19, 1856. Instead, economic tension between the Han and Hui created a belligerent atmosphere between these two groups. Islam appears as the scapegoat for this deep mutual resentment. Murdering thousands of Hui, the Han caused the Hui to lead a rebellion that lasted eighteen years and create an independent state.

Although the Morisco Rebellion in the peninsula of Al-Andalus did not possess a movement for independence, it possessed strong religious fervor caused by the dominance of Christian Spain. While the Panthay Rebellion was rooted in ethnic conflict, the Morisco rebellion was rooted in religious differences. To the Spanish, the Moriscos⁹ were Muslims who failed to convert sincerely to Christianity. These Moriscos were distinguished solely by Islam and did not comprise a separate ethnic group. In response to Phillip II's decree that commanded the use of Castilian language in place of Arabic, and the wearing of Castilian rather than Moorish clothing, and the cessation of other Morisco customs,¹⁰ Moriscos fell back on their religious Muslim identity to disrespect Spain. The Spanish recognized the Islamic culture that Moriscos practiced, as Phillip II's provision stated: "We have understood that for the most of the converts they are not true Christians nor carry out our Catholic faith that they professed... One of the biggest obstacles to this true conversion is the use of the Arabic language that the newly converted speak... They do not understand our language, nor can they learn nor be indoctrinated into the catholic faith and Christian religion."¹¹ The public enforcement of the Castilian language confirms the Spanish fear of Morisco culture. Their religious identity differentiated the Moriscos. To the Spanish, the Arabic language implied the religion of Islam. What they failed to observe, however, was that Arabic was merely a part of the culture of Islam that they sought to destroy, not the religion itself. As a form of protest, the Moriscos resumed traditional cultural practices and discarded Castilian names for Arabic ones. During the rebellion, they too directed their anger at the religion of their Spanish oppressors. They "destroyed the churches, they hacked venerable images to pieces, they pulled the altars down, and laid their violent hands on the priest of Jesus Christ who had taught them the faith and administered the sacraments to them."¹² These violent religious actions define the rebellion for both the Spanish and Moriscos. Each side attacks the religious associations (icons, language, buildings) of Christianity and Islam, indicating that the Moriscos used Islamic culture to drive their rebellion, not Islam as a religion. Islamic culture was the basis of difference between the two groups in the peninsula.

Perhaps another motivation that led to the ban of Morisco culture was the threat to hegemony in Al-Andalus. Andrew Hess suggests that the banning of Morisco customs was the Spanish response to the threat of disunity in their empire. During that time period, the reformation of Luther created religious dissidence in other parts of Europe, and the Moriscos were thought to be a fifth column of the Ottoman Empire. Hess writes, "The revolt of the region of the Alpujarras [The Morisco Rebellion], the Calvinist rebellion in the north, and the advance of the Ottomans in North Africa revived the question of the Moriscos at a time when religious feeling was running high."¹³ Hess's argument explains Spanish anxiety and maltreatment toward the Moriscos in Al-Andalus. As a cultural force, the Moriscos were an entity that could be defeated by the Spanish because they lived in the peninsula and remained under their control. The tone of Hess's conclusion also points to Morisco culture and how it was not the sole factor in the Spanish suppression. Impeding cultural threats from more than the Moriscos provoked a Spanish reaction to preserve their own religious and cultural identity. The Spanish attempted to destroy Morisco culture to solidify strength and hegemony in a time of unrest. Therefore, the Spanish began to expel Moriscos from the southern parts of the peninsula northward. They forced the Granadine Muslims to leave their homes beginning in June 1569.¹⁴ Islamic culture endangered their Christian empire. Their dress and foreign language created a subculture within this empire that needed to be suppressed in order to maintain Spanish power.

To understand these rebellions, the culture of Islam must be separate from its religious aspects. In both the Panthay and Morisco Rebellions, cultural elements of Islam are the Arabic

language, dress, and eating customs. Neither of these rebellions conveys a religiously rooted Islamic motivation nor dedication to a religious teaching or law. The lack of evidence for an attack on a specific Muslim religious practice alone solidifies that Islam is a culture and that their religion is treated as such in Yunnan and Al-Andalus. Each region defended their lifestyle and both the Moriscos and Hui responded through full-scale rebellion to keep their customs alive. Islamic culture did not only comprise of language, eating, and clothing customs, but also economic advantages that led to the majority group to suppress Islamic culture within their respective regions.

The Hui of the Yunnan province had an economic advantage over the Han in the winter of 1855. Exhausting their mining sites, Han sought to work in Hui-owned mines. Hui miners refused, and the court supported the Hui, leading to a massive slaughter of Hui families. A few months later, the Yunnan government blamed the Hui for the violence and ordered the indiscriminate killing of Hui.¹⁵ Hui discrimination directed at Han miners suggests that the differences between the two cultures was rooted in more than religion and revolved around an economic culture in which the Hui surpassed the Han in success. Before the mine incident, other confrontations involving land revealed the economic competition between the Han and Hui. When Hui migrated to Yunnan, they were the first to farm the land in a systematic way and descendants of these migrants still owned fertile land and irrigation systems in the nineteenth century.¹⁶ An increasing Han population witnessed the economic advantage of the Hui in land and farming techniques. Han looked past the Islamic roots of Hui and perceived them as a threat to their well-being. This Hui economic threat is illuminated in Du Wenxiu's military rebellion regulations: "Article 16. In conquest of a strategic stronghold, the officers and men will be duly rewarded, 100 taels of silver and promotion to the commanding offer, and rewards to all."¹⁷ This article signifies the wealth of the Hui army despite their minority role in Yunnan society during the time of rebellion. It is obvious that the Hui started with more wealth. This allowed them to strengthen their rebellion and try to defeat the Han. Despite their earlier reputation as good farmers, the Hui now created an even deeper economic culture than their religion alone, and the Han were extremely displeased.

Morisco landowners also maintained a healthy economic reputation within Spain. Phillips writes, "The Moriscos had the reputation of being hard workers, with frugal habits and useful skills such as silk spinning and weaving."¹⁸ Here, Phillips depicts the Moriscos in a submissive and utilitarian light among the Spanish, who possess skills that could be harnessed by the greater peninsula. The economic culture built by these Moriscos is what the Spanish first tried to exploit then finally expel. The Spanish relocated these Granada Moriscos north to the region of Castile in 1571, where they needed workers.¹⁹ A Spanish General writes, "With the arrival of the new vecinos [neighbors], which were 700 households, they began to work and cultivate the land... from which both they and the city have benefitted."²⁰ This passage relates the great economic fortune that the Granadines brought to Ciudad Real. It appears that the city welcomed the new Moriscos and both cultures benefited from their relocation. However, the relocation of these Moriscos caused major economic turmoil for the decades that followed in the regions they vacated. By exploiting the workers and relocating them to Castile, the Spanish tried to expel the Morisco culture further from their Christian region and exploit their skills in another area. Not accounting for factors of travel such as disease and the subsequent loss of thousands of lives, the Spanish ended the relocation with great economic loss. Without the Moriscos, the whole business was lost and the cost of weaving silk increased immensely.²¹ As an economic entity, the

Moriscos were extremely valuable. This worth as an economic commodity notes that the Spanish government recognized the Moriscos as more than a pure religious identity.

This economic reputation maintained by the Hui and Moriscos creates another aspect of Islamic culture. They both possessed value in their respective regions and sought to defend this productive part of their lifestyle. Because each Muslim group demonstrated such importance, Islam became a crucial factor in their way of life. Identified in this way, Islam became a vehicle for these Muslims to fight against the Hui. They were known as the Muslims that contributed to the economy. Hui were landowners or were good miners, and the Moriscos were hardworking silk spinners. Their identification by the Islam religion informs us that Islam was the force behind their differentiation in both their societies as well as the factor that separates them during the rebellions. Therefore, Islam drove each uprising.

As the rebellion continued, Moriscos were divided according to how well they assimilated into Spanish culture. During the expulsion, Moriscos who were well integrated into the dominant society of the Spanish were allowed to stay in Granada.²² A group of Moriscos wrote, "We feel very much that during our brief exit we will die of hunger. In staying we understand that you are left some rebels that you will disturb every day on this earth and it is this prediction that we ask for and beg You, Our Majesty that you have mercy on us to stay in our houses."²³ Even though these Moriscos realized both the risk of expulsion and staying in Granada, they opted for the less dangerous option. Unfortunately, to stay meant to assimilate completely to Spanish culture and denying their own. This expulsion stirs the desire for a cultural cleansing rather than a religious one. Islam as a religion, therefore, united both the elite Moriscos and those who were expelled in name only. However, in terms of Islamic culture, it separated the two groups. The acculturation of the remaining Moriscos illustrates that they transformed their culture from an Islamic to a Spanish one. Islam served to unite all Moriscos under common culture, and once they broke this shared entity, their Islamic relations broke. This difference in culture drove the regions apart. Islam became a culture, and it was no longer a religion to the conquerors. Islamic culture united the oppressed, as the Arabic they spoke "retained and conserved the memory of the old and gave it life,"²⁴ confirming that Islamic culture – especially its language – united these rebels.

The Panthay Rebellion echoes a similar culture of Islam. According to Atwill, the Yunnan Hui ethnicity is threefold and involves more than solely the Islamic aspect of identity. Ethnicity is not composed of traits alone.²⁵ Naming the Hui "Muslim" would be a great misinterpretation of their wider cultural and ethnic identity. Unlike the Moriscos of the sixteenth century, these Hui shared an ethnicity that defined them as a group. They were not Chinese Muslims or Muslim Chinese, but a Hui ethnicity. One Han man described the Hui in that era: "Full of strength and able to endure hardship, full of vitality, fierce, and brave,"²⁶ thus affirming that the Han stereotyped the Hui. This description further depicts how the Han conceptualized Yunnan Hui identity in terms of how they acted, what they did, and what customs they maintained.²⁷ Even to the oppressor, Hui were not solely defined by their religion.

Islam united the Hui. A correspondence between Ma Rulong and Du Wenxiu alludes to this unity: "Given that all Muslims are one family and that now two-thirds of Yunnan has negotiated peace the one family is the most important point...Peace is really for the good of Muslims as a whole."²⁸ Rulong's statement emphasizes the union of all Muslims, and how their religion draws differences together. The culture that the Hui maintained and the customs they practiced drew their origins from Islam. What created differences between the Hui and Han was the name of Islam. Islam as a religion drew the Hui together to fight against the Han. Therefore, as a reli-

gious entity with basic beliefs in Allah, Islam united the Hui and became the force behind their rebellion. Islam set a cultural basis for their lifestyles and how they organized their community. Their religion was the vehicle through which they built a new identity and culture separate from the Han. In Du Wenxiu's response to Ma Rulong, he affirms this unity: "All Muslims under Heaven are one family."²⁹ Wenxiu conveys a hopeful tone and recognizes that Muslims are united. Furthermore, using Islam as the only differentiating factor between the Hui and Han during this rebellion proves that Islam was the vehicle through which the rebellion occurred. If Islam were not present, what would be the dividing factor between these two cultures? The cultural aspects of Hui life are rooted in Islam. Although Islam does not comprise the entirety of Hui identity, the cultural structure it provides is invoked throughout the Panthay Rebellion.

Looking at the cultural aspects of Islam, a new understanding of the religion arises. From these two rebellions, the culture of Islam separates itself from its religious aspect. Oppressed Muslims were present in both uprisings. The traits of both the Moriscos and Hui confirm that their Islamic culture carried strong traditions, that they both possessed economic advantages and worth to their oppressor, and that they maintained a reputation of working hard. In this light, Islam as a culture becomes the dominant force and should no longer be considered simply a religion when dealing with these conflicts. The culture of Islam is compromised of good economic standing, traditional Islamic dress, speaking or learning the Arabic language as part of their religious experience, and a defense of lifestyle. Neither of these rebellions was first caused by a violent Muslim action, but was a response to restrictions on their culture or the loss of fellow Muslims in their community. Islam served as a vehicle through which these rebellions occurred and it united Muslims under the status of religion. When Islam is considered a religion, it leaves out the presence of numerous other non-religious and traditional factors that affect Morisco and Hui religious practice and lifestyle. Because of Islam, these two Muslim groups maintained their cultural identity amidst a transforming and oppressive environment. Their cultural lifestyle is Islam, and their religion serves as a cultural unifier and identifier.

NOTES

1. Panthay was the Burmese vulgar term for the Hui in Yunnan. Brian L. Evans, "The Panthay Mission of 1872 and its Legacies," *The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 16 (1985): 117, accessed November 19, 2011, ILLiad.
2. David G. Atwill, "Blinkered Visions: Islamic Identity, Hui Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62 (2003): 1080.
3. Evans, "The Panthay Mission of 1872," 117.
4. George W. Clark, *Kwiechow and Yun-nan Provinces*. (Shanghai: Shanghai Mercury Press, 1894) cited in David Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 147.
5. Wang mentions the rebellion sporadically throughout his dissertation, pointing to ethnic and economic confrontation between the Han and Hui. He does not cite particular Islam practice as a cause of dissidence. Wang, Jianping, "Concord and conflict: the Hui communities of Yunnan society." (PhD diss., Lund Studies in African and Asian Religions, 1996).
6. Wang, "Concord and conflict," 17.
7. Wang, "Concord and conflict," 17.
8. This will be discussed in a later paragraph.

9. Defined as "converts from Islam" to Christianity. Harvey further clarifies this definition: "Moriscos was what they were forced to *become*, unwillingly; Muslims is what they *were* underneath. L.P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain, 1500-1614* (USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2-6.
10. Andrew C. Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain," *The American Historical Review* 74 (1968): 5, accessed November 22, 2011, doi: JSTOR/1857627
11. Secretario Diego de Hoyo, "Provisión de Felipe II [Provision of Phillip II]" (Madrid: 1566 November 17) in Angeles Gonzalez-Sinde and Mercedes E. del Palacio, eds., *Tascon, Los Moriscos Espanoles Trasterrados* (Ministerio de Cultura: 2009, 89-90. Translated by Kathleen Murphy.
12. Luis de Mármol, *Rebelión y castigo de los Moriscos* (Málaga, 1991), 95, cited in L.P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain*, 216. Harvey's account of the rebellion greatly relies on Mármol. He was a Spanish Chronicler who lived among the Moriscos from 1520-1600.
13. Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column", 25.
14. A. Katie Harris, *From Muslim to Christian Granada: Inventing a City's Past in Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 23.
15. Michael Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui community: migration, settlement and sects* (London: Curzon Press, 1999), 58.
16. Wang, "Concord and conflict," 249.
17. Du Wenxiu, "Military Regulations, No. 1, Part III," in the appendix of A.B. Wei, "The Moslem Rebellion in Yunnan." (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1974)
18. Carla Rahn Phillips, "The Moriscos of La Mancha, 1570-1614," *The Journal of Modern History* 50 (1978):1070, accessed November 22, 2011, doi: JSTOR/1876621
19. Phillips, "The Moriscos," 1075.
20. Archivo General de Simancas, Cámara de Castilla, "Letter from Cristóbal de la Aguila to Juan Vázquez, secretary of the king" (*legajo* 2157, fol. 15.) cited in Phillips, "The Moriscos," 1075.
21. Harris, *From Muslim to Christian Granada*, 24.
22. David Coleman, *Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492-1600* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 185.
23. Aben Abóo, "Medina de Buenbarrón" (España: Julio 1570) in Gonzalez-Sinde and E. del Palacio, *Los Moriscos*, 113. Translated by Kathleen Murphy.
24. de Hoyo, "Provision of Phillip II," 89.
25. Frederik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Waveland Press, 1998), Introduction, 14-15.
26. Ed. Bai Shouyi, "In Hui Rebellions," (Shanghai: Zhongguo shenzhou guoguang chubanshe, 1953), 216, cited in David G. Atwill, "Blinkered Visions: Islamic Identity, Hui Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62 (2003): 1082.
27. Atwill, "Blinkered Visions," 1082.
28. Ma Rulong. "Zhi Du Wenxishu" [A letter to Du Wenxiu] In HGMY, II: 99 cited in Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, 156.
29. Du Wenxiu. "Fu Yang zhenpeng shu" [A reply to Yang Zhenpeng]. In HQMY, I: 103-08 cited in Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, 157.

LANGUAGE IN ACTION: THE MEANING OF 9/11 AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"

| John F. M. Donovan

Introduction

Any historical event and its ripples of influence can be examined and understood through the meaning placed on the event and the processes by which it is constructed and disseminated. Meaning underlies all social interaction. Without it the social world is rendered senseless and baseless. Thus, in the attempt to comprehend the US government's reaction to the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks analysis of meaning is vital. Immediately following the attacks, a discourse evolved in the United States which consisted of a multitude of cultural expressions that sought to place meaning on what had happened on that day. Today, the meaning of the attacks has become so entrenched in the language of American society that all that is required in its label is the name-date 9/11. The name-date demands knowledge; it takes as common sense the meaning and implication of the event to which it refers.^[1]

In this paper I assess the influence of the language surrounding 9/11, and the meanings it communicated, on the practices that comprised the "war on terror." In other words, how did particular words, phrases, analogies, metaphors, and metonymies used to describe and explain the terrorist attacks introduce a set of meanings that shaped a reality conducive to certain types of action. For example, how did the perception of 9/11 as an "act of war" or a "dividing line in history" translate materially into the policies and practices of the "war on terror."

In addition, I will demonstrate how the meaning placed on 9/11 informed the construction of terrorist and American identities as binary opposites. The legitimacy and common sense of any military conflict is rooted in the binary construction of the collective "self" in relation to the enemy "other."^[2] Thus, in assessing the logic behind the US military's invasion of Afghanistan examination of the construction of identity is particularly important. Certain readings of the attacks implicitly attributed opposing characteristics to American and terrorist identities. For example, by representing the terrorist attacks as an "attack on civilization" politicians implicitly characterized the terrorist enemy as "barbaric."

This analysis will involve the deconstruction of language used by US politicians and cabinet officials that sought to explain what had happened on September 11th. This includes speeches, interviews, press conferences, and any other commentary pertaining to September 11th and the "war on terror." To fully understand the 9/11 discourse, however, or any other discourse for that matter, one must look beyond political rhetoric and examine how the language and subsequent meaning constructed in the political realm was reproduced and solidified in the mass media. This entails the analysis of newspaper and magazine editorials, TV advertisements, various commemorative products, websites, billboards and any other documented medium of communication that implicitly or explicitly refers to the attacks. These media expressions functioned to solidify the common sense of the discourse put forth by the political establishment, thus further empowering and legitimizing the political rhetoric and practices of the "war on terror." I will argue that the language used in the political rhetoric surrounding the attacks created a particular perception of reality which was reinforced and solidified through various popular expressions of meaning. This new reality, constructed both within and outside the US government, provided the foundational logic for the practices and actions of the "war on terror."

Meaning, Discourse, and Language

To properly examine the relationship between language and practice, one needs to address the basic concepts underlying the theories of discourse and language, in particular that of culture. Composed of a multitude of meanings and networks of meanings, culture encompasses all of human social reality. Nothing we study, nothing we do, nothing we think and nothing we write is separate from this network of meaning.^[3] As a part of culture, language is a tool used to objectify, contextualize and categorize one's external reality. It gives order to a senseless environment and gives the illusion of objective understanding in the face of the unthinkable. If culture as a network of meaning is the blanket under which we all live, eat and sleep, then it follows that all action is entrenched in meaning.^[4]

Within culture there exist multiple discourses which include an array of expressions that operate within a particular network of meaning. Discourses shape who we are, who we hate and how we behave towards others.^[5] According to Henrik Larson, "discourses dictate what it is possible to say and not possible to say. Discourses therefore provide the basis on which policy preferences, interests and goals are constructed."^[6] The examination of a given discourse thus allows for a fuller understanding of particular perceptions of reality that produce certain types of action.

A discourse is made up of two interrelated components including discursive formations or constructions and discursive practices.^[7] Discursive constructions are comprised of a collection of related statements that both determine and communicate a subject's meaning. In the 9/11 discourse these verbal or written constructions were present in political rhetoric and the mass media. Discursive practices are the actions that both emerge out of a network of meaning and reinforce or solidify that meaning. In the context of the 9/11 discourse, this could include any act which operated within this particular construction of "reality," from the initial air strikes on Kabul to the abuse of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

In defining and categorizing discursive constructions and practices there is the tendency to think that there is a unidirectional causal relationship between the two. That one subsequently and inevitably leads to the other. However, this is a misinterpretation which must be addressed from the outset. Language and action mutually reinforce each other and are inseparable components of the same network of meaning. It is impossible to properly examine language without analyzing action and vice versa.

The social world is comprised of a series of stimuli and reactions. Reactions place a particular meaning on stimuli through language and practice. For example, in modern societies if a man commits murder, then the meaning of his action is constructed through language, labeling the man a murderer, and through practice, arresting the man and convicting him of murder in a criminal court of law. Both the language and practice that constitute the reaction place meaning on the original act of murder.

Language in Action: The Discursive Practices of the "War on Terror"

In the months following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush administration with the consent and support of the Senate and House of Representatives initiated and developed an official response which affected almost every area of the U.S. government. Entitled, the "war on terror," this new government initiative involved three broad and overlapping dimensions which sought to counter terrorism both within the United States and abroad. One of the central tenets of the "war on terror" was its foreign policy dimension, which involved the full-scale mili-

tary invasion of Afghanistan. A second dimension of the new war was that of national security and intelligence which refers to the CIA's global "war on terror" involving the arrest of 3,000 suspected terrorists in over forty countries between 2001 and 2005.^[8] The third area of government affected by the "war on terror" was that of domestic policy which introduced new legislation and institutions created specifically for the purpose of finding, detecting and arresting terrorist suspects within the United States.

Foreign Policy: The Invasion of Afghanistan

The most costly dimension of the "war on terror," both in terms of economic resources and human life, was that of foreign policy, in particular the military invasion of Afghanistan.^[9] Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed the *Authorization for Use of Military Force*, granting President George W. Bush the authority to "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."^[10] Additionally, in preparation for the invasion of Afghanistan, Congress increased military spending by \$20 billion.^[11]

On October 7th, less than a month after the attacks, the US military began air strikes on Kabul in Afghanistan in an attempt to overthrow the country's ruling party, the Taliban, in a campaign entitled "Operation Enduring Freedom."^[12] This US-led campaign employed the military and financial support of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance. Over the next two months the US military dropped 14,000 tons of bombs killing 2,969 to 3,413 civilians and 4,000-6,000 Taliban soldiers.^[13] By early December of 2001, the last Taliban stronghold in Kandahar fell to coalition forces thereby officially ousting the Taliban government from power in Afghanistan.^[14]

Over the past eleven years the US military has maintained a significant military presence in Afghanistan, battling periodic Taliban counter-offensives while struggling to sustain a positive public image amongst the Afghan population in the midst of various human rights abuses and inflammatory acts seen as affronts to the Islamic faith.^[15] Although President Obama ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 troops in December of 2011 and will withdraw 20,000 more by the Summer of 2012, 90,000 U.S. soldiers remain in the country at the time of writing this paper.^[16] Lasting over a decade, the conflict in Afghanistan is America's longest war claiming the lives of 1,500 American soldiers and costing the US government hundreds of billions of dollars.^[17]

Security and Intelligence: "Black Sites" and New Methods of Interrogation

Another dimension of the discursive practices surrounding the "war on terror" was that of security and intelligence which entailed the arrest and detention of 3,000 suspected terrorists in over forty countries between the years 2001 and 2005.^[18] On September 17th, President Bush issued a directive allowing the CIA to set up detention facilities outside the United States called "black sites" in which he authorized the use of alternative interrogation methods.^[19] This order allotted the CIA \$1 billion in funding for counter-terrorist operations and directed the CIA to "undertake its most sweeping and lethal covert action since the founding of the agency in

1947.”^[20] In reference to this executive order, one senior official told the Washington Post that “The gloves are off... The president has given the agency the green light to do whatever is necessary. Lethal operations that were unthinkable pre-September 11 are now underway.”^[21] The most notable of these “black sites” were Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan which both began operations in January of 2002. Because these bases served as America’s largest and most active prisons in the war in Afghanistan, examining the methods by which prisoners were captured and treated in these facilities provides a glimpse into the more general security and intelligence gathering dimension of the “war on terror.”

In October of 2001, shortly after the first airstrikes on Kabul, the US military dropped hundreds of leaflets throughout Afghanistan offering cash rewards for anyone who turned in members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda to US authorities.^[22] As a result, warlords, tribal leaders, and bounty hunters throughout the country were provided financial incentive to capture and hand over people to the US military who in some cases were not involved in the conflict at all.^[23] Additionally, there have been reports of people handing over business, personal or tribal rivals to US authorities in return for cash payments, resulting in the wrongful imprisonment of innocent men with no affiliation with the Taliban or al-Qaeda.^[24]

In January of 2002, the Bush administration set up the legal guidelines and parameters for interrogating and detaining suspected members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice drafted a series of memoranda claiming that the Third Geneva convention, prohibiting the use of torture and aggressive interrogation techniques, did not apply to suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban members.^[25] On January 25, 2002 White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales presented memorandum to the President which argued that the “war on terror” had rendered “obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on (the) questioning of enemy prisoners” in order to “preserve flexibility” in questioning suspected terrorists.^[26]

By the summer of 2002, interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, had yielded very little information pertaining to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in the Middle East. As a result, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo in August of 2002, drafted a legal memo defending the use of aggressive interrogation techniques claiming that the abuse of prisoners is not torture unless it inflicts pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”^[27] On December 2nd, 2002 Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld authorized the use of several harsh interrogation tactics including isolation for thirty days at a time, 24 hour interrogations, and the exploitation of individual fears, vulnerabilities and cultural taboos.^[28]

In order to carry out these new measures, the administration replaced Brigadier General Rick Baccus with Major General Geoffrey Miller as the Commander of the Joint Task Forces at Guantanamo Bay.^[29] Seen as too soft on the prisoners, Baccus granted a number of privileges to the detainees including distributing Korans and changing meal times to accommodate Ramadan prayers.^[30] Under Miller’s leadership, interrogations at Guantanamo Bay incorporated new aggressive methods of extracting information from prisoners which at this time were also introduced to prisons in Afghanistan.^[31]

At Bagram Air Force Base, detainees were subjected to a number of aggressive interrogation techniques such as painful stress positions and sleep deprivation.^[32] There is also evidence of more harsh tactics meant to dehumanize prisoners including forced nudity, sexual humiliation, sexual assaults, and use of dogs and electric shocks.^[33] In statements made to army investigators, one soldier stationed at Bagram testified to witnessing an interrogation where the detainee was “forced to roll back and forth on the floor of a cell, kissing the boots of his two interrogators.”

Another soldier’s testimony included an instance where a detainee was “made to pick plastic bottle caps out of a drum mixed with excrement and water as part of a strategy to soften him up for questioning.”^[34]

Former prisoners at Bagram spoke of similar cases of dehumanization. Hussain Mustafa, a Jordanian teacher who had been wrongfully imprisoned, testified that guards blindfolded and handcuffed him, then bent him over and sodomized him with a wooden stick.^[35] Al-Jazeera cameraman Sami al-Hajj, spent sixteen days at Bagram where he was badly beaten and then was transferred to Kandahar prison where he was sexually abused and had each hair in his beard plucked out one by one.^[36] Additionally, two deaths have been reported at Bagram, including that of Mullah Habibullah and Dilawar who were both severely beaten in the days before they died. After reviewing his body, Dilawar’s coroner stated that he had seen “similar injuries in an individual run over by a bus.”^[37]

Similar treatment of prisoners has also been reported at Guantanamo Bay.^[38] Under the direction of Major General Geoffrey Miller, “not only was Guantanamo the most oppressive of prison environments, but those who refused to cooperate - or were unable to cooperate, because they had no information - were subjected to horrendous abuse.”^[39] Until recently, prisoners being detained at Guantanamo Bay were not allowed legal representation and were restricted from seeing classified evidence held against them.^[40]

The Bush administration’s new legal guidelines and procedures for the interrogation of prisoners captured in the “war on terror” indicate that the use of torture at Bagram and Guantanamo Bay were not isolated incidents but were part of a larger effort to extract information from terrorist suspects. The methods of arresting, detaining and interrogating prisoners in the war in Afghanistan thus constituted a unique dimension of the “war on terror” characterized by a considerable departure from American and international law.

Domestic Policy: Legislation and Homeland Security

The third and final, aspect of the “war on terror” was domestic policy. This dimension primarily consisted of a series of new legislative initiatives, most notably the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the *Mobilization Against Terror Act*, and the *Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002*. Drafted almost immediately after the September 11th terrorist attacks the USA PATRIOT Act consisted of 342 pages of legislation that covers 350 subject areas. Overall, the act enhanced the ability of the US government to detect potential terrorist activities within the United States by expanding the powers of US law enforcement agencies in a variety of different ways. Under the PATRIOT Act, law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, are now allowed access to an individual’s private medical, financial, educational and business records upon suspicion of engagement in terrorist activities. The law also approved the use of national, as opposed to local, search warrants and the detention of immigrants for up to a week without charge. In addition, the PATRIOT Act empowers the Secretary of State to label any individual in the United States a “terrorist” without subject to review.^[41]

Officially passed by Congress in September of 2001, The *Mobilization Against Terrorism Act* enhances the ability of US authorities to detain suspected terrorists by granting new legal powers to the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Services and federal prosecutors to spy on and apprehend suspected enemies of the state. The next year, Congress passed the *Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002*, which established the Department of Homeland Security as the

third largest federal agency in the American government with over 40,000 employees.^[42] Originally placed under the leadership of Tom Ridge, the department's primary functions are to coordinate national responses to terrorist attacks and maintain border and transportation security within the United States. In addition, a number of counter-terrorist agencies were created in support of the department, including the Terrorist Threat Integration Centre, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the Joint Interagency Task Force for Counter-Terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Campaign Support Group, FBI counter-terrorism units, and CIA counter-terrorism units.

Each of the dimensions of the "war on terror" examined above, included a wide range of practices rooted in the same discourse. Although the three different dimensions of America's new war are each institutionally unique, discursively they are the same. The different practices that comprised the "war on terror" should therefore be viewed as different fruits from the same tree. They are all part of the same logic; the same common sense or construction of reality rooted in the meaning placed on the September 11th terrorist attacks.

Discursive Formations

The practices of the "war on terror" were conceived of and carried out within the confines of a particular construction of reality rooted in the meanings placed on the September 11th terrorist attacks. Politicians and top government officials in speeches and interviews following September 11th, labeled the event a "national tragedy" and an attack on the American nation as a collective community. This discursive formation shaped other representations of the attacks as well. As an assault on the American nation, 9/11 came to represent an "act of war," an attack on American values, and a "dividing line" in the nation's history. Behind each of these constructions existed a wide array of implications which contributed to the overall common sense of the "war on terror" and the practices of which it consisted.

The interpretation of the September 11th terrorist attacks as an assault on America led to a second interrelated aspect of the 9/11 discourse, the reconstruction of national identity in relation to terrorist identity. Belief or pride in a national community involves a shared belief in a set of values associated with the community as a whole. Social cohesion of any type and a subsequent belief in a collective identity requires the notion that the community or nation is bound together by a set of commonly held beliefs and values. Thus, an event constructed as an assault on a nation, implies that the instance represented an attack on the values and beliefs attributed to the nation and its identity. As a result, in both the political rhetoric and mass media commentary surrounding the attacks, there was an emphasis on restating the values attributed to America's national identity and constructing the identity of the terrorist as a binary opposite. America was associated with civilization, democracy, heroism, equality and the overall good of mankind. In contrast, politicians and the mass media constructed terrorist identity as the ultimate antithesis to these values, associating the terrorist with barbarism, totalitarianism, cowardice, inequality and evil.

Description of the Event

In the months following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the US political establishment played a primary role in shaping the description of the event which characterized the 9/11

discourse.^[43] Popular mediums of communication, including news media, billboards, newspaper and magazine editorials and headlines, TV advertising, and various products associated with the commemoration of the attacks took the language contained in the political rhetoric surrounding 9/11 and reproduced it, thereby solidifying the basic tenets of the discourse as common sense notions of reality.^[44] The description, labeling, and remembrance of the attacks can be understood as a series of stages based in discursive construction. These stages should not be viewed as chronological or linear but rather as mutually reinforcing levels of meaning. Much like floors in an office building, each stage is built on top of one another to form a coherent set of understandings surrounding the September 11th terrorist attacks.

The central discursive formation which provided the foundation for the discourse, was the representation of 9/11 as an attack on the American nation.^[45] In both political rhetoric and popular culture, the idea of America as a collective victim allowed for the construction of the attacks as an "act of war." This interpretation was further reinforced through the comparison of the attacks to the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor.

In attempting to answer why the attacks had occurred, government representatives and officials from across the political spectrum claimed that the hijackers had committed such acts out of an irrational hatred for the American way of life. Additionally, politicians and media producers alike portrayed September 11th as an unprecedented event that represented a "dividing line" in the American narrative, thereby further solidifying the idea that the attacks were not in any way the result of American policy, but rather were motivated by a hatred for American values.

National Tragedy and the Meaning of Remembrance

Immediately following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the political establishment constructed the event as an attack on the American nation as a collective community. Within hours of the attacks President Bush announced, "Today we've had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country."^[46] In an interview with CNN on September 11, 2001 New York Governor George Pataki proclaimed, "Clearly this is an attack upon America."^[47] That same day, Massachusetts Senator, Ted Kennedy referred to attacks as a "searing of the nation's soul."^[48] The common sense interpretation of the September 11th terrorist attacks as an exceptional American tragedy is additionally reflected by the fact that the event is referred to as 9/11, as opposed to 11/9 or 11/2.^[49]

This discursive construction has had far-reaching implications, in particularly in the nature and function of the acts of commemoration which followed the attacks. In American popular culture, various mediums of communication associated the remembrance of those who had lost their lives on September 11th, with a reinvigorated sense of American pride. This discursive link had two primary functions. Firstly, it reinforced the common sense of portraying the attacks as a national tragedy. Secondly, it associated opposition to US policies with anti-Americanism and disrespect for the 9/11 victims. As a result, the practices and institutions of the "war on terror," in particularly the military invasion of Afghanistan, received overwhelming political and popular support from both Democrats and Republicans alike. Three days after the attacks, almost every member of Congress approved the *Authorization for the Use of Military Force*, allowing for the invasion of Afghanistan, with the exception one state representative.^[50] Additionally, a poll taken in September of 2001, showed that 89% of Americans supported a military response to the at-

tacks.^[51] Media expressions of commemoration contributed to political and popular consent thereby granting legitimacy to the US government's military invasion of Afghanistan.

One of the key aspects of the 9/11 discourse was the use of the American flag as a symbol of what had been attacked on September 11th, 2001. On that day alone, Wal-Mart sold 116,000 American flags compared with that of 6,400 the day before.^[52] On the day of the attacks, various TV news programs used American flag imagery as the background to their broadcasts.^[53] In addition to this more general display of patriotic fervor, there emerged several symbolic and commodified images that overtly represented the September 11th terrorist attacks as an exceptional American tragedy.

One such use of this imagery included the Honor and Hero flags which listed all the names of those who had died on September 11th on the image of an American flag.^[54] On its website, the creator of the Honor and Hero flags, John Michelotti, in reference to the victims of the terrorist attacks, writes "Every one of them should be remembered in a way that will honor their memories and forever tie them to the symbol of America."^[55] Here, Michelotti clearly conveys the purpose of the flags, which is to associate the reverence for the victims of the September 11th attacks with patriotism and belief in the perceived values of the American collective consciousness. On the tenth anniversary of the attacks in September of 2011, the Honor and Hero Flags were planted throughout Battery Park across the street from the World Trade Center in memory of those who lost their lives thereby reflecting the common sense of the representation of 9/11 as an American tragedy.

Another cultural medium that contributed to this particular meaning of 9/11 in the months after the attacks was advertising. Much like political rhetoric, advertising can function as a myth-making vessel of communication that reinforces particular ideologies or discourses.^[56] In the case of 9/11, certain TV commercials reinforced the central discursive construction surrounding the September 11th attacks, that it was an attack on the American national community.

In the auto industry, General Motors and Ford initiated advertising campaigns which sought to use the connection between the commemoration of the terrorist attacks and American nationalism to sell cars. General Motors' campaign, entitled "Keep America Rolling," included a commercial which referred to the "American Dream" GM's refusal to "let anyone take it away."^[57] Although 9/11 is not explicitly mentioned in the advertisement, it implicitly represents the event as an attempt to "take away" the American dream, thus reinforcing the idea that 9/11 was an attack against the American nation.

As part of the same advertising campaign, GM published a full-page advertisement in the New York Times with an image of the Statue of Liberty rolling up her sleeves with a headline that reads: "We will roll up our sleeves. We will move forward together. We will overcome. We will never forget."^[58] Through the repetition of the word "we" the ad presents America as the subject, thus implying that the nation as a collective community was the primary victim of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

Ford produced similar advertisements in its post-9/11 campaign entitled "Ford Drives America" including a commercial which states "In light of these challenging times, we at Ford want to do our part to help move America forward."^[59] The examination of these advertising campaigns reflects the construction of 9/11 as a national tragedy in the discourse surrounding the terrorist attacks. In addition, these examples display how the interpretation of any event as a national tragedy, invokes a heightened sense of nationalist fervor which is then associated with reverence or respect for the victims of that tragedy.

In the months following the September 11th attacks, sporting events also served as a platform for meaning production. At the beginning of Game 3 of the 2001 World Series between the Arizona Diamondbacks and the New York Yankees held in the Bronx, the national anthem was sung followed by a moment of silence in remembrance of those who had lost their lives in the attacks. After a long applause, President George W. Bush threw out the first pitch wearing an FDNY windbreaker amidst the background of a tattered American flag, salvaged from the wreckage of Ground Zero. The crowd greeted the president's first pitch with the repeated chant, "U-S-A" as the camera turned to a homemade banner that read: "USA Fears Nobody Play Ball" with the American flag and two Yankee symbols drawn underneath.^[60] Here, 9/11 is visually and aurally constructed as a national tragedy to be commemorated through the expression of American nationalism. The president, seen as the living embodiment of the nation, initiates America's favorite past-time with the symbolic first pitch followed by the crowd's affirmation through patriotic chanting.

Magazines and newspapers also reinforced the representation of 9/11 as an attack on the American national community.^[61] On the day after the terrorist attacks, the headline of the Nashville City Paper read "AMERICA IN SHOCK." That same day, the Chicago Tribune ran a similar headline which read "US Under Attack."^[62] The New York Times published an ad-free section covering the attacks and the "war on terror" for fifteen months after September 11th, 2001 entitled, "A NATION CHALLENGED." In addition, a wide variety of magazines published special editions covering 9/11 and representing the event as an attack on America including Sports Illustrated, Rolling Stone, and People. On September 24, 2001, People Magazine's special issue cover presented the headline "The Day That Shook America." In the background is an image of the North Tower burning, with the silhouette of the next plane about to hit the South Tower.^[63]

One of the most widespread modes of communication emphasizing the association of the remembrance and commemoration of 9/11 with American patriotism were billboards. In the years following the attacks up until the present day, billboards have functioned to solidify the construction of the September 11th terrorist attacks as a national tragedy through the employment of particular types of language and images.^[64] On one billboard, sighted on I-10 West just east of Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 2012, a picture of the head of a bald eagle and the American flag provide the background to the words, "9-11-01 Never Forget." On another, in Haines City, Florida sighted in 2004, the words "Remember 9/11" are written with an American flag in the background.^[65]

Politics and popular culture are usually viewed as two separate spheres which operate independently of one another. However, political rhetoric gives meaning to a given situation. It is an assessment of external reality which is given considerable weight by its audience (i.e. the government's citizens) particularly in times of fear or crisis. Thus, the language that justifies and rationalizes certain political projects and ideologies can be reproduced in what is normally distinguished as "popular culture" through the expression and communication of shared meaning.^[66] Such is the case, in the solidification of meaning placed on the September 11th terrorist attacks. Politicians introduced the discursive construction of 9/11 as a national tragedy which was then reproduced through a variety non-political mediums, thereby reinforcing the idea as common sense and providing a foundational base of logic for other constructions.

“Act of War” and the Pearl Harbor Analogy

Politicians and government officials quickly sought to construct the September 11th terrorist attacks as an “act of war” in the weeks after 9/11. President Bush pronounced, “On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.”^[67] Similar proclamations were heard and read throughout the political rhetoric surrounding 9/11. Retired House Republican leader, Bob Michel in reference to the attacks, said “It is an act of war.”^[68] Arizona Senator John McCain declared “This is obviously an act of war.”^[69] Former FBI assistant director, James Kallstrom, said the terrorist attacks were “clearly an act of war.”^[70]

This particular representation of 9/11 found in the political speeches and interviews, following the attacks, was seen repeatedly in a variety of means of communication, in particularly in the news media. On CNN, whose coverage of the attacks relied heavily on political commentary, the word “war” was stated 234 times in just the first twelve hours after the first plane hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center.^[71] Politicians used this discursive construction to place meaning on the event, thus shaping a particular common sense within the American government and amongst the general public, conducive to a certain set of actions and practices. By framing 9/11 as an “act of war,” a full-scale mobilization of the US military would be the most logical next step in America’s response the attacks.

The political rhetoric surrounding 9/11 additionally reinforced the representation of the terrorist attacks as an “act of war” through comparing the event to the 1941 Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. In an address to the nation President Bush implicitly invoked this historical analogy stating, “Americans have known wars - but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.”^[72] Here, Bush is comparing the 9/11 attacks to Pearl Harbor while at the same time constructing the event as an “act of war.” US Senator from Connecticut, Christopher Dodd in an interview with Judy Woodruff on CNN, noted the exceptional nature of the terrorist attacks claiming that “a day like this...rivals if not exceeds the attack on Pearl Harbor almost 60 years ago.”^[73]

Politicians employed this historical analogy in an effort to make sense of the acts of terrorism which had occurred on September 11th, 2001. The images of the twin towers burning and collapsing coupled with the outstanding loss of life was too immediately traumatic to be compared with any other act of violence in America’s history which fell under the category of terrorism. The nature of the event itself demanded that the use of any historical analogy be equal in shock and level of destructiveness as that which was experienced on September 11th, 2001. Pearl Harbor thus provided Americans with an anchor of meaning in the attempt to objectify and put into words what had happened on September 11th.

Reflections of the Pearl Harbor analogy were present in American media outlets as well. On September 12th, 2001, the Chicago Tribune published a cartoon by Nick Anderson which showed an image of the twin towers burning with a quote from a Japanese admiral saying, “waking a sleeping giant.”^[74] Anderson’s cartoon, not only compares the two events themselves, but also implicitly equates America’s impending military response to the September 11th terrorist attacks with the nation’s previous reaction to the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. The Tribune published a similar cartoon three days later by Chip Bok which displayed the dates and images of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the collapse of the World Trade Center. Underneath these two depictions was the phrase “Infamy II.”^[75] In addition, the New York Times published an article the day after the attacks which focused primarily on this historical analogy through interviews

with various politicians who described the similarities and differences between Pearl Harbor and 9/11.^[76]

In the American narrative, the attacks on Pearl Harbor are commonly represented as the event which would trigger US involvement in World War II, which represents one the largest and most exhaustive military campaigns in the nation’s history. By comparing 9/11 to Pearl Harbor, therefore, one is not only comparing two single isolated events but also two narratives. The comparison implies that America’s reaction to 9/11 should reflect to a certain extent its response to Pearl Harbor. It is in this way that the use of this historical analogy is discursively similar to the representation of the September 11th terrorist attacks as an “act of war.” Both constructions placed a particular meaning on 9/11 which shaped a common sense conducive to military action.

Attack on American Values and “Our Way of Life”

The representation of 9/11 as an attack on America as a national community provided a basis of logic on which all other meanings surrounding the attacks relied. The concept of the American nation contains within it a shared set of values, principles, and beliefs. Thus, the interpretation of 9/11 as an “attack on America” implied that those values, principles, and beliefs too were attacked and that those who perpetrated the acts did so out of a hatred for the American “way of life.”

On September 11th, President Bush addressed the nation stating, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.”^[77] In the same speech, Bush goes on to address the motivation behind the attacks claiming that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world,”^[78] thus implying that the hijackers were driven to such lengths of destruction and violence out of an opposition to the abstract values of “freedom” and “opportunity” embodied in the American nation. New York Governor George Pataki offered similar statements on September 11th, 2001, saying that the terrorist attacks were “an attack upon our freedom and our way of life.”^[79] Bush advisor Karen Hughes reiterated this sentiment stating that “Our fellow citizens and our freedom came under attack today.”^[80]

American editorials further reinforced the idea that 9/11 represented an attack on American values. In his article entitled “To Go On Being Americans” published in the Washington Post on September 14, 2001, E.J. Dionne argues that the central purpose of terrorism is to disrupt the foundational principles of a nation: “Terror is designed to paralyzed. It succeeds when a country loses confidence in itself -- when it gives up what it values most.”^[81] Dionne goes on to write that in response to the terrorist attacks “our central resolve must be to go on being Americans, to remain a people who cherish our liberties and never allow a small, mad group to push us into questioning the value of freedom.”^[82] Here, the author implies that the events of 9/11 were an attack on American values of “freedom” and “liberty” perpetrated by a “mad group” whose intentions were to force Americans to question those values.

In a similar Washington Post article, published on September 24, 2001, former chair of the Democratic National Committee, Joe Andrew, emphasized the significance of dissent while still contributing to the dominant discourse writing, “Democracy is what our terrorist adversaries want to disrupt. Let us not let them.”^[83] Both Andrew and Dionne’s articles seem to take as common sense and fact that the motivation behind the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 was to disrupt American principles and values.

In constructing the reasons for the attacks in such a way, both the political establishment and popular media dispelled any interpretation of 9/11 that placed blame on the policies or intelligence failures of the American state itself.^[84] This interpretation provided discursive closure, thus severely limiting the space for alternative readings of the attacks.^[85] The representation of the attacks as an assault on American principles additionally carried with it implications pertaining to the motivations behind the attacks thereby contributing to the construction of terrorists as “enemies of freedom.”

“Dividing Line in History”

The 9/11 discourse was additionally characterized by a sense that the terrorist attacks had come out of the blue.^[86] Political rhetoric and other media commentary framed the attacks as a historically unprecedented event which defied conventional understanding. This interpretation led to the construction of the attacks as a moment in American history which changed everything; a moment that would completely alter the nation’s historical direction in the years to come.

Following the attacks, politicians and government officials emphasized this interpretation of 9/11, thereby providing justification for future US action, policies and institutions which lacked any historical or legal precedent. The material characteristics of the “war on terror” were therefore conceived of, out of the common sense idea that the world was inherently different after September 11th, 2001.^[87]

Political rhetoric laid the groundwork for the representation of 9/11 as a moment which changed everything. Following the attacks, President Bush declared, “For the United States, September 11th 2001, cut a deep dividing line in our history.”^[88] Colin Powell stated, “The 11th of September will always be known as a unique day in history. It was before 9/11 and after 9/11.”^[89] Condoleezza Rice reiterated this statement saying, “The fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center were the bookends of a long transition period.”^[90]

Popular cultural expressions reflected this representation of 9/11 and as a result solidified it as a common sense interpretation of reality. A day after the attacks, the Philadelphia City Paper’s headline read “NOTHING WILL EVER BE THE SAME.” Similarly, on the same day the Detroit News published the headline, “AMERICA SAVAGED, FOREVER CHANGED.”^[91] In addition, the New York University Child Study Center published a book of children’s art depicting the attacks entitled *The Day Our World Changed: Children’s Art of 9/11*.^[92] Although this book has no explicit political motives, its title and content reinforce the idea that 9/11 represented a rupture in the world’s history thus reinforcing the dominant narrative introduced in the political rhetoric surrounding the September 11th terrorist attacks.^[93]

The perception of reality which emerged out of this discursive formation was highly conducive to the introduction of unprecedented government reform. If 9/11 had completely transformed the world then America’s foreign and domestic policies would too have to change. The Bush administration’s introduction of new legal memoranda concerning the treatment of prisoners in US custody is a clear example of how this meaning placed on the September 11th terrorist attacks contributed to a particular common sense conducive to certain types of practice. In a considerable departure from American and international law these new interrogation guidelines sanctioned the use of “aggressive” techniques in extracting information from prisoners and ultimately led to acts of torture and dehumanization within the US military. This unprecedented use

of torture in military interrogations was a manifestation of the new reality of the “war on terror” rooted in the language surrounding 9/11 and the meanings it communicated.

Construction of Identity

The description of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the 9/11 discourse shaped the characterization of American and terrorist identities as binary opposites.^[94] Identity is constructed through the binary structure of language and is thus defined as what it is not.^[95] More generally, words achieve meaning through their opposites.^[96] “Good” implies the existence of “bad” and also depends on the idea of “bad” for meaning. This way of understanding how meaning comes into existence is especially helpful in understanding the social construction of identity within a given discourse. In the discourse of gender, masculine identity and all the adjectives attributed to it exist only in relation to feminine identity. Similarly, in the 9/11 discourse politicians and other cultural producers constructed terrorist identity in relation to that of the American nation through language. The “heroic,” “good,” and “civilized” American was defined in contrast to the “cowardly,” “evil,” and “barbaric” terrorist.^[97]

These constructions of identity are essential in understanding how and why the processes and actions that comprised the “war on terror” made sense within the 9/11 discourse, in particularly its military dimension. In the attempt to mobilize any type of military action, the political leadership must demonize the enemy and glorify the collective self.^[98] The “othering” of the terrorist in the political rhetoric surrounding the “war on terror” is just another example of a government seeking to legitimize and rationalize military conflict. The identity of the “evil terrorist” in the “war on terror” thus serves the same function as the construction of the German “kraut” in World War II or the Vietnamese “gook” in the Vietnam War.^[99]

The representation of 9/11 as an attack on American values implied that those who funded and carried out the hijackings were motivated to do so out of hatred for those values. As a result, politicians and government officials characterized terrorists as enemies of freedom and democracy driven to commit various acts of extreme violence out of a blind hatred for these abstract principles. The adjective most often used to describe this irrational anger was “evil,” implying that terrorists were beyond the reach of rational negotiation or conversation.^[100] In the 9/11 discourse, the construction of the “evil” terrorist implies that violence and destruction are intrinsic to the enemy’s identity. Acts of terrorism are thus the result of the terrorist’s nature rather than any type of perceived political grievance.^[101]

The construction of the “evil terrorist” was facilitated through the characterization of American identity as “heroic.” Through the use of various images and language, the political establishment and popular media portrayed the heroism of the New York City Police and Fire Departments as the embodiment of the true American spirit. This association further reinforced the representation of 9/11 as a national tragedy and also constructed the American nation as the protagonist in the “war on terror,” thus portraying all US actions as objectively good.

“Evil Terrorist”

In an address to the nation, on September 20th, 2001 President Bush offered an answer as to why the 19 hijackers had committed such acts of violence on American soil, stating, “They hate what we see right here in this chamber - a democratically elected government...They hate

our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."^[102] In another speech a month later Bush claimed that the terrorists "can't stand what America stands for."^[103] By constructing the motivation behind the September 11th terrorist attacks in this way President Bush characterized the terrorist other as "enemies of freedom,"^[104] an antithesis to all that America stood for. In a speech given outside the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld further articulated this sentiment stating, "In targeting this place, then, and those who worked here, the attackers, the evildoers correctly sensed that the opposite of all they were, and stood for, resided here."^[105] Here, Rumsfeld portrays terrorist identity in direct contrast to that of America. The terrorist is understood to be everything that an American is not.^[106]

The terrorist hatred for American values was additionally portrayed as an irrational conviction rooted in fanaticism. In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush characterized the terrorist identity stating, "the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design."^[107] Here, terrorists are depicted as angry fanatics who can not be reasoned or negotiated with in a peaceful manner. Politicians communicated this meaning primarily through the use of the adjective, "evil." On September 11th, 2001 President Bush labelled the terrorist attacks "evil, the very worst of human nature."^[108]

The discursive construction of the "evil terrorist" was additionally reinforced through historical analogy. In seeking to solidify the depiction of terrorists as "evil," Bush and other cabinet officials equated terrorism with fascism and communism, and the "war on terror" with World War II and the Cold War. In his September 20th, 2001 address to the nation President Bush, in reference to al-Qaeda, claimed "They're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century... they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism."^[109] These historical analogies attached particular meanings to the perceived terrorist enemy and the new war against that enemy. In the excerpt presented above, by comparing al-Qaeda to Nazism, President Bush is implying that al-Qaeda is a well-organized powerful military machine whose aim is world domination.

This historical comparison also carried with it implications concerning what actions and practices were to be used to combat al-Qaeda in the months following the September 11th attacks. If al-Qaeda was analogous to one of the most militaristic, destructive and inhumane movements in human history, than it would logically follow that any initiative taken against such a group would involve a full-scale military effort coupled with a new way of treating prisoners of war which would match the enemy's blatant disregard for human dignity. This is not to say that the use of the adjective "evil" or of certain historical analogies directly caused the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq or to the torture of prisoners at Bagram or Guantanamo Bay, but rather that the employment of this particular language surrounding terrorist identity contributed to the common sense of the practices and actions that comprised the "war on terror." In other words, the use of certain language allowed some practices to make sense, while making others seem illogical.

The representation of 9/11 as an "attack on civilization" also carried with it certain implications pertaining to the terrorist identity.^[110] In a speech given in October of 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled the attacks "an attack on civilization."^[111] In the same speech Powell went on to characterize the US government's response to the attacks, stating, "America is prepared to be a leader in this new campaign against a threat that is against all of civilization."^[112] In an address to the nation in September of 2001, President Bush portrayed the "war on terror" as "civilization's fight."^[113] Bush further articulated this interpretation of America's new war in his

2002 State of the Union speech claiming, "the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers."^[114] The use of certain words invoke the idea of their opposites. Thus, in conceiving the 9/11 as an "attack on civilization" and the "war on terror" as "civilization's fight" the US political establishment implicitly characterized the terrorist identity as "barbaric."^[115]

The rhetorical examples presented above, demonstrate how the American political establishment attributed the September 11th terrorist attacks to the binary structure of identity. In claiming that cultural identity provided the motivation behind the attacks, politicians ruled out any possibility of rational agency on the part of the terrorist. According to the 9/11 discourse, terrorists have no real reason for perpetrating acts of violence against America, they just do so simply because of their evil nature.^[116]

"Heroic American"

In addition to an attack on the American nation and its values, 9/11 also represented an attack on the American identity. Any action constructed as an attack on a community results in the strengthening of that community through a restatement of its values. The interpretation of the attacks as an assault on the nation and its values thus involved the redefinition of national identity through the expression of the shared meaning of American nationhood.

In a speech given outside the Pentagon in October of 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in reference to the victims of the attacks stated, "They died, then, because of how they lived - as free men and women, proud of their freedom, proud of their country and proud of their country's cause - the cause of human freedom."^[117] Here, Rumsfeld is constructing the attacks as an assault on the American identity while at the same time defining what that identity is. Additionally, by associating the American character with "the cause of human freedom," Rumsfeld implicitly represents the terrorist as the direct opposition to this "cause." Thus, as America's binary opposite, terrorist identity is associated with the "cause" of human oppression.

In the same speech Donald Rumsfeld further characterizes the victims of the attacks stating, "We remember them as heroes."^[118] Popular cultural expressions also used the word, "hero" and its implicit meanings, as a label to describe the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks. In addition, these expressions represented the 9/11 victims as casualties of a national tragedy. As a result, through the use of certain language and imagery, popular and political expressions of meaning constructed the identity of those who had died on September 11th as distinctly American, thus linking the characteristics of the victims to the American community more generally. Just as the commemoration for the victims of 9/11 came to be associated with national pride, politicians and cultural producers associated the attributes of the victims with national identity. The "heroic" quality of those who had died and risked their lives to save others on September 11th, 2001 was therefore represented in American popular culture as a uniquely American trait.

One popular expression which contributed to the construction of the "heroic American" in the early stages of the 9/11 discourse was the Enrique Iglesias song "Hero." Originally released on September 3rd, 2001, the song became a national hit in the days following the attacks, peaking at number three on Billboard's Hot One Hundred Chart and becoming one of Iglesias' best selling singles.^[119] After receiving widespread radio play throughout the United States, New York DJ's produced a remix of the song which included the voice overs of New York firefighters and policemen talking about the attacks.^[120] Iglesias sang the song for the first time on television

as part of the "Tribute to Heroes" telethon in an effort to raise money for the families of the victims of the attacks. Although "Hero" was not specifically intended to be about the attacks its meaning in the 9/11 discourse reinforced the construction of the victims as "heroes" and as a result contributed to the characterization of American identity as "heroic."

In addition to music, certain greeting cards, produced and marketed in the aftermath of the attacks, more explicitly associated American identity with "heroism."^[121] The company, American Greetings created one card that shows the silhouetted image of a police officer and a firefighter staring at the American flag above the caption: "It is in life's hardest moments heroes shine the brightest."^[122] The image of the flag represents the abstract idea of the American nation while at the same time symbolizing the single identity of the police officer and firefighter who are both referred to as "heroes."

A cartoon featured in the Houston Chronicle by Nick Anderson additionally reflected the construction of the "heroic American." Published on September 14, 2001, Anderson's drawing depicts firefighters and police officers running into a smoldering skull labeled "Terrorism" with the text above reading "War Heroes."^[123] Here, Anderson both represents 9/11 as an "act of war" and reflects the dominant discursive construction of the New York City firefighter and police officers as "heroes."

Another cultural contributor to the identity of the "heroic American" was the shoe designed by Steve Madden, entitled, "The Bravest," in honor of those who had lost their lives on the September 11th, 2001.^[124] Originally intended to raise money for the families of the firefighters who died in the attacks, "The Bravest" brandished the American flag as part of its design. The association of the symbolic image of the American flag with the word "bravest" further reinforced the characterization of American identity as "brave" and "heroic."

The image which most effectively and overtly contributed to the construction of the heroic American in the 9/11 discourse, however, was that of three New York City firefighters hoisting up the American flag amidst the rubble of the twin towers.^[125] Presented in the photographs taken by Ricky Flores of *The Journal News* and Thomas Franklin of *The Record*, this image was reminiscent of the famous Joseph Rosenthal picture of US soldiers planting the American flag at Iwo Jima.^[126] The image of the firefighters reinforced the analogy of the September 11th attacks to Pearl Harbor while at the same time constructing American identity as "heroic." Robert Rue articulated the cultural impact of the image stating, "what Flores's editors saw was the chance to make meaning out of incoherence, the chance, perhaps to create the first myth of 9/11: Americans love America, and its citizens will be as heroic and resilient as soldiers in assuring its survival."^[127]

The construction of terrorist and American identities in the 9/11 discourse were rooted in the language surrounding the September 11th attacks themselves. The description of the event allowed for the emergence of certain characterizations of identity. The representation of the attacks as an assault on American values implied that the difference in abstract principles between Americans and Islamic terrorists was one of the root causes of the attacks. This understanding of 9/11, led to the construction of terrorist and American identities as binary opposites rooted in values. As a result, the motivation behind the attacks was not interpreted as a perceived political grievance but rather as an irrational hatred for the principles and values attached to the American nation.

The American political leadership additionally characterized the terrorist as "evil" thus further associating terrorist identity with irrationality. By constructing terrorist identity in this way politicians claimed that the hijackers had not committed such acts of violence out of disa-

greement with US policy but rather had done so because it was in their "evil" nature. The construction of the "evil terrorist" was contrasted with the identity of the "heroic American." Politicians and media producers alike represented American identity as "heroic," thus characterizing the United States as the ultimate protagonist in the America's "fight for civilization" against the forces of "barbarism" and "evil."

Conclusion

In the attempt to rationalize and properly respond to our external reality, we as human beings use meaning as our primary tool. However, all stimuli are meaningless and devoid essence. The objectification of stimuli is thus not an exercise in objectivity but is rather the ultimate act of subjectivity. Reality is subjective, though the limit of its subjectivity is determined by its perceived objective condition. Different realities are shaped by different meanings which exist only in language. Meaning ceases to exist without language. The existence and power of language is reliant entirely upon social interaction. Human reality is therefore a social construction rooted in particular meanings that come into being as a result of language. The direction and purpose of human behavior depends on the reality in which a group of individuals operates.

The meaning of the September 11th terrorist attacks expressed in the language of politicians and cultural producers alike provided the foundation for a particular construction of reality out of which certain actions and behavior emerged. The political establishment introduced particular meanings pertaining to the attacks which were then reproduced and expanded upon in American popular culture, thereby solidifying these constructions as common sense. Both American politicians and civilians perceived the meanings surrounding the September 11th attacks as objective understandings of reality.

One of the primary aims of this paper is to dispel the myth that democratically elected governments, more generally, have complete agency over decision-making. If language, and the meaning it communicates, shapes common sense than the use of certain language determines the fruition of particular types of action and human behavior. Political life is not separate from culture, and thus is not separate from the shared meaning and language that constitutes culture. The "war on terror" and all that it consisted of, was therefore a manifestation of the language surrounding the September 11th attacks which constructed a shared meaning of 9/11 in both the political and non-political spheres of American social life.

Each meaning that comprised the 9/11 discourse, corresponded to the material reality of the "war on terror." By labelling 9/11 an "act of war" and comparing it to Pearl Harbor, it made sense that the reaction to the attacks would include a full-scale military invasion of a country. By claiming that the attacks were an assault on American values, it made sense that a major tenet of state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq would be the installment of democracy and representative government. By portraying September 11, 2001 as a day that changed everything it made sense that the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists would be carried out with a whole new set of unprecedented legal guidelines which disregarded American and international law. The descriptions of the September 11th attacks and the implications of these descriptions, are thus vital in understanding the logic behind the practices of the "war on terror."

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WEAPONS OF RATIONALITY: THE CO-DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS THOUGHT AND AERIAL WARFARE

Jesse Wilson

Abstract

This paper explores the development of systems thought in its service of the Air Force during World War II. The quantified analysis of systems thought was a natural fit for air war for four main reasons, its relative youth and lack of martial tradition, its "man-machine" integration with technology, the ease of applying a statistical cost-benefit analysis to it, and the relatively uniform and simple space in which it took place, which made it easier to analyze symbolically.

The product of this collaboration was a ruthless, mechanistic view of human nature in cybernetics and game theory, a belief that wars could be won by rationally convincing a population to surrender through demonstration of technology of destruction and the idea that the world could be controlled through the combination of superior technology and management.

These ideas reached their apex with the strategy of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during Vietnam. McNamara, himself a product of World War II systems analysis, employed a number of prominent economists and systems analysts who create a "production" model of war based in the cost-benefit analysis which had been applied to aerial warfare. This approach contributed to the overall political, humanitarian and military failure that was the Vietnam War.

Vietnam stands as a reminder that we must always value historical and social knowledge above computerized analysis. Not only does this approach detach us from and rationalize violence, it is also a vain attempt to use an abstract mechanical system to control an infinitely complex system of social organizations.

Introduction

This paper began with a basic question: how do methods of standardization shape the world we live in? Standardization is an attempt to increase the economy of a society, organization or machine through the application of regularity and coordination. In order to increase a complex systems efficiency, an abstract model of said system has to be created. In order for this to take place, the parts of this system have to be quantified in order that they can exist in a symbolic space. Inevitably, this standardized model is then imposed on the real-life system, which is supposedly being modeled, reshaping its reality. Symbolic models have great potential for improving efficiency but they lack the ability to process concepts, intentionality, morality, honor; anything which cannot be interpreted in a numeric or binary sense. For this reason, trusting them above all else can be dangerous.

Along with the dominant technologies of our times, most notably the digital computer and the internet, the modern incarnation of this style of thinking, known as "systems thought" has its roots in military applications. This fact leads to a further question: how has our world been shaped by dominant technologies and modes of thinking borne out of militaristic aims? This paper studies the most important period for the development of this ideology and technology in America, from World War II to the end of the Vietnam War.

The Military and Science, Technology, and Systems Thought

The collaboration between science, academia and the military generated a huge number of important inventions including; radar, computers, microwave generators and, of course, nuclear weapons. An important product of this collaboration that is often overlooked is the theoretical development and institutionalization of systems thought.

Systems thought aims to model the interrelationships of elements unified under a common goal, i.e. a business, an electric grid, or even a country in order to predict or improve its functioning. Systems thought in World War II began as operations research (OR). OR analyzed wartime data and used this analysis improve the use of technology. It was later expanded to improve tactics and, eventually, to predict and plan wars on a broader scale at which point it was more commonly referred to as systems analysis or engineering.

Systems thought and the Air Force share a symbiotic relationship. While the Navy employed its fair share of operations research groups, the majority of work done in operations research was in the service of air power. When World War II began, the Air Force was still attached to the Army and had only existed in that capacity for a few decades. The use of airplanes in warfare was only as old as World War I. Powered flight itself was not much older than that. Because it was still in its early stages of development, the Air Force was less bound to leadership steeped in the precedents of military tradition or dogma than the Army or Navy, which frequently resisted both the introduction of new technology and outside attempts at reorganization.

While all soldiers rely on their equipment to some degree, the Air Force is more directly tied to technology than either the Army or the Navy. Because of the nature of flight and, by extension, air combat, pilots depend on quick and accurate control. This has the twofold effect of both unifying the pilot and aircraft as a "man-machine" system and amplifying the importance of having superior technology to the enemy.

Generally as military technology advances, the connection between warriors and their violence decreases. As weapons evolved from leverage based blades and clubs to projectiles and eventually firearms, the physical and psychological distance between an attacker and his target increased.

Air warfare continues this trend. A fighter pilot does not aim directly at his enemy. He aims at a machine employed by an enemy through the scope of his own machine. A bombers only evidence of the death and destruction they have inflicted is the distant explosions of their own munitions. In our time this trend continues, as attacks are increasingly undertaken through unmanned, remote controlled drones.

Aerial warfare also offers a narrowed criteria for success, in the form of target destruction. This simplifies cost-benefit analysis, an essential element of statistical and systems analysis. Trying to do the same for an army battalion, as was attempted in the Vietnam War, is a difficult task. This focus on specific criteria is dangerous when it is not qualified by a broader perspective.

Aerial warfare takes place in a space that is relatively easy to develop models of. Besides fickle weather, there is a relative lack of what Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz called "friction", the element of random chance and contingency that, "distinguishes real war from war on paper". War in air has both a literal and figurative lack of friction.¹ In air war there are no hamlets to occupy, no civilians to differentiate from insurgents, no alien terrain. There are only enemy fighters and pre-assigned targets, both engaged in an aerial, uniform space.

This relative simplicity also allowed for the solution to one of the central problems of modeling "man-machine" systems, the prediction of human behavior. These methods, which emerged out of a utilitarian need to predict an enemy's behavior in battle, were later established as universal explanations of human behavior. The two most prominent were cybernetics, created by Norbert Wiener, and game theory, created by John von Neumann.

Modeling the behavior of humans in an air battle scenario is relatively simple; behavior is dictated by a need to survive as well as a need to destroy the enemy. In a do or die, zero-sum situation, rationality is laid bare. In this instance, it is helpful to view human intentionality as analogous to a self-regulating machine. While this makes human behavior easier to calculate, when these models are taken to be universally accurate, a huge disconnect emerges. A mechanistic view of human behavior ignores the more intangible and complex qualities of humanity.

This quantified, militaristic mode of thinking became institutionalized in the post-war years in organizations such as the RAND (Research AND Development) Corporation. Their perception of human behavior and the world helped to enforce the idea of a unified, expansive communist threat. It also shaped the perception in American foreign policy that the world, in matters of war, commerce and aid, could be shaped through "technology and superior managerial skills". This approach reached its apex when Robert McNamara, a disciple of systems thought, became Secretary of Defense. Combined with the false assumption of the effectiveness of strategic bombing, the Vietnam War was fought and lost in terms of this myopic, or perhaps more accurately hyperopic, rationalized arrogance.

Attempts at manipulating the world through computerized models and the view of destruction down the sites of bomber from the view mutually reinforce a dangerous vision of the "Other" and war. Rather than a heroic struggle against a sub human enemy as portrayed in propaganda of the past, war becomes a rational operation against a non-human enemy.

The Rise of Strategic Bombing: Destruction as Communication

World War I brought about two of the most horrifying elements of modern war, which were made possible by the introduction of aerial warfare. The first was "total war" in which destroying industry and attacking civilian centers became as important as winning battles.² The second was a tactic called strategic bombing, advocated by men such as Italian pilot Giulio Douhet, which emphasized the bombing of cities and industry in an attempt to break the morale of a country to achieve early victory.³

World War II brought strategic bombing to unthinkable new levels. Despite early promises, it quickly became evident that population centers would not be spared. Germany set this precedent by bombing Warsaw and in the Blitz of Britain. The Allies retaliated with even greater destruction of civilian centers with the fire-bombings of Hamburg and Dresden.⁴ Strategic bombing both began, with the bombing of Pearl Harbor and ended, with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the war in the Pacific.

The effectiveness of strategic bombing in both World War I and II is one of the most contentious issues in modern history.⁵ What is undeniable is that strategic bombing and the atom bomb created a sense that air power was essential to the future dominance and security of America and that destructive technology could be used to "convince" a nation to surrender.

World War II and the Development of Systems Thought

The Manhattan Project generally overshadows an arguably more influential product of academic and military collaboration during World War II, the co-development of the computer and systems thought. Systems thought has been described as, “the process of studying the network of interactions within an organization and assisting in the development of new and improved methods for performing necessary work.”⁶ Systems thought is a fuzzily defined field which includes a huge number of disciplines that overlap and are often referred to interchangeably. These include systems analysis, statistical control, policy analysis, cost/benefit analysis and management science. This confusion of jargon is partially due to the large variety of fields that the systems approach attempts to integrate. Because of this potential confusing speculation, it is useful to look to the roots of this concept to understand its true nature.

A standard definition of a system is “An array of related principles or parts given coherence by focusing on the achievement of an objective.”⁷ This gives an idea of the massive scope of the field, an earthworm is as much of a system as a missile defense system. Generally though, systems thinking is applied to the improvement of “man-machine” or hybrid systems which connect mankind to engineered technology for the purpose of “directing the great sources of power in nature for the use and convenience of man,”⁸ producing goods and services or strategic destruction in the case of warfare. These hybrid systems can take on the appearance of objectivity or even autonomy. It is essential to remember that they are social in both their construction and their effects.⁹

The roots of the systems theory ethos go as deep as the history of mankind. Humans attempt to control their environment as old as the use of tools and arguably their defining feature. The real modern notion of controlling systems is the idea that systems can be modeled and then controlled based on said model. This concept is based in the methods of differential calculus developed by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, which became the foundations of classical mechanics. Classical mechanics established methods of predicting the behavior of macroscopic bodies in the physical world. This led enlightenment philosophers to believe that the whole world acted based on rational laws. If the world was essentially rational, it could be mathematically modeled. In turn all of its problems could be solved in a quantified fashion, including those of a social nature (i.e. Sir William Petty’s *Political Arithmetick*).¹⁰

Historian Thomas Hughes points to Thomas Edison as a prototypical systems engineer in his book *Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930*. He not only invented the electric lightbulb, meter, underground cable and generator but also had the vision to figure out how these devices would be successful within the context of electricity at large. In this regard he was a true systems thinker, he understood the relationships of various elements through the perspective of a collective purpose.

Another visionary who demonstrates a more insidious strain of systems thought is Frederick Taylor. In the early 20th century, Taylor pioneered scientific management, also known as Taylorism. Taylorism applied concepts of engineering to the management of industrial labor for the purpose of efficient production. Through this lens, a worker and a machine are not inherently different. They are both defined, analyzed and managed in their practice in terms of their contribution to overall production. Taylor saw a prophetic element in his own work, writing, “In the past the man has been first, in the future, the system must be first.”¹¹

While people have been attempting to tweak systems of organization and technology for ages, the systems approach didn’t reach its mature form until World War II. Military funding and

goals provided the impetus for its institutionalization as well as the computer, which made its modern form possible.

The development of modern systems thinking began during World War II with the practice of operations research. In 1935, the British Royal Air Force enlisted a small group of mathematicians and physicists to study early applications of radar to fighter direction and anti-aircraft control. They analyzed the documents such as battle reports and track found in the “operations rooms” of military facilities.^{12,13} These practices, which began as a way to evaluate and improve weapons and equipment were successfully expanded into a role of analyzing and improving tactics, a notable example being successfully tweaking depth charge bombings of the infamous German U-Boats.¹⁴

The Navy and the Air Force both established operations research organizations after they learned of the success of the approach in Britain.¹⁵ However, the military research and development community in America was slow to support OR. This was largely due to the efforts of Vannevar Bush the man behind the foundation of both the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). NDRC and OSRD were created by Bush not only to coordinate civilian defense research, but also to protect said research and development from undue military and governmental influence.¹⁶ Bush disliked operations research because he thought its integration of social scientists tainted the “hard science” of research and development and also because he believed it would result in a brain drain from the OSRD. Additionally, operations research had the effect of connecting scientists, mathematicians and engineers directly to military command. This flew directly in the face of his efforts to keep science safe from the permanent influence of the military.¹⁷

The same event that mobilized the war effort at large in America mobilized operations research: the attack on Pearl Harbor. The bombing of Pearl Harbor was partially due to the failure of air defense systems. In contrast, the radar systems developed by OR were a crucial element of the Royal Air Force turning away the German *Luftwaffe* at the Battle of Britain.¹⁸ This led to the commission of a critical report by British radar Pioneer, Robert Watson-Watt, on the state of US air defense systems which rallied the nascent Air Force in support of OR.¹⁹

Operations research, in its more ambitious forms, would frequently fail in its original aims but still end up introducing influential techniques or technology in the process. A central example of this is Norbert Wiener’s “antiaircraft (AA) predictor”. Wiener was an influential mathematician at MIT.²⁰ The importance of air warfare in the Battle of Britain inspired Wiener to research the improvement of anti-aircraft weaponry, specifically the possibility of automatic control of AA devices using emergent computer technology.²¹

Ruthless Automata: The Conception of Man as a Rational Weapon

A central issue with his plan, a common issue for military and systems planners, was the human element. How could a machine predict the behavior of a person? Solving this problem involves either making a machine more human or conceiving of the human in terms of a machine. Wiener chose the latter option. He began to think of the pilot and his aircraft as a unified servomechanism. A servomechanism is essentially a self-correcting device. The classic example is a thermostat, which uses input from its environment to keep itself in correction, which, in turn, affects the environment, creating a negative feedback loop.²²

Ultimately, Wiener's attempts at creating an AA predictor were unsuccessful. It was found that simpler, geometric methods of prediction were superior.²³ However, the ideas he developed during this project into a whole new field called cybernetics.²⁴ The idea of a self-correcting man/machine weapon based on a feedback loop became not only the inspiration for cybernetics, but its central idea.²⁵ Cybernetics also applied this model to the behavior of machines and nature. Wiener's ideas were profoundly influential in the development of systems thought.

Another huge development to emerge out of ballistics calculation was ENIAC, the first digital computer. ENIAC was developed based on the increasing need for the calculation of ballistics tables, originally undertaken by human "computers", for the variety of new weapons employed during World War II. When it was completed in 1946, ENIAC was a thirty-ton behemoth which required constant maintenance and replacement because of its construction out of vacuum tubes. In 1947, a new electronic amplifying device called the germanium transistor allowed for the replacement of the temperamental vacuum tubes, allowing for further development of the digital computer.²⁶

Just as Norman Wiener's attempts at creating an AA predictor influenced cybernetics, the creation of ENIAC greatly influenced a field developed by one of its designers, John von Neumann. This field is known as game theory. Game theory was the calculation of how rational actors would respond to each others moves in "zero-sum games" where one side's loss was another's benefit and calculated which moves in any given scenario would maximize gain and minimize loss. This concept was later applied to a huge variety of applications after the war including strategic bombing, air defense and supply and psychological warfare.²⁷

From Analysis to Control: The Development of Systems Thought and Computing in the Post-War Period

I dread specialists in power because they are specialists speaking outside their special subjects. Let scientists tell us about sciences. But government involves questions about the good for man, and justice, and what things are worth having at what price; and on these a scientific training gives a man's opinion no added value.

—C.S. Lewis

In the post-war period, research and development funded by the military and government waned slightly, but still remained at levels much higher than the pre-war period.²⁸ Both the military and civilian scientists and researchers maintained that this partnership was mutually beneficial, both thought they were getting the better end of the deal. The prerogative of nuclear politics quickly became the pretext for the institutionalization of militarily funded research and development and systems analysis. Quasi-independent think tanks, laboratories, embedded programs in schools such as MIT popped up around the country.²⁹ The seeming permanence of these institutions prompted a number of critics from the military, civil authority and science, including Vannevar Bush himself. However, these critics were mostly silenced by the remobilization of the Korean War.³⁰

In terms of systems thought, the most prominent organization to emerge in the post-war era was the RAND Corporation. RAND was founded in 1946 as a joint venture between the Air Force and Douglas Aircraft. It became an independent, non-profit corporation in 1948 but continued to receive federal funding.³¹

The focus and scope of the work done at RAND represented the general shift in the field at the time. Problems of macro level strategy, weapon selection, research and development and inter-service coordination were chosen for research instead of those of bombing accuracy, gunnery practice, the logistics of supply and inventory and maintenance of equipment which had been the focus of operations research groups during the war.³²

Using the same techniques used to calculate ballistics and predict enemy behavior RAND expanded the scope of systems analysis to social issues such as healthcare, welfare and education reform.³³ Whereas operations research in World War II was largely dominated by physicists, systems analysis in the RAND era included a huge variety of experts from different fields including political scientists, engineers, lawyers and, most prominently, economists.³⁴

The majority of the work of RAND was based on nuclear war and politics. Game theory was a foundational element in analysis of these issues at RAND, von Neumann himself was a frequent consultant. This method presupposes a purely rational and ruthless human energy. This leads to a mode of "zero-sum" thinking in which the idea that one "players" gains are another "players" losses always trumps a cooperative model.³⁵ It is clear how this mode of thinking could direct one away from cooperative diplomacy and towards proliferation and war. The increasing influence of game theory went hand in hand with the increased influence of economists within RAND. Economists constituted only 3% of RAND in 1949, and rose to 35% in 1950.³⁶

Because a nuclear war had never been fought, the calculations of RAND's models became increasingly reliant on purely hypothetical data. Ironically, as systems thought became less and less based in real data, it became increasingly convinced of its own ability to holistically predict and control scenarios.³⁷

This evolution from analysis to simulation to control parallels the military use of computers. Computers such as ENIAC were developed during World War II for the purpose of analysis and calculation. The first attempt at using computers for simulation rather than analysis was a computerized model of McChord Field Air Defense Direction Center created for the purpose of training radar operators.³⁸

Real-time computerized control, introduced by the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) computer. The project attempted to integrate separate, manually controlled, air defense systems under a central computerized system. SAGE automatically ordered pilots to intercept any potential enemies in US airspace.³⁹ SAGE was unsuccessful in its aims but introduced a number of new technologies and the idea of a closed world that could be monitored and controlled from a computer with a digital display.^{40 41 42}

Jay Forrester, one of the key engineers of the SAGE project, perhaps best embodies this belief. After his work with SAGE, he turned his focus to a field which he named "Industrial Dynamics", a style of scientific management informed by his work in the automation and simulation of military systems.⁴³ He argued that digital computers provided the perfect method for analyzing the underlying principles and "systems of information-feedback control" of any organization or system.⁴⁴ Forrester later attempted to model cities and, eventually, the world at large which he called "world dynamics".⁴⁵

The End of the Honeymoon: Techno-Managers Versus Warriors

Figures and human nature sleep in the same bed even though they do not like each other.

—Ross G. Walker

The development of SAGE was not by any means universally supported. While it was embraced by politicians, who appreciated its aura of invincibility, as well as technocrats, scientists and engineers, it was largely distrusted or outright hated by Air Force leadership. They believed it was an overstepping of civilian authority and that it was a technological version of the Maginot Line, the failed French defense fortification of World War II.⁴⁶

This conflict is characteristic of the tension that emerged both internally within military command and externally between think tanks like RAND and the military. The operation of the complex technological systems of war and methods of analysis that had developed under the funding and direction of the military had now become threats to military authority. During the Cold War, military aims became focused on the constant vigilance against and ability to react against a nuclear threat, made possible by technology, rather than a full mobilization of forces under the direction of military leadership.⁴⁷

The complex systems of war technology of the Cold War required a variety of diverse experts to maintain them. This reliance on complex technological systems created a sea change in military command in which leadership based on management rather than command took precedence.

Military groups became more reliant on the command tactics of *manipulation* rather than the traditional *domination* of military command. In this case, *domination* refers to issuing explicit orders backed by punitive threat. Goals are not communicated to the subordinate, only desired behavior. In contrast, *manipulation* means emphasizing the ends rather than the means, persuading a group to achieve rather than ordering the individual. Military commanders could no longer issue commands based on behavior rather than goals because they did not understand the means to the end in technological systems, only the specialists did.⁴⁸

The rise of this "war manager" style inevitably led to tension within the power structure of the military. This shift was seen as a threat to the traditional military command.⁴⁹ Similarly, as systems analysts grew independent from the military and began more ambitious research, a tension emerged between systems analysts and military leaders. While RAND was funded by the Air Force, its advice and research was often faced with antagonism from military leaders. In general, system analysts generally viewed military leaders as irrational, while military leaders viewed the analysts as lacking a fundamental understanding of the essence of warfare.⁵⁰

It is easy to overstate the power of RAND and other think tanks during the Cold War period. While their research and ideas were certainly influential, it is important to remember that they remained in advisory role without the direct ability to shift either civil or military policy. All of this changed when John F. Kennedy came into office and hired Robert S. McNamara as his Secretary of Defense.⁵¹

A Rational Man: The Rise of Robert S. McNamara

The intellectually sophisticated person is indifferent to all genuine individuality, because relationships and reactions result from it which cannot be exhausted with logical operations.

—Georg Simmel

Robert McNamara is a man whose personality and life embodies the systems approach, with all of its potential, hubris and pathologies. After working hard academically his whole life, McNamara travelled to the east coast in 1937 to get his Masters of Business Administration degree at Harvard University.

The accounting section of the MBA program at Harvard was under the influence of a style of systems engineering known as "control accounting" which left a lifelong mark on McNamara. Control accounting took a field that was based on the analysis of historical data and turned it on its head towards an inventive, speculative approach. Accounting was thought of not as a simple tool for creating financial statements; it was believed to be a force that could analyze, predict and of course, control, the future of an organization.⁵²

During World War II, McNamara and his associates at the Harvard Business School, were enlisted in the effort of teaching Army Air Force officers the methods of control accounting, in this case referred to as statistical control.⁵³ As a rapidly expanding organization that needed to expand its personnel and establish methods for the efficient allocation of resources the Air Force was a perfect match with statistical control. By the end of the war, there were over sixty-six Army Air Force statistical control bases.⁵⁴

Along with other members of Air Force Statistical Control known as the "Whiz Kids", McNamara spent the post war years applying the techniques he employed in the USAAF to turning around a failing Ford Motor Company. McNamara was so successful with these tactics, McNamara he was promoted to the presidency of Ford.⁵⁵ Only weeks into his presidency at Ford, McNamara was recruited by John F. Kennedy's administration to the position of Secretary of Defense. McNamara soon brought his "Whiz Kids" into his Department of Defense. He created an Office of Systems Analysis staffed by prominent RANDites such as Alain Eindhoven and Albert Wohlstetter.⁵⁶

The first undertaking by this team of analysts led by McNamara was a reorganization of the Pentagon and the Military's budget.⁵⁷ McNamara named RAND economist Charles Hitch head of the Programming, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS), which spearheaded this effort.⁵⁸ In this effort at budgeting the Pentagon, McNamara employed the same tactics of reorganization that he used at Ford, the numeric analysis of questionnaires and studies.⁵⁹

This reorganization was successful in reining in a military budgeting system plagued by inter-service rivalry, inefficiency and overspending. It also established, through control of the budget, an unprecedented level of civilian power over the military.⁶⁰ This perceived success led to wider employment of the RAND approach to solving problems in other areas of governance, most notably in the planning of Johnson's Great Society Programs. While McNamara's statistical control was effective in reining in the military budget it proved to be disastrous when applied to the Vietnam War.

Blipkrieg: Systems Analysis and the Vietnam War

Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex and more violent.

—Albert Einstein

The language used to justify the Vietnam War embodies a sense that international conflict was in essence a problem of physics or science. The use of terms like falling dominoes, popping corks, chain reactions, etc. betray an understanding of Vietnam as a situation that could be corrected with the rational application of force in the opposite direction.⁶¹ The methods for achieving this, as well as the foundation of the belief in the impossibility of defeat, was superior American firepower and communication technology efficiently applied through the computerized use of statistical control.

American strategy was heavily founded on the presupposition of strategic bombing that a country's morale could be broken through aerial bombing. Echoing Douhet, the emphasis in this approach was not destruction of the enemy, but the destruction of the enemies will through demonstration of a capacity for destruction.⁶² It was thought that the potential for destruction made possible by American firepower, including tanks, incendiary bombs and helicopters would ensure victory over the relatively unequipped Vietnamese forces.⁶³

Even after it was realized that tanks were totally unsuitable for the rice paddies and mountainous jungles of Vietnam, General Westmoreland argued that the psychological impact of tank's firepower, independent of the actual potential for its use, was reason enough for their deployment.⁶⁴ The terrain was a huge problem in general for US troops. Strategies and weapons that had been formulated to fight in the flat terrain of Russia were of little use in the dense, tropical foliage of Vietnam.⁶⁵ Much vaunted attack helicopters were of little use against an enemy they could not see. The reality was that the low-tech weapons and transport of the Vietnamese, seen as fundamental weaknesses by the US Military, were actually more effective than the US Military's tactics. Small guerrilla units popped out of hidden tunnels and attacked American squadrons, whose presence was announced by the noise of their support vehicles and the scheduled nature of patrols, returning before they could be attacked by air support.

One might make the argument that the war strategy and technology of the Vietnamese was clearly inferior if Vietnamese military casualties outnumbered US casualties roughly five to one American bombers killed a huge number of Vietnamese troops but the Viet Cong and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) dictated the war on the ground. The National Security Memorandum 1 on the "Situation in Vietnam", published in December 1968 found that "Three-fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice of time, place, type and duration."⁶⁶

This view of the assumed superiority of American military tactics and technology against guerrilla insurgents was reinforced by the DOD's employment of statistical control. Empowered by its control over military budget, the DOD and its Offices of Systems Analysis established by McNamara in 1961 had a huge influence in the way the war was fought.

McNamara believed he could fight the overall war in Vietnam based on the same methods of systems analysis he had used since the beginning of his career in both the Air Force and at Ford. He required a huge number of data about the war effort from every level of command. Numerical figures such as the tonnage of bombs dropped, kill/death ratios, amount of patrols taken and number of hamlets "pacified" were all taken as quantified measures of success.⁶⁷ This data was then analyzed by computers in an attempt to create a model of the war that could be used to successfully direct it.⁶⁸

This "production" model of fighting a war was fundamentally flawed for three main reasons. First off, as demonstrated by the National Security Memorandum, these numbers did not accurately reflect the situation of the war on the ground. Secondly, because of the stress of command on producing these numbers, they were frequently misreported and encouraged tactics that were destructive but not necessarily effective. Thirdly, this outlook failed to take into account essential elements of the conflict from the perspective of the Vietnamese, which could not be quantitatively evaluated.

McNamara's approach to the Vietnam War was not essentially different from the basic precepts of control accounting he learned at Harvard. An accounting approach stresses centralized command, but not in the traditional authoritarian or dictatorial sense. It allows freedom amongst its actors as long as they produce the numbers required of them by their higher ups.⁶⁹ At a corporation this might mean a fudging of the numbers or maybe even a more creative solution

to a problem then might have been possible under direct authority. In war, when these numbers are measures of destruction and death, this can result in distortion or fabrication of facts and encouragement of destructive practices that have low tangible value yet are fed back to command as success.

An emphasis on body counts led to the tactic of "search and destroy" missions, in which infantry would be used as bait so that enemy troops could be attacked from the air as well as well as false reporting.⁷⁰ Methods of inflating body count included inferential counting i.e. counting body parts and bloodstains as kills and counting any dead Vietnamese as VC.⁷¹ Additionally, numbers were sometimes totally fabricated by troops who had a firefight without any recovered bodies or were unwilling to risk their lives trying to get a count in a dark jungle.⁷² These numbers still wouldn't have told the whole story even if accurately counted. All the same, they were reported to the American public as not only measures of military success but also as evidence that the war managers of Vietnam were employing a foolproof, rational and scientific method of warfare.⁷³

McNamara and RAND's foundations in strategic bombing and the systems view of human behavior in conflict as a rational kind of bargaining or game manifested itself in a hugely destructive and ultimately unsuccessful air campaign in Vietnam.⁷⁴ Rolling Thunder was the name given to the American bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Like so many strategic bombing campaigns it was flawed in its goals, not its execution. The basic idea was to bomb North Vietnamese industry, transport hubs and air defense as a means of convincing the North Vietnamese to end involvement in the south. This was based on the idea developed at RAND, influenced by the theorists of strategic bombing, that every attack is a form of "communication" designed to dissuade the enemy. The goal was not defeat of the Vietnamese, but instead on applying enough force to *convince* them that American victory was inevitable. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese in reality meant an attempt to destroy their will through destruction of their means of defense and subsistence.⁷⁵

Rolling Thunder's focus on POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant) and industrial targets, were based of incorrect assumptions about the nature of the Vietnamese economy and war effort. It was believed that destruction of North Vietnamese industry would both halt their war production and create enough of an economic shock to turn the Vietnamese people against the war. The reality was that NVA were being supplied both military equipment and oil by China and Russia and had only the beginnings of industry.⁷⁶

More importantly there was a general failure to grasp the Vietnamese conception of the war. The Vietnamese did not see Americans as fundamentally different from the French, whom had colonized and exploited them for over a hundred years.⁷⁷ The desire for independence proved stronger than any technological capacity for destruction.⁷⁸

Perhaps the most extreme example of blind faith in the combination of technology, air power and systems thought is that of Project Igloo White also known as the McNamara Line (a play on the Maginot Line, the failed French defensive strategy of WWII). Project Igloo White attempted to destroy the Viet Cong's ability to traffic between North and South Vietnam through the Ho Chi Minh trail. Electronic sensors, which could detect the sound of trucks and even the scent of human urine, were dropped on the trail from helicopters. When these sensors were tripped, F-4s would drop bombs on their location. The program ran into problems when Viet Cong discovered how to trip the sensors. Despite the fact that in reality the program mostly resulted in failed bombings, directors of the program recorded every falsely tripped sensor as a successful bombing.⁷⁹

The failures and misconceptions of Vietnam demonstrate the inherent danger of the computerized systems approach taken to the extreme, the replacement of experience, perceived to be inherently biased, with that of quantitative analysis, assumed to be purely rational.⁸⁰

War as Vitality, Violence as Communication

... although the practice of Empire is continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to peace.

—Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt

The approach of Vietnam can be seen as the spread of the tactics of *manipulation* rather than *domination* from the internal command structure of the military to the actual tactics of warfare. This shift relates to Michel Foucault's idea that in the transition to modernity, states increasingly draw their legitimacy from the power over life rather than their ability to end it. The right of the sovereign to kill or let live has been replaced by a right to foster life or disallow it, often to the point of death.⁸¹

This shift can best be demonstrated through the shift of punitive measures used by the state. In pre-modern times states embraced the ethos of punishment whereas in modernity the emphasis is on restricting freedom, supposedly for the purpose of correcting the transgressor's behavior ("correctional facilities"). Capital punishment is used increasingly less because it goes against the supposed life-preserving role of the state. The archetypal image of the prison as a method of control is from that of a dungeon, filled with devices of torture to that of the panopticon. The panopticon is an architectural design conceived of by Jeremy Bentham in which a central authority exists in a central position from which it can observe and manage the behavior of either its prisoners or employees.⁸² Direct threats to physical well being have been replaced by the observation and control of behavior.

Despite this shift in rhetoric and focus, we have seen the bloodiest wars of all time and unprecedented, systematic genocide in the last century. Powers no longer justify wars as a defense of a sovereign's power, but rather as a way to protect life. This is generally achieved by arguing that war is either essential for protecting the lives of civilians of the state or to protect the ideological lives of the people of the country being invaded i.e. protecting them from communism, spreading freedom and democracy.⁸³

This contradictory notion of war as vitality is supported by the confluence of air power and the systems approach. From Douhet's strategic bombing theory, to RAND's view of every attack as rational communication, the idea of bombing a country to break its morale has introduced a bizarre logic. Aerial bombing, which kills men, women and children alike, is seen first and foremost as a psychological attack, deflecting the true horror of the action.

The disconnection from violence made possible by air warfare is amplified through the use of digital computers for analysis, planning and real time control. Using the same interface in simulation and real war, i.e. radar and computer screens, blurs the line between the two.⁸⁴ The fundamental disconnection of using data analysis to dictate policy is evident in the handling of the Vietnam War. Even though the use of strategic bombing, and air power in general, was ineffective in Vietnam, its use only increased afterwards after the intense public backlash against the draft.

The 60s anti-war, and counter culture movement at large, can be viewed not only as the result of a disagreement with the Vietnam war but as a reaction against the militaristic "rationali-

ty" at large. This supposed rationality led to what seemed to be supremely irrational results of a never ending arms race and war fought to win "hearts of minds" by dropping bombs and chemical weapons.⁸⁵

Conclusion: The Pathologies of Systems Thought

It is not granted them to penetrate with plastic mind and to fashion something of their own, but their activity dissipates itself in a futile game with empty notions. They never make a living study of anything, but devote their whole zeal to abstract precepts that degrade everything to means, and leave nothing to be an end.

—Friedrich Schleiermacher

To understand the failings of a culture, it is useful to hold it up against its own rules and ideals. In attempting to establish a "General Systems Theory", Systems Theorist Kenneth Boulding established a hierarchy for systems in our world. In this hierarchy, each level is comprised of systems from the previous level. The *framework* level is the foundational level of systems, it includes the physical rules and construction of our universe. The next level is that of *clockwork* systems which are simple dynamic systems, which exhibit standardized motion i.e. a clock, moons orbiting around a planet or even a steam engine. The next level is that of the *thermostat* or servomechanism, these systems create homeostasis by reacting to input from their environment. Beyond this are the *cell* systems, *plant* systems, *animal* systems, *human* systems and *social organizations*. *Social organizations* are not only groups in which we are unified with others for a common purpose such as families, churches or corporations; they are also the shared symbolic language, which defines our relationship to both each other and the organizations we are a part of. Next are *transcendental systems*, the "ultimates", "unknowables" and "inescapables" of our universe.⁸⁶

Viewed through Boulding's General Systems Theory, the fundamental flaws of both McNamara's DOD and RAND become apparent. They essentially elevated an abstract theoretical system, powered by computers, which operated at the level of a *thermostat* level system and attempted to raise it to a level of control above that of *social organizations*.

A student introduction to systems analysis sheds some light on the danger of over empowering the systems approach. Specifically, it warns of the "systems initiation approach" in which systems analysts are the driving force behind new systems based on their own studies rather than trying to solve problems presented to them by management.⁸⁷ It's fair to say that this was the mode employed at McNamara's Department of Defense and often at RAND. The potential dangers of this approach read almost as a direct indictment of McNamara's DOD:

Although priorities are readily assigned, they are frequently assigned in a manner which is not beneficial to the true needs of the organization. Similarly, planning, although efficient, tends to be short-ranged or even near-sighted. The broader understanding... is not always apparent at the Systems Department level.

Perhaps most importantly, a strong systems initiative often causes problems between systems personnel and other members of an institution. The practice of this model has traditionally led to mistrust of the aims and motives of systems personnel⁸⁸.

This is followed by what reads as a direct attack against McNamara himself:

It is probably true that few organizations have consciously planned to employ this model. Rather, the practice has developed as the result of an aggressive and presumably capable individual or

group within the Systems Department. It has probably continued because of specific projects which have "made a name" for the institution as progressive or even as a leader in its application and use of automation.⁸⁹

These passages do a great job summarizing the pitfalls of letting analysis and accounting dictate policy. Abstract models of systems can be useful tools in gaining perspective on a problem. However, when these models are taken to be absolute truth and allowed to dictate events, they inevitably impose their own limited measurement on a world of infinite complexity. While this forced standardization creates efficiency, this efficiency is often at the cost of the losing fundamental values and the inability to face unforeseen contingency.

Because models ignore elements of a system they cannot understand, attempts to use them to solve problems often ends up generating new ones. An example of this was the 18th century German practice of "scientific forestry". The idea was to create a forest wherein only the most profitable trees would be grown in ordered rows, eliminating the "inefficiencies" of a natural, heterogeneous forest. The method had brief popularity until it was realized that these ordered tree could not survive without the complex ecology with which they had developed.⁹⁰ Another example of this approach is the World Bank, USAID and IMF's attempts to manufacture prosperity in impoverished countries through the calculated application of huge sums of money, which can potentially stifle homegrown economic growth and democracy.

The issues with using quantified schemes to solve problems of the world are reminiscent of Max Weber's idea of skilled incapacity, bureaucracy's inability to react to contingency because of the specialized and rigid nature of their structure. Weber, in his studies of the rationalization and bureaucratization of modern western culture, offers some additional insight into the origins and pathologies of systems thought. He argues that the increased complexity of societies creates a need for an ever expanding apparatus of support. This system of support creates a demand for "objective" experts who inevitably displace older social structures that relied on "personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude."⁹¹

It is dangerous to idolize these older social structures, which in western history generally refer to the hegemony of rich, white males. The rise of pluralistic modern societies, held together by interdependence rather than the power of one group, is something to be cherished and developed. But in a society in which interdependence rises at the same rate as traditional bonds of trust based on kinship drop, objectivity emerges as the common currency.⁹²

But what is true objectivity? Objectivity is most commonly expressed in a quantified form, in the language of numbers and mathematics. Mathematics is generally accepted as the purest form of objective knowledge. It is perceived as a preexisting set of rules that coexist to form a steadfast logic. Yet mathematics is filled with its own controversies and mysteries. As it applies to systems thought, this idea is maybe best expressed through Godel's Uncertainty Principle. Using the idea of the liar's paradox ("this statement is false"), Godel proved that within any logical system there will always be some statements that cannot be proven either true or false based on the rules of that system. While another system could be set up to prove these statements true, this system would be subject to the same internal inconsistency as the first. A system ultimately only has its own set of logic with which it can verify the validity of said logic.

While computers and models are certainly useful and insightful tools, they will always be based on the limited foundational axioms of their construction. Having an "open mind" is a uniquely human quality, a quality that we often long to deny due to the sense of powerlessness it can invoke. In a sense, a computer program operates on the same principles as an insane person entirely convinced of their own set of self-referential logic. We run the risk of viewing our own

mathematical models and methods of analysis as sources of truth rather perspective. Just as with religious fundamentalism, the idea of a mathematical, rational objectivity projects a seductive infallibility that acts as false panacea to the anxiety of living in a universe of infinite contingency, mystery and complexity.

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**PRAGMATISM, PRINCIPLE, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PAPER MONEY AND EARLY AMERICA**

| Garrett Fontenot

Introduction

Paper money is a uniquely American development, the byproduct of the expanding mercantile interests of the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth century and British colonial policy that aimed at keeping specie out of the colonies. The need for a convenient medium of exchange to facilitate commerce in the colonies drove the development of currency finance systems throughout the colonies that allowed the colonial governments to fund their limited expenditures while simultaneously providing a circulating form of currency for the colonists. Issuing paper money redeemable in future tax payments helped sustain the economy of the American colonies for most of their history, until the American Revolution pushed the system to its breaking point.

The outbreak of the American Revolution put a strain on American currency that had not previously existed. More and more currency was issued as the expense of the war increased, and since the Continental Congress had no powers of taxation, it could not directly withdraw the money from circulation, leading to an inevitable crisis of inflation. The previously functional system of colonial currency finance fell apart as too much currency entered into circulation and the Continental Congress lost power, as it could not control its own finances. Within a matter of a few years, the power to make money, which had previously been a legitimate source of power for the Congress, was transformed into an evil that was ruining the new country. Currency finance schemes largely disappeared in the post-war period, much to the chagrin of many back-country residents and debtors, who saw and experienced paper money as an equalizer, since cheap paper money enabled them to pay off long-standing debts and break ties of obligation that had long informed the social structure of the colonies. Fearing the "lack of virtue" exhibited by the new popular elements emerging throughout the colonies and filling the state legislatures, the Federal Convention shaped the Constitution in such a way as to limit the power of rural and debtor interests which threatened the "virtue" of the new republic. In this process, paper currency, viewed as an evil by the Framers of the Constitution, was given stringent treatment in the Constitution and framed as an evil to be avoided, despite the popular support and historical utility of paper money.

(Note: The following is an excerpt from a longer paper which also examines the origins of paper money in the British North American colonies, the development of paper currency finance systems, and the overall failure of paper currency financing during the American Revolution. The full version is available online at: http://louisdl.louislibraries.org/cdm4/document.php?CISO_ROOT=/LOYOLA_ETD&CISOPTR=4238&REC=6).

The Federal Convention

The Federal Convention remained, for the most part, curiously silent on the issue of paper currency as an issue unto itself when Article 7, Section 1 was brought to the floor for debate on August 16, 1787. Previously, on June 6, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had invoked the issue of paper money during the debate over the method of electing members of the Senate. According to Pinckney, not only was popular election of Senators impractical given the broad distribution of the population of South Carolina and other states, but also impolitic. The popularity of paper money in South Carolina had led to calls for making it a legal tender. The legislature had refused to assent to a legal tender law, despite the popularity thanks to what Pinckney called their "sense of character."¹ Pinckney extrapolated this prudence to the national level, supporting the idea that the Senate should act as the disinterested mediator to temper the passions of the masses in favor of looking towards the long-term interest of the nation as a whole.

On June 19, during a discussion on William Paterson's proposal for a unicameral plan of government (the New Jersey Plan), James Madison argued that state emissions of paper money formed a sort of aggression against other states. "Creditor states," according to Madison in reference to Congressional requisitions, "must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor states." In his analysis of Paterson's plan on the basis of preventing state trespasses against each other, Madison rejected the plan for having no such mechanism for mediating disputes between the states and therefore providing no better remedy than the Articles of Confederation.²

Roughly two months prior to the primary debate over the federal power to emit bills of credit, Pinckney noted in his "Observations" submitted to the public on the proceedings of the Federal Convention that the sole right of Congress to coin money is "essential to assuring the Federal Funds." Allowing states to coin money or emit bills of credit would invite the states to "force you [the federal government] to take them [state bills of credit or coin] in payment for Federal Taxes and Duties," which would greatly confound the system of federal revenues when state currencies depreciated or changed in value. The remedy, according to Pinckney, was to ensure, via the Constitution, that "the payments of the respective States into the Treasury, either in Taxes or Imposts, ought to be regular and uniform in proportion to their abilities; —no State should be allowed to contribute in a different manner from the others, but all alike in actual Money. There can be no other mode of ascertaining this, than to give to the United States the exclusive right of coining, and determining in what manner Federal Taxes shall be paid."³ Roger Sherman, in notes written while assisting in the preparation of the New Jersey plan, similarly proposed that the "legislatures of the individual states ought not to possess a right to emit bills of credit for a currency..."⁴ The stage was thus set for the more substantive debate on the power of the federal government to emit bills of credit, with the states constitutionally forbidden from issuing their own bills of credit. Though the ban on state money would not garner much attention in the Convention, the issue of national bills of credit proved somewhat more contentious of an issue.⁵

The debate over bills of credit opened in August with discussion on the power of the national government to tax exports, a debate that unsurprisingly broke down along regional lines. When the clause granting the power to coin money and emit bills of credit was brought to the floor, the former was agreed to with no contest. Gouverneur Morris, however, brought forward an objection to including the power to "emit bills on the credit of the U. States," arguing that these were essentially useless. Morris argued that should the United States find itself with a favorable standing in terms of credit, it should have no problem securing loans based on its credit rating

and thus not need to resort to revenue raising measures such as bills of credit. Were the United States to find itself without a favorable credit standing, than any bills issued against the injured credit of the United States would be worthless, which Morris presumably saw as leading to the same problems that the Congress had previously faced with its issue of Continentals.⁶

James Madison suggested that rather than omitting the power, it could merely be amended so that bills of credit could not be made legal tender, preserving the power to issue bills of credit as "promissory notes" for use should emergencies arise, as most of the colonies had initially done in times of war. George Mason, with reservation, seems to have agreed with Madison, noting that he was "unwilling to tie the hands of the Legislature" by barring emissions of bills of credit after seeing their usefulness at the beginning of the War for Independence, echoing also the sentiments of his fellow Virginian Edmund Randolph.

John Francis Mercer of Maryland joined those who voiced hesitance about an outright prohibition, warning against antagonizing the "friends of paper money" and "stamping suspicion on the Government" should it be denied this power.⁷ Madison unfortunately did not record Mercer's rationale as to why such a prohibition would cast suspicion on the federal government, so it is open to speculation in what way Mercer envisioned the loss of that power affecting the overall prestige of the national government in the eyes of its constituents.

The opponents of paper money took the occasion presented by Gouverneur Morris's motion to lambast paper money. Gouverneur Morris warned that the "Monied interest" would not take kindly to a plan of government that granted the legislature the power to print paper money, citing the moneyed interest's power and influence as reason enough for removal of the clause, since it was vital to secure their support for the new plan of government. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut agreed with Morris, arguing that "by withholding the power....more friends of influence would be gained to it than by almost any thing else..."⁸ Ellsworth disagreed with Mason, Randolph, and Madison's contention that paper money could be called upon in a crisis as was the case during the War for Independence. He instead interpreted the public's reaction to further emissions of bills of credit as bound to be unfavorable given the failure of the Continental money during the war and the popular distrust they garnered as they fell in value.⁹

Opponents of paper money in the Convention also objected to keeping the power in case of emergency because of the temptation it posed. Critics aired the fear that unless specifically limited, the power would eventually be used no matter what the situation of the nation. This was analogous to the way in which the paper money supply had gradually expanded as the colonial government began to issue bills of credit to cover normal expenses rather than just extraordinary wartime expenditures. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, imaging the way in which the Constitution might be interpreted in the future, warned that "if the words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure," even if only intended as an emergency power.¹⁰ James Wilson joined his fellow Pennsylvania representative Morris in voicing the fear that such an enumerated power would act as a crutch for the United States. The federal government would fall back upon it whenever adversity presented itself. Oversupply because of this would ultimately ruin the credit of the nation and bar the way for further recourse to other means of resolving financial crises available with good credit.¹¹

Despite, or perhaps because of the contentious role that paper money had played in the first decade of the nation's existence, the debate over the issue in the Federal Convention was short, concluding by the end of the day on August 16. George Read of Delaware and John Langdon of New Hampshire rounded out the debate by voicing their opposition to the enumeration of the power to emit bills on the credit of the United States in the starkest terms, though with

the least substantive arguments offered during the short debate. Read equated the inclusion of the phrase as "alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelation," while Langdon suggested that he "had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words ('and emit bills')." ¹² When called to vote, the motion for striking out passed nine to two, with only the Maryland and New Jersey delegations voting against (Rhode Island would likely have joined the dissent but did not send a delegation to the convention). ¹³

After another month of debate and changes, the Constitution was adopted without provision for the emission of bills of credit by the convention on September 17, 1787 and sent to the states for debate and ratification. At this point, the public debate over the Constitution began, with Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay offering the most famous defense of the plan of government devised at the Federal Convention in the *Federalist Papers*, a series of essays written and published originally in New York newspapers, but widely reprinted throughout the states. The issue of paper money is spoken of at most length in the *Federalist* no. 44, written by Madison. Madison saw the removal of the concurrent power of Congress and the states to coin money as an improvement on the old system of the Confederation as it would decrease the diversity of currencies in circulation. ¹⁴ This argument, however, was only in reference to metal coinage, not paper currencies. Reversing his stance in the Federal Convention, Madison described the prohibition on bills of credit as a "voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice," since these bills/bills of exchange had done such great harm to the confidence felt by citizens in the "public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of republican government." ¹⁵ Madison also used the opportunity to argue for an extension of the prohibition on paper bills of credit to the states as well as the national government. Identifying the prohibition on the states' power to coin money as a possible excuse for states to resort to emissions of bills of credit, Madison asserted that for the same reasons that the federal government was prohibited from doing so, so should the states find similar reason to restrain themselves. He cautioned further that were every state to regulate the value of coin and paper currency, it could be possible that "the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member," especially in terms of foreign trade. ¹⁶ This argument was directly related to the defense of the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) in the Constitution, which granted Congress the sole power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." As the power to regulate foreign commerce was devised as an enumerated power of Congress, it was inherent that the states not be allowed to take action that would impede the exercise of this power. For Madison, allowing the states the possibility of creating something which might act as a currency would create the possibility that a state, through its individual financial policy, might impede the power of the Congress to regulate commerce, especially in matters of foreign trade. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where a state, initiating policy favorable towards debtors, might create a situation that would make foreign creditors unwilling to invest, thereby hurting the foreign commerce of the United States.

The *Federalist Papers* are otherwise remarkably silent on the issue of paper money and bills of credit. Other than Madison's denunciation of their emissions at either the state or federal level in the *Federalist* no. 44, no other substantive discussion is offered on the topic. Paper money reappears in *Federalist* no. 80, written by Hamilton describing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Hamilton chooses paper money as an example of a case that would be elevated to the federal courts because it would arise as a constitutional matter, rather than under the laws of the United States. Since the states are constitutionally banned from prohibiting paper money, a federal court would handle any case against a recalcitrant state that emitted paper money. ¹⁷ The

choice of paper money as the exemplar of a federal judicial case is an interesting decision. Hamilton seized on this issue to reassert his abhorrence of paper bills of credit by using their hypothetical appearance at the state level as an example court case. In *Federalist* 44, Madison's argument suggests that the states may not be technically barred from using bills of credit, but should desist from doing so because the federal government was barred from doing the same. This suggests the possibility that it may not have been certain to some that states were positively denied this power. Hamilton here took the initiative to suggest that should this hypothetical case arise, it would be challenged in the courts, and therefore should not be a power of the states.

Viewed in the way in which the Federalists framed it, banning state emissions of bills of credit represented a strong step towards centralization and away from the idea of coordinate powers between the state and federal governments, which upset some Antifederalists. Under the new Constitution, states would no longer be allowed the power to print their own money supply, which some opponents of the Constitution argued would deprive the states of one of their primary means of funding under the new system of government. Brutus, in writing to the people of New York, raised a rather practical objection to the both the power of the federal government to directly tax the people and the prohibition on state bills of credit. Barring the ability to issue bills of credit in a manner similar to as done before the War for Independence, Brutus was concerned that the states would be left with no other recourse for revenue than to directly tax its citizens, wherein lay the problem with the new Constitution. Since the federal government was given that same right, and considering the lack of check on the extent of the federal government's ability to tax, Brutus was concerned that the states would be left with almost no ability to tax its own citizens. Any given area was limited in the amount of taxes it could realistically be expected to pay and it was presumed that the federal government would tax to the greatest extent possible. The ultimate result of such a system would be the inevitable withering away of the power of the states, as the federal government would undermine state authority through superior powers of taxation. ¹⁸ It is easy to see the connection between this issue and the issue of taxation leading up to the Revolution. Much in the same way that the colonists had opposed direct taxation by Parliament in the pre-Revolutionary period, those opposed to the Constitution now raised similar concerns about the federal government. The federal government was still directly taxing the citizens of the states, with the exception that the people were now represented through elected officials in the federal government. The fear of loss of local autonomy at the expense of the national government is clear in these objections, despite the stronger representative elements created by the Constitution.

Philadelphia merchant and prolific pamphleteer (especially on the issue of finances) Pelatiah Webster responded to Brutus on these charges by expressing the need for the federal government to have such authority in order to properly maintain the defenses of the nation as well as to be able to exercise power throughout the federal union. Furthermore, according to Webster, if any defect could be found, it is in those chosen for office rather than in the Constitution itself. The structure of the Constitution assumed that lawmakers would have the necessary virtue, wisdom, and ability to prevent the abuse of power at the federal level feared by Brutus, thereby protecting the people of the states from undue federal burden. ¹⁹ Should the representatives not meet that standard, the people could easily replace them through elections.

Despite what could be assessed as a direct violation of the principles of federalism, the critics of the Constitution, with the exception of some outliers such as Luther Martin (who so opposed the changes proposed that he abandoned the Convention to return home and write polemical tracts against the form of the new government taking shape in Philadelphia), were re-

markably silent on the issue of state emissions of bills of credit. Many antifederalists were keen on the prohibition of bills of credit in the Constitution, despite their opposition to other provisions. Most of these objectors saw the war as the critical turning point. The Federal Farmer, one of the most well known of the Antifederalist writers, declared that the war "disturbed the course of commerce, introduced floods of paper money, the stagnation of credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business," out of which "great evils arise."²⁰

Even Patrick Henry, ardent patriot and opponent of the Constitution, was even satisfied by the Federal Convention's handling of the issue of emissions of bills of credit at both the state and national level, despite denying the authority of the Convention to propose such a radical change from the Articles of Confederation that the Constitution represented. Henry, in front of the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, declared that "we are at peace on this subject [paper money]. Though this is a thing which that mighty Federal Convention had no business with, yet I acknowledge that paper money would be the bane of this country. I detest it. Nothing can justify a people in restoring to it, but extreme necessity."²¹ When William Grayson took the floor at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, he summed up the general feeling of the body against paper money in stating that "it is unanimously wished by every one that it should not be objected to" and that "there is no disposition now of having paper money; this engine of iniquity is universally reprobated."²² Richard Henry Lee went so far at the ratifying convention as to express his approval of the limitation on the power of the states in favor of the federal government, preferring that the federal government, not the state governments, have the sole power of coinage.²³ For Patrick Henry, who famously "smelt a rat in Philadelphia" and who led the Antifederalist opposition in Virginia on the basis of the loss of individual and state rights (before, ironically joining the Federalist party in the late 1790s) and other major Antifederalist leaders to agree that the Federal Convention was correct in condemning bills of credit and paper money, signals that resentment, at least among many with the influence to voice their opinions on the ratification, were sufficiently unenthusiastic by the concept at the time of ratification to trigger broad consensus crossing Federalist and Antifederalist lines against paper money.

Especially important to those opposed to paper money, including those who also opposed the Constitution, was the moral dimension of paper money. Morality and the decay of morals caused by paper money were themes common amongst many of its detractors, with the "corrupting influence" of the "attendant paper securities" which formed the "enormous public debt" being enough to "contaminate a society of angels..."²⁴ In a speech before the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Charles Turner declared that "the operation of paper money...have produced a gradual decay of morals—introduced pride—ambition—envy—lust of power—produced a decay of patriotism, and the love of commutative justice..." The necessary result, according to Turner, was the inevitable turn towards luxury as a guiding principle for society, with "luxury and avarice" acting against the draw to fulfill the public duty and repayment of debts, especially evident in the lower ranks.²⁵

Paper money was also conceptually linked to the problems of debt in the ratification debates. By 1787 and 1788, the United States was still straddled with a large debt from the War for Independence. Issues of personal debts between citizens were also widespread, especially in light of the financial upheaval during and after the war. Brutus, writing to the people of New York, saw debts between persons in a similar light as Madison saw debts amongst the states. States that issued paper money allowed debtors to repay their debts at deflated values, with several states going so far as to make laws openly unfavorable towards creditors. The inevitable result was to make property insecure and debts between private individuals a contentious issue.²⁶

It is apparent that an element of immorality is at play in these statements on debts, since debts began to be described in language incorporating a moral dimension and paper money, the use of which favored debtors over creditors in most cases, was described as an evil. Also apparent are signs of a breakdown of traditional systems of patronage and creditor-debtor relationships long at play in British North America and in the early republic.²⁷ The way was paved for a change of government, according to Richard Henry Lee, when the "several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors."²⁸

The correlation between supporters of paper money and debtors is one that seems logical, since depreciation of currency necessarily favors debtors over creditors, but it is not a perfect relationship. It is possible that the "creditor-debtor thesis" in regards to paper money is an oversimplified model, with the historical precedents of colonial paper money emissions providing an effective counter-example. Conceivably, the majority of debtors would be poorer members of society lacking the political influence of the wealthy merchants and planters, who would make up the creditor class and also control most of the political functions of the colonies and therefore be opposed to paper money emissions and inflation. During the colonial period, however, the mainly aristocratic bodies in control of the affairs of the colonies regularly approved of and renewed currency emissions and often, especially in the middle colonies, protested any limitations Parliament attempted to set on the colonial supply of paper money.²⁹ This early consensus (to use the term loosely) on paper money suggests that the turning point in attitudes towards paper money was a result of the problems faced because of the finances and inflation of the revolution rather than on tensions between creditors and debtors.³⁰ The debates in the Federal Convention point to the same, given the lack of substantial discussion on the creditor-debtor issue and the greater emphasis on the problems with the financial structure of the nation in relation to bills of credit issued by the national and state governments.

The problem of the national debt had still not been resolved, prompting some to argue that paper money might well represent an evil, but a necessary evil. Were the public debt to be paid off in specie, it would well secure the public credit, but in doing so it would also "overwhelm the people" in their ability to pay. Using paper money to clear the debt, however, would have the "great benefit of enabling the public to cancel a debt on easy terms." Cincinnatus, writing in New York, worried that "the new government, by promising too much, [would] involve itself in a disreputable breach of faith, or in a difficulty of complying with it, insuperable."³¹ Implicit in this was the assumption that the new government, despite having greatly expanded powers of finance, would not be able to raise the necessary funds to pay off the debts. Such funds as were necessary either did not exist within the United States either did not exist or represented such a great burden on the people of the States that it would spark distrust in the government from the outset based on enormous imposition of federal taxes necessary to clear the debt. Brutus's concern about the severity of federal taxes leaving states little source of income were echoed in this objection, as the same principle of the unlimited power of the federal government to tax the people of the states informs both arguments.

Perhaps, however, the person to most strongly cleave to these arguments was Luther Martin of Maryland. Martin, despite attending the Federal Convention in Philadelphia, refused to sign the completed document.³² In Philadelphia, expressing his exasperation with the proceedings of the Convention, Martin declared "that he had rather see partial Confederacies take place, than the plan on the table."³³ On returning to Maryland, Martin lamented that "the convention was so smitten with the *paper money dread*, that they insisted the prohibition be *absolute*...the States ought not not to be *totally deprived of the right to emit bills of credit*, and that as

we had *not* given an authority to the general government for that purpose, it was *more necessary* to retain it in the States."³⁴

Luther Martin also found a flaw in the principle behind the prohibition on bills of exchange. Despite having the power to emit bills of credit under the Articles of Confederation and despite the inclusion of that power in the report of the Committee of Detail, which prepared the draft of the Constitution debated, amended, and ultimately adopted by the Federal Convention, the Convention nonetheless decided to omit the power to issue bills of credit. Martin questioned whether, lacking a safety measure in the form of recourse to paper credit, the country would be able to defend itself in the event of war or national emergency.³⁵

Further, Martin saw a contradiction in the Convention's logic. The Convention was willing to entrust nearly unlimited powers to the federal government in other areas, such as taxation (and in the lack of a bill of rights protecting the people from tyranny), but yet would not trust the federal government to responsibly maintain the power to emit bills of credit.³⁶ Martin saw no reason why the Convention felt so strongly that the national government could not be trusted to emit bills of credit but could be trusted to directly tax citizens with few restrictions. The Federal Convention chose to, in the words of Oliver Ellsworth on August 16, "shut and bar the door against paper money."³⁷ For Martin and Rawlins Lowndes of South Carolina, this sort of reaction was unwarranted, especially given the important role that paper money had played in financing the initial stages of the war. Rawlins questioned "what evils had we ever experienced by issuing a little paper money to relieve ourselves from any exigency that pressured us?" Issuing and recalling paper money promptly, so as to discourage inflation, had resulted in "great convenience and advantage" and had "carried us triumphantly through the war," but were, under the Constitution, banned "however great our distress may be."³⁸ Martin agreed that the States and the state of Maryland, whose legislature he addressed the comments to, in particular had benefited from emitting bills of credit in the past in times of need and cautioned that no one could foresee future circumstances which would warrant further emissions.³⁹

Considered in the context of past uses of paper money in the colonies and States, the stances of both Lowndes and Martin appear simultaneously reasonable and out of touch. Looking back to the colonial period, the colonies had successfully emitted bills of credit backed by the promise that they could be redeemed in the future in payment of taxes. For many of the colonies, lacking specie from Britain, this formed an effective scheme of financing up until the first few years of the war, when the taxation system broke down because of the weakness of the Congress. According to Martin and Lowndes, once the financial problems of the war were corrected, and assuming the States handled emissions problems responsibly, that same scheme could be successfully readopted when necessary and thus the delegates to the Federal Convention had taken an unreasonable stance, especially from the perspective of the rights of the States.

Even in light of the financial crisis of the war, Martin and Lowndes's defense of paper money can be viewed as reasonable. Implicit in their argument is the idea that paper money itself was not the root of the financial problems encountered during the war, but rather the unrestrained policy behind the paper money during the war. Paper money itself was seen as a valuable tool, as evidenced by the immediate recourse to Continental emissions almost as soon as the war began. The problem lay more in the lack of means by which to secure their value, namely by implementing national taxes or supplying the Congress with the means by which to force states to comply with its requisitions. A ban on paper money, in the minds of its opponents, did not address the root of the problem which was, in essence, uncontrolled or under-controlled fi-

nancing. It instead cut out the most visible manifestation of the problem, despite the fact that paper could be used effectively as a currency when controlled.

Despite these objections, the prohibition on bills of credit remained in the Constitution, as Martin and Lowndes' appeals to the states were not moving enough to prevent ratification. The issue of bills of credit was not sufficient to rally Antifederalist support against the Constitution. Many Antifederalists, despite other objections to the Constitution, found the limit on bills of credit amenable, especially in light of the problems faced because of over-emissions during the war and the debt problems caused in part by paper emissions, which overshadowed many potential objections. The more salient issue with the Constitution, which far overshadowed the issue of bills of credit, was the lack of a Bill of Rights enumerating the rights of citizens, which would eventually be secured with James Madison's 1789 introduction of the amendments to Congress as the final act of the extended ratification process.

The story of the evolution of paper money presented here culminates in the ratification of the Constitution, a document that strengthened the national government substantially in comparison to the powers enjoyed by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. At the outset of the Revolution it was believed that a proper republic should have the ultimate ideal of securing the welfare of the people as a whole (the common good), which was something only possible in a small state where similar interests aligned in the interest of the public good. A single republic composing all the states, as formed under the Constitution, was not thought possible in 1776.⁴⁰ It was believed that it was better to give people power than to try to restrain power from those ruling because it was ultimately easier to constrain the power of the people than restrain the power of a dictator.⁴¹ This belief culminated in the framing of a weak central government dominated by its constituent parts (i.e. the states) under the Articles of Confederation. It would also serve as one of the main points of contention raised by some Antifederalists during the debates over the ratification of the Constitution, raising both ideological and practical challenges to that notion.⁴²

The concept of "republican virtue," which arose out of those principles, is in many ways key to understanding the shifting status and nature of the public finance systems and the views and opinions of paper money from the colonial period to the ratification of the Constitution. A shift in the reality of the situation concerning the finances of the early United States helped to shift the views of paper money from something that was imminently practicable up until and during part of the War for Independence to a mode of finance viewed as a burden on the economy during the war, creating many of the problems in connection to public and private debts and relationships between the states during and after the war.

Even after the war, when a large portion of the paper bills of credit issued to cover war-time expenses had been withdrawn from circulation, new issues based on the same principles that had supported colonial emissions of bills of credit were viewed with distrust from those same powerful men who had previously recognized their value and had called upon paper money unquestioningly at the outset of the war. Paper money and the inflation crisis of the Revolution had upset a long-standing balance in American society. Before the Revolution, paper money had been viewed as something tied deeply to the community and benefitting the community as a whole by facilitating economic exchanges in the absence of any other viable form of circulating medium. It had allowed for a certain amount of economic independence in the face of the economic dominance that the British had over their colonies by allowing the colonists to loan money against themselves through the security of future redemption via taxation. The debts borne by the colonial societies were against themselves rather than from an outside creditor, making the

colonists liable only to themselves.⁴³ Peletiah Webster had noted this fact as early in the Revolution as 1776, observing that

...the American States owe nothing to any body but themselves, and employ no ships, soldiers, etc. but their own, so that they contract no foreign debt; and I take it to be a clear maxim, that no state can be ruined, bankrupted, or indeed much endangered, by any debt due to itself only...The soldier renders his personal services down on the spot, the farmer his provisions, the tradesman his fabrics, and why should not the monied man pay his money down too? Why should the soldier, tradesman, farmer, etc. be paid in promises, which are not so good as money, if the fulfillment is at a distance?⁴⁴

Debt, in a way, represented a community's commitment to itself. By borrowing against itself and binding the medium of exchange to the very well-being of the community, it was able to secure the value of its money by ensuring that it was well-handled and issued for proper purposes, since any inappropriate emissions would only hurt the very persons in whose name it was issued.

War changed this understanding. The Continental Congress had achieved great unity at the beginning of the Revolutionary War. Most of the powers of the national government were centralized in the Congress. After the war, however, the Congress lost much of its power to the states, which claimed sovereignty in speaking for their citizens. The Congress almost ceased to function as a body, often failing to meet quorum. Sovereignty after the war was a sovereignty that came from below, with idea that people vest power in the state governments and the state governments likewise in the federal government. Should the state legislatures not represent fully represent the interests of the people, it was ultimately the responsibility, duty, and right of the citizens to set up or take down governments as they saw fit to best serve their interests.⁴⁵

When the Continental Congress began to emit bills of credit in its own name following largely successful historical precedent, it could not have known just how much the war would cost and the consequences that the mode of public finance chosen would have on the new nation. At the outset of the movement towards independence, the political mindset of the colonies could be differentiated by region, with New England politics oriented towards "service to society," the politics of the middle colonies preoccupied with obtaining power and influence in order to both strive for the public good and private benefit, and southern politics concerned primarily with maintaining the standing order.⁴⁶ As the needs of the Congress to carry out the war became greater (especially after military reverses in 1780) the business of the Congress became marked by an increased shift of the political culture of the body towards the pragmatic mindset of the middle colonies. It simultaneously moved away from the Puritan, ideological political ideals of New England that had dominated the early stages of the Revolution.⁴⁷

A reflection of these shifts in political ideology is readily visible in the Congress's handling of its finances as the war progressed. The early Congress, forced to respond to the radical actions of the New England states (in particular, Massachusetts) in their resistance to Great Britain and early calls for independence, made these ideologically motivated actions the bulk of their business, including the numerous petitions to the King seeking reconciliation, the Declaration of Independence, and the early measures taken to sustain the war, such as creating the Continental Army and selection of George Washington as commander. Part and parcel of this ideological focus was the relatively unquestioned acceptance of Continental emissions of paper money as a

means to fund the army, despite the fact that, unlike the historical precedents they looked to, the Congress had no power to issue the requisite taxes to instill value in the currency.

The move towards the more pragmatic Congress occurred as a result of the inevitable inflation resulting from the near limitless issue of paper money (the Congress is estimated to have printed more than \$241,000,000 bills of credit alone by the time it ceased printing in 1780; a total of possibly \$400,000,000-\$500,000,000 including state emissions⁴⁸) and the resulting financial crisis that required the Congress to develop some sort of strategy to deal with. The decision of the Congress to stop issuing bills of credit in 1780 and to begin calling in and destroying the old devalued notes to be replaced by "new tenor" notes, which they hoped would better retain their value since less would be in circulation, can be viewed as a step in the direction of the practical. Doing so realized the faults of the old system and attempted to replace it with something more functional.⁴⁹ The same can be said of the appointment of Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance, whose sweeping powers across all facets of government would likely have been viewed as dictatorial were not the need for action to control the spiraling financial woes of the nation absolutely necessary to save the revolution.

The power of the states in the post-war period also reflects this change in ideology. State governments had not yet been formed when the Congress passed the Declaration of Independence; the responsibility for declaring independence therefore fell on what could be considered the sovereign Continental Congress rather than states, as representatives to the Congress were chosen directly by the people without recourse to the colonial legislatures.⁵⁰ When it became clear that independence was inevitable, the new states looked to the Congress for guidance in forming their own governments.⁵¹ Yet, by the end of the war, the Congress had abandoned many powers, notably in this case the power to print money, to the states. The states' rise to power points to the inefficiency of the Congress in managing its affairs as the war progressed. As the Congress increasingly attempted to implement practical measures meant to control and contain its financial problems, the people, as well as the states, began to look towards themselves and their direct representatives to manage their own affairs given the breakdown of the Continental system.

Despite the economic recovery and population boom in the United States after the war, the new political landscape that emerged from the war troubled many. The numerous warnings of contemporaries in private letters and correspondents despairing of crisis in the country and decaying morals of the 1780s were signs that something was felt to be amiss amongst those whose position enabled them to view across broad swaths of the social, political, and economic landscape of the nation.⁵² If the "social distinctions and economic deprivations" described and felt by the people of the post-revolutionary period were truly thought of as "caused by abuses of government," than what better exemplar of an abuse of government than the rampant issue of paper money by that same government, which caused economic deprivation in the form of higher prices, large public debts, and worthless money, as well as allowed speculators to gamble on the fluctuating values of the currency?⁵³

The sense of foreboding amongst the men who played the largest role in the framing of the Constitution stems not from the strictly structural defects of the Articles of Confederation, but rather from what the revolution had wrought, what is considered the "radicalism" of the Revolution: a change in the social structure of the Americas whereby new and "interested" voices in the states became increasingly powerful.⁵⁴ Before the Revolution, the men instrumental in guiding the colonies and later the new nation to independence were of good education and high standing in society and concerned for the well being of society as a whole. The new voices

brought out by the Revolution and the radical concept of democracy were the opposite. These new men were men who looked primarily to serve their own interests and the interests of their direct constituents who usually shared their same concerns. They appeared to many of the Framers as shortsighted and blind to the larger implications of their actions.⁵⁵

The concept and importance of "disinterest" was prominent in the minds of Founding Fathers and framers of the Constitution. It was believed by those men that virtue should be the true aim of the Republic and of government in general; that those in power should be those capable of exhibiting a character of disinterest in matters concerning the common good in order to make a judgment which would ultimately benefit all. Common men were too involved with everyday affairs to remove themselves from a position of interest, leaving those with means as the only men worthy of standing indifferently in the face of interest.⁵⁶ Married to the fear of the concept of "rampant democracy" was the growing economic power of the common person as a result of the Revolution. The war had expanded the internal economy of the states, leading to a greater experience of wealth amongst those formerly alienated from large sources of profit, but also a growing debt in part caused by a drop in demand from the inflated levels of demand required by the war. These factors in turn lead to increased pressure for regulation of internal commerce and standardization and control over common currency, arousing in Federalists the fear that the American republic would soon be transformed into a nation dominated by the economic interests of the common person. This would not be the republic of ideas championed by the revolutionaries, but rather a republic consumed by the idea of consumption and the attainment of luxuries.⁵⁷

Directly intersecting these concerns was paper money. Before the people of the United States lay the example of paper money emitted during the colonial period, which had largely held its value and was critical for the development of internal commerce in the colonial period. Since most of the specie that made it to the colonies was quickly sent out overseas in payment for imports, paper money served as the vital lifeblood that allowed the internal colonial economy to function. Were it not for the various emissions throughout the colonies, commerce would have been impossible.⁵⁸

The relative lack of controversy over paper money before the outbreak of the war for independence is evidence of the necessity of it as currency. Because paper retained its value fairly well (in most cases), it was viewed as being essentially the same as specie, in that it had a set value which was regulated and controlled and acceptable as a medium of exchange since all persons in a given colony were similarly bound to pay the taxes which the bills were issued in anticipation of. Paper money existed in an unquestioned way because it did not upset the *status quo*. Creditors, broadly, favored it because of the way in which it facilitated commerce, which in ultimately enabled them to expand their profits through increased commerce such that they might continue to act as creditors to build webs of dependent debtors giving colonial society some of the attributes of the traditional hierarchical society present in Britain.

Paper money served as a valuable link connecting all parts of society. Creditors were bound to the government of the colonies to give value to the paper they used for commerce through taxation, governments required both creditors and debtors to buy into the system of anticipated taxation in order to meet their expenditures, and debtors were bound to creditors in the form of their debt relationships. In this system, every person played some sort of part. Should any constituent part of the whole fail to play their role the entire financial system would collapse, since money was ultimately based on an abstract concept of anticipation rather than any hard backing. This hierarchical arrangement of society, seen as natural in the colonial period, would

be heavily impacted by the changes brought by the revolution in ways that it could not withstand.⁵⁹

The pre-revolutionary aristocratic ideal of wealth, that of landed property, allowed for the aristocracy to develop for themselves a sense of patrimony and security of interest in the obligations that their wealth allowed them to draw through various networks of dependents.⁶⁰ It was these gentlemen that were able to act to shape the course of the early events of the revolution through the respect they drew and their ability to devote themselves to the political needs of the early nation without worrying about their livelihoods. The unforeseen consequences of their actions meant to secure the liberty and independence of the American colonies were, in the end one of the primary motivating factors behind the "radical" shift in the revolution.

What the Founders did was create and mobilize large amounts of technically non-existent capital through the emissions of Continental and state bills of exchange. By allowing this currency to pass at legal tender while simultaneously issuing more and more to cover the costs of funding the war for independence, the cycle of traditional patronage relationships was broken. Borrowing before the war had often been done on an informal basis, relying on "book accounts" or nonmonetary payments to redeem debts in the absence of circulating specie or lacking sufficient paper money in circulation to cover debts. The sudden overabundance of paper money, as well as the large public debts being simultaneously incurred by the state governments and the Congress, allowed debts to be redeemed using undervalued paper money, switching the advantage in the patronage relationship from creditor to debtor.⁶¹

Increasing the amount of paper money in circulation to a point that exceeded the needs of normal commerce had been looked down upon as dangerous by the aristocratic elements of society before the war. It became the norm as a result of the dramatic spending during the war. Paper money gave those who had previously had little opportunity to advance themselves a chance to move ahead and take on greater roles in society as they were liberated from networks of patronage by the now impersonal nature of legal tender paper. In the new democratic society created by the Revolution, many of these voices began to be heard in the state legislatures and became increasingly influential, to the apparent shock and concern of the Framers of the Constitution.

It is thus no surprise that the Convention that met in 1787, composed mainly of members of the gentry, chose not to simply draw up proposals for amending the Articles of Confederation. The balance of power between the state and national governments was now squarely in the hands of the states, and by extension the state legislatures. Local interest took precedent in the state legislatures over the interests of the greater commonwealth. James Madison especially feared that democracy brought by the revolution had gone too far, a view shared by many of his fellow revolutionary leaders. As the Founding fathers believed in a "patrician-led classical democracy in which 'virtue exemplified in government will diffuse its salutary influence through the society'" it was taken for granted that the entire mode of government, which had allowed the evils of paper money to be perpetuated in the hands of the states, be changed so as to reinforce the virtuous direction that a strong, central government would provide.⁶²

Only with this mode of thinking was it possible for Charles Pinckney to praise the South Carolina legislature for refusing to submit to the whims of the people of the state when they called on the legislature to make paper money a legal tender.⁶³ A different sense of the idea of democracy and republicanism is engendered in this reasoning. The state legislature, the supposed representatives of the people, were praised not for doing the will of the people, as would be expected of a legislative body today, but rather for doing what was thought to be best for the

common good, despite the fact that the making paper a legal tender would have primarily been to the detriment of the gentry and creditors of the state.

The moralistic tone taken against paper money in the form of George Read's apocalyptic censure of paper money, James Madison's description of the omission of the power to emit bills of credit as a "voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice," and the description of paper money as an "engine of iniquity" whose influence was strong enough to "contaminate a society of angels" all heard in the postwar period demonstrate the way in which virtue was construed in terms of paper money.⁶⁴ For a group of men like the framers of the Constitution who were determined to instill the values of virtuous rule in their government, paper money and the resulting "interest" created in men by temptations of paper money were immoral forces to be avoided in the new government. Given that the perceived highest moral good in government was to maintain a level of disinterestedness so as to leave unclouded one's judgment in order to decide what was best for society as a whole, paper money came to be a corrupting force which should be eliminated at any cost in an attempt to preserve the "republican virtue" dreamed of by the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the Constitution. Paper money, by changing from a useful means of public finance to a financial burden easily exploitable by those who stood to benefit from inflation, was an evil that would corrupt the morals of the new Republic. In the words of Benjamin Rush, should the Constitution have "held forth no other advantages [than] that [of] a future exemption from paper money and tender laws, it would be eno' to recommend it to honest men" for the reason of protecting "men of wealth" in the "safety of his bonds and rents against the inroads of paper money and tender laws."⁶⁵

Paper money thus represented a threat to the gentry and their established ideals of republican virtue and disinterestedness. By both allowing for the participation of the public at large in the legislative process at the state level, simultaneously opening the doors to the "interested" demands of the democratic public and threatening the stability of the established gentry creditors, paper money in its new form after the war for independence represented a matter of principle more than a practical matter. The days of paper money issued as a simple expedient to make up for the lack of circulating specie in the colonial era were over, replaced by a new era where paper money had proven itself almost as dangerous an enemy as the British during the War for Independence and was still looked upon with suspicion by the landed gentry and creditors of the new United States. Where the gentry and creditors saw a threat, however, the debtor and country interest saw primarily opportunity for greater participation in their government through the democratizing forces unleashed by the revolution as well as increasing opportunity to capitalize on the rapidly evolving financial system of the new nation. Ultimately, the friends of paper money would win out in the end, with the Jacksonian era of popular, participatory democracy in the early nineteenth century signaling a death knell to the Founder's ideas of a virtuous republic guided by men of aristocratic leanings free from the distractions of everyday life. The effort of the Framers to preserve this idea in the Constitution and circumvent any future problems with paper money was an effort that failed to bear the fruit that they assumed it would.

NOTES

1. Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, New Haven: Yale University Press (1911): I, 137 (Madison, 6 June).

2. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, I, 317-318, 327 (Madison, 19 June; Yates, 19 June).
3. Charles Pinckney, "Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, May 28, 1787," in Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, III, 117-118.
4. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, III, 616; Sherman, "Proposals" in Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, III, 617.
5. Cecelia M. Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1966: lxxxviii-lxxxix.
6. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 308-309 (Madison, 16 August).
7. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 309 (Madison, 16 August).
8. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 310 (Madison, 16 August).
9. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 309-310 (Madison, 16 August).
10. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 309 (Madison, 16 August).
11. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 310 (Madison, 16 August).
12. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 310 (Madison, 16 August).
13. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 303-304.
14. James Madison, "Federalist no. 44" in *The Federalist*, ed. Cass R. Sunstein, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2009: 292-293.
15. Madison, "Federalist no. 44": 293.
16. Madison, "Federalist no. 44": 293-294.
17. Hamilton, "Federalist no. 80": 526.
18. Essays of Brutus, *New York Journal*, 18 October 1787 in *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, ed. Herbert J. Storing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981: 366; Brutus, "Antifederalist no. 17: Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority" in *The Antifederalist Papers*, ed. Morten Bordon, Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1965: 43-44.
19. Pelatiah Webster, "The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some remarks in vindication of the Constitution" in *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States*, ed. Paul L. Ford, New York: Da Capo Press, 1968: 122-123.
20. "Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention," Letters of The Federal Farmer, 23 January 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, 334.
21. Patrick Henry, Speeches in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, 9 June 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, V, 229.
22. Jonathan Elliot, *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787*, Second edition, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1896, III, 566, as quoted in Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, lxxxix; William Grayson, Debates in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 12 June 1788 in Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, 297.
23. Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, lxxxix.
24. Essays by a Farmer, *Baltimore Maryland Gazette*, 22 April 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, V, 112.
25. Charles Turner, Speeches in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, 17 January 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, IV, 219.
26. Essays of Brutus, *New York Journal*, 6 March 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, 435-436.
27. Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*: 66.
28. Richard Henry Lee, Letters from a Federal Farmer, 8 October 1787 in Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, 203.
29. E. James Ferguson, "Currency Finance: An Interpretation of Colonial Monetary Practices," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (April 1953): 155, 157.
30. E. James Ferguson reaches a similar conclusion concerning the confidence of the people in paper money in "Currency Finance": 167; Ferguson further argues that that the distrust was most felt amongst the propertied classes most while still being looked upon as having some utility by the majority of people, leading to calls for renewal of paper systems after the end of the war. By this reasoning, it is easy to explain why a strong defense of bills of credit was not heard in the Federal Convention or in the various state ratifying conventions and why what defense was heard centered on the past utility of paper money.
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32. Jackson T. Main, *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution 1781-1788*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961: 213-214.
33. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, I, 445 (Madison, 28 June).

34. Luther Martin, "The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, 1788" in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, 64; emphasis in the original.
35. Luther Martin, "The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, 1788" in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, 56.
36. Luther Martin, "The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, 1788" in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, II, 56-57.
37. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 309 (Madison, 16 August).
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41. Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*: 23.
42. Richard B. Morris, *The Forging of the Union, 1781-1789*, New York: Harper & Row (1987): 307.
43. Christine Desan, "From Blood to Profit: Making Money in the Practice and Imagery of Early America," *Journal of Policy History* 20, no. 1 (January 2008): 30-32.
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47. H. James Henderson, *Party Politics in the Continental Congress*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974: 247.
48. Robert Becker, "Currency, taxation, and finance, 1775-1787" in *A Companion to the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000: 389; Gordon S. Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution" in *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, ed. Richard R. Beeman et al., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (1987): 77.
49. Worthington C. Ford, ed. *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1780, XVI, 205, 206; XIX, 376*.
50. Morris, *Forging of the Union*: 59, 57.
51. *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1776, IV, 342*.
52. Gordon Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness": 70-71.
53. Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*, New York: A.A. Knopf (1992): 5.
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55. Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness": 74-75.
56. Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness": 84-87.
57. Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness": 77-81; Charles Turner, Speeches in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, 17 January 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, IV, 219.
58. Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*: 65.
59. See Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*: 19, 57, 66-68.
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63. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, I, 137 (Madison, 6 June).
64. Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, II, 310 (Madison, 16 August); Madison, "Federalist no. 44": 293; William Grayson, Debates in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 12 June 1788 in Kenyon, *The Antifederalists*, 297; Essays by a Farmer, Baltimore *Maryland Gazette*, 22 April 1788 in Storing, *The Complete Anti-Federalist*, V, 112.
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